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This research focuses on the use of dynamic optimisation modelling techniques to 
describe the interactions between the economy and the environment. 
The environment not only provides us with economical1y valuable resources but 
also provides us ,with many essential services that support human welfare. Over-
exploitation of these resources and the destruction of the natural environment not 
only affects human welfare but may severely limit future production possibilities. 
For natural resources to continue to be inputs to production and to ensure equal 
access to environmental services by future generations, all ecological systems must 
remain in operation. The issue is how we treat our natural resources so that we 
have a sustainable economy. 
In this thesis, models are formulated that combine the economic and 
environmental processes. Current environmental concerns are incorporated into 
the framework of economic optimisation problems. The issues addressed are: 
1. The competition for land of preservation and development. What is the optimal 
balance between the two? 
2. Pollution from production can have negative effects on the environme~t. This 
in turn can affect the economy through diminished resource supply. What is 
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the optimal use of these environmental resources so that we can sustain our 
productive capabilities? 
3. Carbon emissions need to be controlled. A tax on emissions would encourage 
switching away from carbon intensive fuels. How should this tax behave over 
time - should it rise or fall? 
4. With increasing populations, resources are being used up dramatically. Can 
we get to a point where the economy can be sustained while maximising human 
welfare? 
5. What happens to a private firm's output decisions when it has to conform to 
environmental regulations? 
The models are useful for studying sustainable development in that they provide 
us with the steady state relations of a sustainable economy and, in some cases, the 




Before the main thesis is presented, it is important to discuss current 
environmental issues so that the areas the work is concerned with can be set in 
context. It is necessary to briefly describe the problems that we face today so as 
to give a background to the work and to see why it is important that 
environmental considerations are taken into account. It would be foolish to 
launch into such work without knowing what the motives are behind it and why 
the work is being carried out. 
In Section I, there will be a discussion of the current issues that this thesis is 
concerned with, 'such as deforestation, global warming and population pressures. 
In Section II there will be a brief discussion about sustainable development and the 
importance the environment plays in supporting human life. 
In Section III there will be a summary of the thesis and how this bears on the 
environmental and sustainable development issues that have been discussed. 
SECTION I 
Deforestation 
Tropical forests cover 9% of the earth's surface or 1,260 million hectares (FAO 
1988). Around 7 million hectares are lost every year and over half of that is in 
Latin America alone. Overall there is a deforestation rate of 0.6% and the rate of 
disappearance is accelerating. For example, Brazil accounts for 67% of the 
Amazonian tropical forest. Before 1975 there was very little loss of the forest, 
perhaps 0.6% of the total area, but from 1975 to 1985 the deforestation rate grew 
at a rate of 11%.{Barbier et a/1991). 
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The focus of attention on tropical rain forests has arisen because they have many 
important ecological and environmental functions to serve and there is an 
increasing threat to their existence. Tropical forests absorb carbon dioxide 
through photosynthesis. They retain and release water into the atmosphere and 
regulate the regional climate. The loss of forest cover will change the reflectivity 
of the earth's surface. If the forests are burned, then the carbon dioxide that they 
have absorbed is released into the atmosphere and so contributes to the 
greenhouse effect, (see below). Deforestation will have serious impacts on 
regional, global and local climates. 
Tropical rain forests are crucial for the protection of biological diversity. They 
are home to millions of wildlife and plant species and scientists believe that only a 
tiny fraction of species have been identified. Deforestation will mean that millions 
of species will lose their homes and may become extinct. Tropical rain forests are 
also valued for their existence; people desire the very existence of these resources, 
irrespective of whether they use them or not. They are valued for educational and 
medicinal purposes; the forests provide timber and non-timber products such as 
resins, honey, nuts and the increasing loss of forest cover will destroy the 
essential services provided by the forest. 
Tropical rain forests are relatively open access areas and so harvesting and 
converting them for development purposes are undertaken without any common 
property management of the resource. Therefore users will not take into account 
the full environmental costs they are imposing. The forest is not being managed 
in a sustainable manner. 
The most important cause of forest loss is the conversion of forest land for 
agricultural purposes. The traditional practice of "slash and burn" agriculture has 
been used for thousands of years in an environmentally sound way. Most of the 
tropical forest soils are of low fertility and so are not suited to continuous 
cultivation. New forest cultivators bring with them farming practices that are not 
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suited to the forest and pursue continuous cropping until the soil is completely 
degraded and unable to restore itself. 
Barbier et ai's paper examines deforestation in three countries; Brazil, Indonesia 
and Zaire. In Brazil deforestation is attributable mostly to cattle ranching, which 
is estimated to contribute 73 - 88% of deforestation. The establishment of 
settlements by farmers have also contributed to a high degree of deforestation in 
Brazil. Most of the deforestation is a direct consequence of deliberate 
Government policy. Development strategies financed by the Government through 
subsidies and incentives have favoured the expansion of the forest destruction. 
They point out that a typical subsidised cattle project in the Amazon would have a 
net return of 2.5 times the investors outlay. However, without subsidies the 
project would make a net loss of 0.9 times the outlay. There are also 
Government policies such as the land tax system that encourages owners of large 
farms to convert their forests for development purposes and in doing so they are 
exempt from land tax. 
In Indonesia 97% of the forests are in the Outer Islands. The major source of 
deforestation is the migration of people from the Inner Islands. Since 1979, 
approximately 540,000 families have resettled in the Outer Islands. Zaire 
contains approximately 10% of the world's tropical forests and 180,000 hectares 
of forest are estimated to be cut down every year. The main cause of 
deforestation is the settlement of small holding farms in the forest. Demand for 
fuelwood is also a primary cause as this is the most common energy source. With 
a well managed system of forest resources, sustainable development could be 
achieved without the tropical forests being completely destroyed. The areas that 
need to be addressed are population pressure, transmigration of people and 
misguided government policy. 
Miller et al (1993), point out many causes of deforestation. Firstly, increasing 
populations in developing countries places ever greater demand on their resource 
base, but one of the main causes they point out is misguided Government policies. 
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Forestlands in developing countries were owned by local tribes and local farming 
communities. The practices they used for hunting farming and grazing were 
based on traditional customs that effectively regulated the use of the forest. In 
the last forty years, they point out that 80% of the worlds tropical rain forests 
have been bought under the ownership of national governments, resulting in 
government having the rights of forest control. There is no longer now the 
incentive to conserve the forest resources. They also discuss the fact that 
deforestation is being triggered in many rain forest regions as title to land is 
granted to those who 'improve' the land by converting it to another use. Those 
who would exercise traditional sustainable practices would not normally be given 
title to the land. Also, landless people may find that their tenure is insecure and 
so are less likely to practice sustainable forest use than if they owned the land. 
They will farm intensively so as to obtain the maximum immediate financial gain in 
case they loose t~eir tenure of the land. 
Governments are also subsidising the exploitation of the forest through investment 
subsidies and tax incentives. In Brazil, corporations that invest in Amazonian 
development are given investment tax credits against income tax liabilities. 
Subsidised credit is also given to crop and livestock development of the forest, 
thereby diverting developments to the Amazonian region. National governments 
also allocate significant funds to infrastructure development, the motives for which 
are economic and social and also to secure national boundaries. 
The third cause of deforestation is from international pressures. There is 
increasing pressure to finance immediate development needs by liquidating forest 
capital. The external debt problem exerts a powerful incentive to exploit the 
forests. The forests are one of the only resources that can be converted to much 
needed immediate revenue for debt servicing 
Miller et al also point out that behind many of the flawed government policies is 
faulty economic analysis concerning the use of forest resources. The fourth cause 
they discuss of deforestation is that the true value of the forest and the true cost of 
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its exploitation are not calculated correctly. The common value put to forests is 
the value of the timber or the agricultural potential of cleared land. There is a 
need to evaluate the unpriced services of the forests so that attention can focus on 
the full environmental costs of deforestation. The non-timber products sustain 
much of the forest population who depend on nuts berries, fish and honey. These 
products do not reach the market place and so the value of the products is 
ignored. Some products do however reach the market place for instance, resins, 
essential oils and medicinals and this can provide a considerable income for those 
who collect them. Indeed the income gained from collection of forest products 
can be very large. In the 1980's, Indonesia exported $125 million of non-timber 
products annually. These are sustainable practices that could yield sustainable 
incomes. A study on Peru found that the net earnings from the sale of non-timber 
products were 13 times greater than the net earnings from the sale of the forest 
timber, (Miller et al (1993». 
The costs of exploitation are not borne by those who benefit from such practices. 
The costs will accrue to innocent parties, usually future generations. The 
company that is dutting down trees in the forest will not bear the cost of the loss 
of watershed, local farmers and communities will be affected by flooding or 
increased saJinisation of the waterways they depend on. The full costs and 
benefits need to be internalised - they need to be accounted for in the actions of 
those that destroy the forest. There is a need to evaluate the unpriced services of 
the forests and the full costs of exploitation so that attention can focus on the full 
environmental costs of deforestation. 
However, the industrialised world has no right to criticise the developing countries 
for the policies that encourage deforestation. Why should the developing 
countries not exploit their resources, all other countries have done and still do? 
After all, that is how industrialised countries have developed into the economic 
forces they are today. Industrialised countries now call for conservation 
measures in the developing countries; this shows no sensitivity for their 
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development objectives. The only way forward is for industrialised countries to 
encourage policies and practices that are sustainable and so sustainable economic 
growth can be achieved. For instance, industrialised countries should only import 
timber from well managed sustainable forests. Governments should be 
encouraged to invest in non-timber products, which have been shown capable of 
yielding more revenue than timber products. Government interference in the 
market for timber and agriculture give distorted price signals, making timber 
extraction and clearance more profitable. If markets were allowed to function 
more efficiently then it would be more profitable to exploit the forest for non-
timber products. 
The adverse effects that clearing land has on the economy in the relatively near 
future, such as reduced agricultural output due to soil degradation and thereby 
reduced employment need to be made clear to national governments. 
Developing countries should not be criticised for investing in infrastructure, this is 
essential for economic growth, but should be encouraged not to clear areas and 
open them for up agricultural use so as to try and relieve unemployment and 
poverty when these areas have soil conditions that are unsuitable for agricultural 
practices. Other policies. are needed to help reduce the external debt these 
countries face and to encourage overall economic growth so that subsistence 
agriculture is not the staple form of income. 
Global Warming 
Cline (1991) gives a clear account of the greenhouse effect. Radiation is emitted 
from any substance in space. The wavelength of this radiation is inversely related 
to the temperature of that substance. The sun's radiation is therefore in the 
shorter wavelength band (0.2 to 0.4 micrometers) whereas the radiation emitted 
from the earth is in the long-wave bands (4 - 100 micrometers). The greenhouse 
gases, such as carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons, methane, and water vapour are 
transparent to short-wave radiation, thus letting in the sun's radiation, but don't 
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allow the long-wave radiation to pass through. Thus the sun heats up the earth 
and a portion of this heat is not able to escape. This is known as the greenhouse 
effect. 
Most of the greenhouse effect has come from natural causes , primarily from 
water vapour. But since the industrial revolution anthropogenic, or man-made 
emissions, have increasingly added to the effect as emissions of carbon dioxide 
have risen by about 25%. This has been largely as a consequence of burning 
fossil fuels. 
Cline also gives us some interesting figures. Radiation is measured in watts per 
square metre (W mo2). Radiation from the sun (the incoming radiation), is 340 W 
mo2. Part of the earth's surface, such as snow and clouds, reflects radiation; they 
reflect 100 W mo2 back into space. There is a remaining 240 W mo2 and it is this 
that warms the ,earth's surface from OoC to 18°C. The earth emits its own 
radiation equal to 420 W mo2 from the surface. The greenhouse gases deflect 180 
W mo2 back to the earth thereby warming it by another 33°C. The radiation that 
is let through (420 - 180 = 240) exactly equals the incoming radiation from the 
sun (340 - 100 = 240). 
Cline states that the annual emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel burning is 
5.4 billion tonnes of carbon (GtC). Deforestation contributes approximately 1.6 
GtC. Much of the emissions are absorbed by the oceans. The surface oceans 
hold 1,000 GtC and the deep ocean holds 38,000 GtC. The forests hold 550 GtC 
and the soil 1,500 GtC. The stock of carbon dioxide stored in the atmosphere 
amounts to 750 GtC. 
The most important of the anthropogenic greenhouse gases is carbon dioxide. 
The burning of fossil fuels is the prime cause of emissions. In 1992 over 95% of 
carbon dioxide emissions in the UK came from the burning of fossil fuels. The 
UK contributes about 2 per cent of global emissions of CO2. Emissions in the 
UK in 1992 were less than 1 % higher than in 1982, but were 15% less than in 
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1970 when power stations and industry emitted more CO2• Methane (C~) is the 
second most important gas. The global yearly emissions of e~ into the 
atmosphere is approximately 500 million tonnes. Out of that, man-made 
emissions amount to 360 million tonnes of which the UK is responsible for about 
1.3%. The main sources of methane emissions are livestock (32%), landfill waste 
disposal sites (41%) and coal mining (14%). Emissions in 1992 were 7% less 
than in 1982 and also 7% lower than in 1970, (Digest of Environmental Protection 
and Water Statistics 1994). 
The greenhouse effect is different to any other environmental problem. Where 
the effects of most kinds of pollution can be felt within a couple of years, or at 
least in one generations lifetime, the greenhouse effect may last for several 
centuries and so can be regarded as virtually irreversible. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which was set up by the World Meteorological 
Organisation and the United Nations Environment Programme in 1988, argue that 
if the atmospheric concentration of CO2 were to double there would be a rise in 
the mean temperatures of between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees Celsius (Houghton et at 
(1990». 
They predict that the higher temperatures will cause the sea water to expand and 
the glaciers and ice caps to melt and so cause the sea level to rise. The IPee 
report predicted that the sea level would rise by about 65 centimetres by the end 
of the next century. There will be other changes too: the warmer climate will 
result in the extinction of some species as they may well be unable to adapt to the 
change; rainfall may be reduced; there may be an increase in tropical storms; 
some regions may find they are no longer able to grow food. 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency estimated the cost of 
protecting US cities by sea walls if there was a rise in the sea level of 1 metre, as 
$100 billion. They also estimated that with a 1 metre rise in sea level, Bangladesh 
would lose 20% of its land (Beckerman 1991). It is expected that the effects of 
climate change will fall unequally on the worlds regions. Places that are 
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characteristically cold such as Russia may actually benefit from the warmer 
weather, but arid areas may find that marginal agricultural land become as 
unproductive as a desert. They will have a diminished ability to grow food. 
The IPCC report only examines the effects of doubling CO2 concentrations from 
pre-industrial levels. The known reserves of fossil fuels are substantial enough to 
permit burning them until well after the doubling point has been reached. Cline 
{l992) argues that if fossil fuel burning continued fast enough so that resources 
were exhausted in 300 years, then the concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere would be 6 times the pre-industrial level in approximately the year 
2200. 
At the Rio de Janeiro "Earth Summit" in 1992 the world agreed to ward off the 
build up of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The 
rich countries agreed that nations should stabilise emissions of CO2 at the 1990 
level by the year 2000. In 1995 a UN conference on climate change was held in 
Berlin to assess what progress has been made since Rio. The result was that 
there has been virtually no progress made to date. A group of 30 Caribbean, 
Pacific and Indian islands want the rich countries to reduce their CO2 emission by 
20% from 1990 levels by 2005 for fear of sea levels rising and flooding lowland 
areas. Rich countries are unlikely to even meet their Rio target. OPEC countries 
never agreed to anything at Rio as their economies would be badly hit by falling 
demand for their oil. It is likely that America, Canada and the European Union 
will not meet their targets as there is more concern for employment than the 
environment. Germany is, however, likely to meet its target and reunification has 
closed down antique eastern coal-burning industries (Economist, 1995). 
It was argued that even if these targets were met the growing emissions from poor 
countries would overtake the rich countries emissions by 2010. Of concern is 
what happens in China, with its increasing population and thirst for development. 
The rich countries are reluctant to make the effort to reduce emissions when poor 
countries have committed themselves to nothing, (Economist, 1995). 
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Acid Rain 
Acid rain is the term used for the deposition of acidic substances from rain and 
other forms of moist air. In fact these substances can be deposited by dry 
particles as well. Oxides of Sulphur, S02, and Nitrogen, N02, are released from 
both natural and man-made sources. In Europe, anthropogenic emissions of 
S02 account for 90% of total emissions, mainly coming from power stations. 
The remaining 10% come from natural sources such as sea spray, plankton and 
volcanoes. Half the emissions of N02 are from anthropogenic sources (Blunden 
and Reddish (1991». They are dispersed into the air and then physically 
transported downwind where they will undergo a chemical transformation. 
Emissions of S02 remain in the atmosphere for very long distances and usually 
travel distances of hundreds of kilometres. While it is in the air it can have its 
proportion of oxygen increased - it can be oxidised and result in the oxide S03. If 
it is still a gas the reaction that takes place with the S03 is very slow, but if it is 
absorbed into droplets of fog or water the reaction is much faster. The S03 
reacts with the water and forms sulphuric acid H2S04. This is then deposited on 
the ground. 
In a report funded by the US Congress called the National Acid Rain Precipitation 
Assessment Program (1989), it was found that 14% of 1,290 lakes in the 
Adirondacks in New York and 23% of2,098 lakes in Florida were acidified. In 
fact the trout populations of these lakes have died due to the effects of acid rain. 
They also found that in many of the national parks sulphuric acid which is 
produced from sulphur emissions were responsible for 50% to 60% of the 
degradation in visibility. The deposits of acid also appeared to intensify the 
effects of natural stresses upon the red spruce tree in the eastern mountain-top 
locations. 
The effects of acid rain are mainly the reduction of pH values in lakes and. rivers, 
resulting in the loss of aquatic life in commercial fisheries, direct damage to leaf 
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surfaces of trees and crops and the acidification of soils which can damage forest 
and crop cover. 
Ozone depletion 
Just above the troposphere, which is the portion of the atmosphere closest to the 
earth, lies the stratosphere. The ozone present in this layer of the atmosphere has 
a crucial role to play, it absorbs the ultraviolet rays from the sun. Thus the 
stratospheric ozone is a shield to protect people, plants and animals from harmful 
radiation. 
In 1985 a hole was discovered in the ozone layer over Antarctica. Since then the 
concentration of this protective stratospheric gas has been thinning allowing more 
of the sun's harmful rays to penetrate to the earth's surface. Ozone destruction is 
caused mainly by anthropogenic substances such as Chloroflourocarbons (CFCs), 
which are used as aerosol propellants, coolants, cleaners, frothers used for making 
plastic foam, halons used in fire extinguishers and air conditioning for cars and 
buildings. 
The alternatives to CFCs are hydrochloroflourocarbons (HCFCs), and 
hydroflourocarbons (HFCs). These substitute compounds are not satisfactory 
substitutes for environmentalists. While HFCs do not attack the ozone, HCFCs, 
do albeit at a far less vicious rate than CFCs. Also all these chemicals are 
greenhouse gases and so trap the sun's heat and add to global warming. 
Environmental groups are now pushing for the use of hydrocarbon gases such as 
propane and butane which had been used in refrigerators before CFCs took over. 
In Germany, use of these gases were introduced in refrigerators in 1992 and have 
since become very popular and now other companies are entering the market. 
Under the Montreal Protocol, countries are phasing out production of these CFCs. 
This was drawn up at the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer in Vienna in 1985. Under the Protocol, the use of CFC's was to be 
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frozen at the 1986 levels by 1989, and cut to 80% of this level by 1994. The 
Protocol was tightened in June 1990 to achieve reductions of 50% by 1995 and 
85% by 1997. Indeed the UK and United States have announced that they plan 
for a complete phase out by the year 2000. The Protocol gave developing 
countries a grace period of 10 years. Most of the industrialised countries have 
now signed the Protocol and these countries account for most of the global use of 
CFCs. 
Population 
Underlying almost all environmental concerns is the relentless growth in the 
human population. The simple fact is that population growth puts pressure on 
both environmental and economic systems. The prospects for development may 
actually be increased by population growth. But population growth contributes 
to the depletion <;>f natural resources and in so doing so will impede development 
and reduce environmental quality. 
The population growth that the world is currently witnessing threatens the 
quantity and quality of natural resources and the capacity of the environment to 
assimilate waste from the economic process. The sheer fact that the earth has a 
finite amount of space indicates that a growing population must eventually lead to 
crowding and congestion that would one day be very unpleasant and destructive. 
We can already see land being increasingly eaten up for housing, development and 
agriculture; this can be most drastically observed in the developing countries 
where forests are being cut down at an alarming rate. In the rainforest areas 
particularly, land is increasingly being ploughed up for agricultural purposes, 
increasing population is placing ever greater demand on their resource base. In 
1987 The World Commission on Environment and Development concluded that 
with the current deforestation rate and the expected growth in world population 
and economic activity, there would be little virgin rainforest left outside of forest 
preserves beyond the year 2000 (Miller et al (I 993». 
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The increasing demands as well as the sheer size of numbers means that 
population increases willlimit environmental quality and our ability for economic 
growth. However, the absolute level of population is not the only issue, the 
geographic regional distribution also has important environmental implications. 
Any concentration of people will have important implications for the surrounding 
environment and the quality of life that exists there. 
SECTION II 
Sustainable Development 
The environment provides us with the infrastructure that without which our 
economy could not survive. All economic activity is based on those resources 
found in nature. Current over-exploitation of the worlds natural resources and 
destruction of natural environments jeopardises the future possibilities of obtaining 
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environmental services from these areas and so threatens the future world 
economy. For flows of these natural materials and energy to continue to be 
inputs in our productive processes, all ecological systems must remain in 
operation. Renewable resources must be able to maintain their regenerative 
capabilities, the environment must retain the capacity to break down waste that 
pollutes natural areas, and non-renewable resources must be used up at a slow 
enough rate so that they can be substituted for renewable resources. 
We must ensure equal access to environmental services by different generations. 
Intergenerational equity relates to fairness and justice between different 
generations. It may be possible to grow more trees, set aside land to revert back 
to wilderness but in many cases environmental losses that occur are irreversible. 
This irreversibility means the removal of an option for future generations. Once a 
tropical rain forest has been puIJed down and the land used for development, it is 
impossible to recreate it due to loss of species, loss of soil fertility and alt~ring of 
the water table. Desertified land is very difficult to reclaim. 
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Apart from the productive function of the environment, which provides us with 
useful energy and material inputs in the economic process, the environment also 
provides us with important services that are essential in supporting human welfare. 
The natural environment provides us with recreational, cultural, educational, 
scientific and aesthetic services and also maintains the climate and ecological 
cycles and functions. The need for preserving our environment is becoming an 
increasingly important issue. The biosphere is home to a diverse range of species, 
including ourselves, and the greater it is damaged the less hospitable the 
environment becomes for those that live there. 
What is important is to have a sustainable economy. The issue is how we should 
treat our natural environments in order that they can play their part in sustaining 
the economy as an improved source of standard of living. 
A statement fron:t the World Bank Development Report 1984 says: 
"Degradation and destruction of environmental systems and natural 
resources are now assuming massive proportions in some 
developing countries, threatening continued, sustainable 
development. It is now generally recognised that economic 
development itself can be an important contributing factor to 
growing environmental problems in the absence of appropriate 
safeguards. A greatly improved understanding of the natural 
resource base and environment systems that support national 
economies is needed if patterns of development that are sustainable 
can be determined and recommended to governments. " (World 
Bank Development Report 1984). 
The concept of sustainable development (SO) has become a key issue in 
environment-ecological science. Robert M. Solow (1991) quoted from a 
UNESCO document that: 
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"every generation should leave water, air and soil resources as pure 
and unpolluted as when it came to earth." 
But, as Solow argues, carrying out this obligation in unfeasible and not even 
desirable for this would mean that to leave the earth as we found it there could be 
no use of the earth's natural resources, no construction on the land and no roads 
could be built. This is clearly not desirable and not the basis of SD. 
Solow's idea of SD is: 
"an obligation to conduct ourselves so that we leave to the future 
the option or the capacity to be as well off as we are." (Solow 
1991) 
The clearest and most widely used definition of SD is reflected in the publication " 
Our Common I"uture", (WCED 1987), or sometimes called "The Brundtland 
Report", by the World Commission on Environment and Development. The 
WCED was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1983. 
They define SD as: 
"Development is sustainable if it satisfies present needs without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs. " (WCED, 1987). 
The environment and its ecosystems clearly play an important role in trying to 
achieve SD. The goal of SD therefore is to achieve a level of economic welfare 
that can be perpetuated for many generations in the future and to establish a viable 
path for economic development that is compatible with environmental quality, 
The yield from renewable resources also needs to be maintained in such a way that 
they are not eliminated or degraded in some way that their usefulness for future 
generations is reduced. Renewable resources should be harvested so that the 
yield can be sustained over time rather than being extracted until they become 
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extinct. A tropical rain forest is an example of a renewable resource that is often 
not harvested sustainably. Such amenities are regularly extracted to such a level 
that the natural regeneration potential is threatened. 
The idea is that there is some minimum level at which the resource, such as a 
fishery, can survive. If the yield associated with this resource level is exceeded, 
then the resource is unsustainable. This is sometimes called the maximum 
sustainable yield - it is the maximum amount of the resource crop that can be 
safely harvested so that the resource is sustained over time. This is the principle 
on which international fishery agreements are based. 
In the quest for SO it therefore becomes evident that a transition is required away 
from economic growth based on the extraction of non-renewable natural resource 
stocks and towards economic growth based on renewable resources. A 
permanently dec~easing environmental stock cannot support increasing or constant 
levels of economic growth. SO would imply depleting the stock of a non-
renewable natural resource at a slow enough rate to ensure that there is a high 
probability of a transition to a renewable resource producing the same economic 
output when the non-renewable resource becomes more costly. An example 
would be to extract petroleum at such a rate so that it can be substituted for a now 
cheaper renewable resource such as solar power. Thus we need long term 
planning to guide this transition from non-renewable to renewable natural 
resources rather than leaving it to market forces. When the price of a non-
renewable resource drops, e.g. petroleum in the 80's, demand for that resource 
will increase, encouraging increased depletion of the resource. In such a case the 
market is not reflecting its future scarcity. Economic activities must be 
compatible with the functions of the environment. Therefore long term planning 
is required to achieve sustainability. 
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SECTION III 
Summary of thesis 
The research in this thesis is concerned with the contribution of environmental and 
resource economics to sustainable development. Within the work, conventional 
theories of natural resource scarcity are contrasted with the alternative analysis. 
Conventional theories treat natural resources as those resources that provide 
economically valuable productive services, while the alternative approach 
recognises the fact that there is a great deal of environmental-economic 
interaction. The main objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the physical 
dependence of economic activity on the sustainability of crucial natural resource 
systems. 
From the previous discussions it can be seen that the environment provides us 
with many important functions - recreational, cultural, educational, scientific and 
aesthetic and also maintains the climate and ecological cycles. The focus of this 
thesis is to incorporate these issues into the framework of economic optimisation 
problems. A brief outline of the subject matter of each chapter of the thesis now 
follows. 
Chapter 4 .. The Competition between Preservation and Development for Land 
Use. 
In the first chapter the issue of competition for land use is analysed. There is 
increasing pressure on the land to be preserved but there is also the need to 
develop the land for production and living. Developing the land renders our 
natural environment and resources more scarce and so puts our future prospects 
of development at risk. They are therefore in direct competition with each other 
for land use. In this chapter the competition between these two uses is analysed 
under the constraint that conversion of the natural area for development purposes 
represents an irreversible development. The optimal division between 
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preservation and development is determined along with the optimal time path of 
investment in developing the land. 
This chapter is an extension of a previous paper by Fisher et al (1972), who 
formulate a general model for the allocation of land between preservation and 
development. By applying the Maximum Principle, the investment path is chosen 
to maximise discounted utility subject to the constraint that investment is 
irreversible. In their paper, they showed that the optimal development path for a 
given area of land is given by a sequence of investment intervals. This chapter is 
an extension to their paper and shows that there is a singular arc solution to the 
optimal control problem and that it is optimal to reach the singular arc in the 
shortest amount of time possible and then freeze further investment in 
development. This means that all investment should be concentrated at the 
beginning of the plan and is in direct contrast to the conclusions reached by Fisher 
et at. Specific functional forms are used for the benefit functions of preservation 
and development so that the solution can be fully characterised. Their paper is 
also extended by changing the dynamic constraint on investment from one 
implying constant returns to increasing investment, to one of decreasing returns to 
investment. This illustrates that the easiest land to be developed would be 
developed first and then from then on the land would become more difficult to 
develop. Developing this marginal land would require greater investment and 
would imply decreasing returns to investment. The result is to change the optimal 
path of investment to one under which investment should be undertaken gradually 
over time. 
Chapter 5 - Sustainable Economic Development and Natural Resource Use in 
a Polluted Environment. 
We know that pollution flows from the economic process and collects into a stock 
in the natural environment and that this in tum lowers human welfare by affecting 
people's health or the aesthetic properties of the environment. Pollution can also 
have an effect on the regeneration of renewable resources, for instance, the effect 
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that acid rain depositions have on tropical rain forests, or the effect of pollution in 
rivers and oceans on the growth rate of fish. Pollution can also negatively affect 
the rate at which the environment is able to clean itself up. This chapter 
addresses these issues in a dynamic optimisation model where the problem is to 
find the conditions under which the economic growth path is sustainable. 
In this chapter a model is formulated in which a renewable resource is extracted 
from the environment and used in the production process along with capital 
services. Productive activity generates a flow of pollution, which in tum builds 
up as a stock in the environment. This stock of pollution has a negative impact 
on the regenerative capacity of the renewable natural resource and also affects the 
assimilative capacity (the natural self-purification process) of the environment. 
The problem is to choose a time path for harvesting the resource so as to 
maximise some objective functional whose arguments are the time . path of 
consumption and the stock of pollution. Social welfare at any point in time 
depends on the flow of consumption and the quality of the environment. 
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle is used to derive the optimal solution and the 
steady state values of the variables of interest. The effects that changes in the 
parameters of the model have on the steady state solutions are also analysed. 
Sufficient conditions for the existence of the steady state are given and it is shown 
that when the discount rate is small enough all bounded solutions converge to a 
unique steady state. 
Chapter 6 - Population Growth and Environmental Preservation. 
This chapter concentrates on the pressure a growing population puts on the 
depletion of our natural resources where extraction of the resource causes 
irreversible damage to the environment. It deals with the scenario of an economy 
that possesses a single renewable resource that is extracted from a pre-existing 
pool. The resource is self-replenishable. This situation could apply to the 
cutting down of trees where the forest re-seeds itself There are no controls on 
regeneration - no additional inputs, e.g. fertiliser. It is managed only by cropping. 
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The resource is used in the production of a single composite commodity which is 
either consumed or invested. Depletion of the resource, however, causes 
irreversible damage to the natural environment. The objective is to find the 
optimal extraction rate so as to maximise welfare given that the population is 
growing at a constant rate. The implications of making the population growth 
rate endogenous - a function of per capita consumption and capital per capita are 
examined. This is an extension of a paper by Cigno (1981) in which he does not 
develop this argument into a fonnal optimisation model or take into account 
environmental considerations. 
It is found that an optimal and sustainable consumption and resource harvesting 
policy does exist and also the conditions that are necessary for the steady state to 
exist are given. It is shown that when the rate of discount is small enough all 
bounded solutions converge to a unique steady state. A comparative statics 
analysis shows that if there is a greater preference to deplete the resource early, 
i.e. there is a greater preference for current consumption, then future generations 
will be deprived of some output possibilities. Sustainable development requires 
that the options of future generations are not diminished. If we use up natural 
resources at too fast a rate then we are removing an option for future generations. 
Chapter 7 - The Optimal Time Path of a Carbon Tax. 
The by product that is emitted into the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is 
carbon dioxide, CO2, and this has been discusssed in Section I. The need to 
control these emissions arises because of the externalities that are incurred by 
other members of society. These costs are not taken into consideration by 
individuals, therefore the objective of environmental policy should be to internalise 
these costs. A tax on carbon emissions would have the effect of creating the 
incentive to switch away from carbon intensive fuels and would encourage 
efficient energy use. 
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Much of the concern in the literature has been with the question of what level of 
carbon tax is required to reduce CO2 emissions and it is argued by Ulph and Ulph 
(1994) that what matters is the time path of the tax. A falling carbon tax would 
encourage the delayed depletion of non-renewable resources but as the damage 
arising from global warming is an increasing function of the level CO2 emissions, 
then maybe the correct policy is a rising tax rate. This chapter criticises the 
mathematics of Ulph and Ulph and solves their model for the optimal time path of 
the variables and the steady state. This will be an extension to a paper by 
Chappell and Dury (1994) entitled: 
"On The Optimal Depletion of a Non-Renewable Natural Resource under 
Conditions of Increasing Marginal Extraction Costs". 
The model in this chapter also extends the Ulph and Ulph analysis to incorporate 
increasing marginal costs of extraction and it is shown that the model can be 
solved in general for the time path of the carbon tax without having to make 
simplifying assumptions about some of the parameters as in Ulph and Ulph's 
analysis. The social1y optimal time path for the carbon tax is found and shown to 
fall over time. This is in contrast to Ulph and Ulph who argue that the optimal 
carbon tax trajectory should be one that first rises and then falls. It is also shown 
that it is not optimal to completely exhaust the resource and indeed less is 
extracted when the environmental damage of CO2 in the atmosphere is taken into 
account. 
Chapter 8 - An Economic Model of Open-Cast Coal Mining. 
Open-cast coal is cheaper to extract then deep mined coal and so it is generally 
accepted that the production of this type of coal should be maximised. However, 
open-cast coal mining inevitably causes adverse environmental effects in the 
geographical area concerned; therefore there is a need to strike a balance between 
the benefits of development and protecting the environment. 
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Any application for open-cast mining will have to conform to rigorous regulations 
and any proposal is subject to examination of all the possible effects that might 
occur, including the effects on the environment. The after-use of the land must be 
decided before planning permission is granted as this will affect the cause of 
reclamation of the land. All open-cast coal mining developments have to restore 
the land after the mining has taken place. The purpose of this chapter is to 
consider the optimal exploitation of a non-renewable resource, such as a fossil 
fuel, under the ownership of a monopolist who faces conditions of increasing 
marginal costs of extraction and regularity constraints to protect and restore the 
environment. This is also an extension to the paper by Chappell and Dury (1994). 
A model is formulated where the mining firm is obliged to fill in the area after the 
mining has finished to see how the addition of this new constraint affects the 
optimal decision of the firm whose objective is to maximise profits. Two models 
are considered where different after uses of the site affect the timing of the 
reclamation. In the first model the land is to be used for development and so 
infilling is undertaken after the site has been mined. In the other, the reclaimed 
land is to be used for agriculture or forestry. In this case the infilling is 
undertaken continually to ensure that the subsoil and topsoil are replaced at the 
earliest opportunity to minimise deterioration of the biological value of the soil 
during storage. 
The main conclusions from the work are that it is not optimal for the monopolist 
to completely exhaust the resource when there are no constraints placed on him 
for restoration. Also when he is faced with regularity constraints, it is optimal for 
him to leave more of the resource in the ground and if restoration of the site is 
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undertaken as the mining development is going along then it is not optimal for the 






The aim of this chapter is to review the economic growth theory literature 
involving natural resources and the environment. Section I is a history of how 
natural resources and the environment have been viewed in economic theory and 
describes how this has developed over the centuries and led to our concerns of 
today. Section II gives a brief overview of selected articles from the 
conventional natural resource scarcity literature and Section III shows how this 
literature has taken a different route with regard to sustainability issues. It 
recognises that I)ot only does the environment provide useful material and energy 
inputs to the economic process, but also provides us with important services that 
are essential in supporting the economic system and human welfare. This 
alternative approach to natural resource scarcity shows how concerns for the 
quality of the environment have developed and also shows how dependent the 
economic process is on the environment. 
The aim of Section III is to identify the issues that seem to be of most concern in 
the economic analysis of sustainability and to review economic growth theory, 
which bears on the issue of sustainability - that which involves natural resources 
and the environment. This review of the literature focuses on certain issues such 
as environmental preservation, pollution emissions, and population growth. This 
section also identifies other areas that the economic literature has focused on such 
as global warming and computer simulation modelling of economic and 
environmental systems and the feedback effects that occur. 
To understand the concerns of today and how economic theory has developed in 
analysing the interactions of the environment and the economic system, it is 
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helpful to know how the environment has been viewed by economists over the 
years and how environmental issues have been incorporated into economic 
models. 
SECTION I 
Historical economic approaches to environmental issues 
Physiocrats 
The important role that nature had to play in the economic system had already 
been recognised by the physiocrats. The Physiocratic school of economic 
thought was developed in France in the 1750's, and it had as its first principle that 
natural resources and fertile agricultural land were the source of material wealth. 
Physiocracy means literally 'rule of nature' . They held that the economic process 
could be understood by concentrating on a single factor: the productivity of 
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agriculture. Adam Smith referred to the ideas of the physiocrats on the 
agricultural system; he wrote in The Wealth of Nations: 
'That system which represents the produce of land as the sole source of 
the revenue and wealth of every country has, so far as I know, never been 
adopted by any nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations of a 
few men of great learning and ingenuity in France." (Smith 1776, Volume 
2, Book 4, Chapter 9, pp 156 .. 157). 
Quesnay's Tableau Economique was at the heart of Physiocratic economics. This 
was the name for the visual representation of the circular flow of income and 
expenditure. Any policy that had the effect of increasing the circular flow was 
consistent with economic growth. Any policy that reduces or restricts the 
circular flow is inconsistent with economic growth. Quesnay' then selected a key 
factor in the circular flow and examined the effects that various policies had on 
this factor and the subsequent effects on the economy as a whole. This key factor 
Was agriculture. Manufacturing and service industries were considered 
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unproductive or sterile - they added nothing to the produit net - (net product). 
He looked upon the net product as the only source of wealth and that it was from 
agriculture that additional wealth was created. He postulated that it was changes 
in the net product that effected the course of the economy. He held that 
manufacturing only changed the forms of goods, merely adding labour to the 
products of the soil, nothing new had emerged. 
'~griculture is the source of all the wealth of the State and of the wealth 
of all the citizens." (Institut National 1958, p 102). 
According to the Physiocrats, agriculture was the ultimate occupation because it 
alone yielded a disposable surplus over cost. The Principles of Physiocratic 
economics held sway for nearly two decades until Adam Smith wrote The Wealth 
of Nations in 1776. 
The main criticism of the Physiocrats focuses on the argument that manufacturing 
Was sterile, incapable of yielding a surplus over cost. They argued it was sterile 
in this sense only under conditions of perfect competition, thus competition would 
reduce the price of manufacturing goods to equal necessary costs. However they 
Were willing to admit that a value surplus over necessary costs might result under 
monopoly conditions. But why does competition reduce the price of agricultural 
products to the level of necessary costs and wipe out rent, which was so closely 
associated with the Physiocratic class structure. It was the landlords and 
proprietors who presided over agricultural production and it was to then that the 
produit net ultimately accrued. The Physiocrats toyed with a monopoly 
explanation of why this surplus existed, but their main argument was that the net 
product was simply a gift of nature. This unsatisfactory answer does not explain 
. why there would exist a value surplus. This can be explained by a general theory 
of value which the Physiocrats failed to construct. This task fell to Adam Smith. 
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Malthus 
Malthus published his first Essay on Population in 1798. He was the first to 
emphasise the dependence of population growth on the food supply, he focused 
his attention on the limited supply of land. He made an important departure from 
the view shared by the Physiocrats and Smith who held that there was no limit to 
nature. He held that agricultural land scarcity implied strict limits on population 
growth and that this had powerful social implications. He argued that some part 
of society will live under conditions below subsistence level as a result of the 
finite capacity of nature to support humans and their activities. He states that the 
supply of food would grow at most in an arithmetic progression whereas 
Population would grow in a geometric progression. Malthus says that even the 
smallest finite sum growing at the smallest compound rate must eventually 
overwhelm the largest finite sum growing at the highest simple rate; (consider the 
geometric progression, 2 + 4 + 8 + 16 + 32 + ... in contrast to the arithmetic 
progression, 1,000 + 1,003 + 1,006 + 1,009 + ... ). There would be a 
compounding factor on the population growth because additional people could 
reproduce themselves, whereas additional food can not reproduce itself. 
Malthus argued that a rapid increase in food crops is out of the question since the 
SUpply of land is limited and technical improvements do not come fast enough. 
His predecessors made some striking statements about the explosive nature of 
potential population growth and the availability of land: 
Quesnay assumes that only capital and entrepreneurs are needed to expand 
agricultural production; he states that the availability of land and labour doesn't 
Pose a problem. Concerning land, he writes: 
'The cultivation of corn is very expensive; we have far more land than we 
need for it': (Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques 1958, p473, 
translated by Eltis 1987). 
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Malthus's theory consists of three propositions; 1). man's capacity to reproduce 
is greater than his capacity to increase the food supply, 2). preventative or 
positive checks will always be in operation and 3). the ultimate check on 
population growth lies in the limitations of the food supply, 
He states that the population will be held in check by the food supply unless other 
prior checks on its increase are operating. By these he classified positive and 
preventative checks. Positive checks such as disease would increase the death 
rate, preventative checks such as the foreseeable difficulties in the rearing a family 
would lower the birth rate. 
Concerning the preventative check, Malthus states that: 
'\1 foresight of the difficulties attending the rearing of a family , acts as a 
preventative check ... the labourer who earns eighteen pence per day, and 
lives with some degree, of comfort as a single man, will hesitate a little 
before he divides that pittance amount between four or five ... the 
preventative check to population in this country operates, though with 
varied force, through aU the classes of the community." (Malthus 1798, pp 
62 - 69). 
Malthus confines the positive checks on population growth, such as epidemics 
and diseases, to the poorer members of society: 
'The positive check on population, by which I mean that represses an 
increase which is already begun, is confined chiefly, though not perhaps 
solely, to the lowest orders of society" (Malthus 1978, p 71). 
Malthus states that disease is not the cause of depopulation, but it is a positive 
check that corrects for overpopulation. Population is determined by the 
limitations of the food supply and this is the ultimate check: 
'Famine seems to be the last, the most dreadful resource of nature. The 
power of the population is so superior to the power in the earth to 
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produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or 
other, visit the human race .... but should they fail in this war of 
extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague, advance 
in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should 
success still be incomplete~ gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, 
and with one mighty blow, levels the population with the food of the 
world." (Malthus 1920, pp 110 -111). 
Malthus's theory focuses on limited supply of land~ he states that because of the 
Power of the population to grow in the way described previously: 
'~ . .it is quite obvious that some limit to the production of food, or some 
other of the necessities of life exist." (Malthus 1920, pp 227 - 228). 
He is saying that the production functions are bounded above at some point 
because of the physical limitations of space and the supply of land is fixed. 
MaIthus did not mention a tendency to diminishing returns to agriculture until the 
second edition of the Essay in 1803. It wasn't until he wrote The Principles of 
POlitical Economy (1820), that he used his concept of limited supply of land and 
the consequent population theory to an examination of the long run conditions for 
economic growth. He assumed the land to be homogeneous in quality and as 
Barnett and Morse point out: 
'~. the Malthusian [ doctrine] rested on the assumption that the stock of 
agricultural land was absolutely limited~ once this limit had been reached, 
continuing population growth would require increasing intensity of 
cultivation and, consequently, would bring about diminishing returns per 
capita." (Barnett and Morse 1963, P 51) 
Under the Malthusian doctrine, it is not until the absolute limit of the available 
stock of natural resources (e.g. land) is reached that diminishing returns set in. 
Therefore if rising marginal labour-capital costs are to be associated with 
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diminishing returns, then according to Malthus, it is only when the absolute limits 
to the resource stock are reached do costs start to rise. Malthusian scarcity is 
thus an absolute scarcity implying that the physically limited stock of resources 
acts to constrain the increase in output. Only when this limit is reached does the 
scarcity effect show up as rising prices. 
So how close is Malthus to the alternative view of economic resource scarcity? 
A key difference is that the alternative view of natural resource scarcity assumes 
that the entire economic process is dependent on the limited resources of the 
natural environment, not just agriculture. Another difference is that the 
alternative view of rapid population growth is not the only condition that will 
generate scarcity effects. The continual depletion of resources as inputs on 
material and energy in the economic system may over time threaten ecological 
stability. The alternative view is concerned not just with resource depletion but 
is concerned with economic-en~ironmental interrelationships and emphasises the 
important scarcity effects brought about by greater environmental disorder, 
ecological instability and falling environmental quality. It is not only population 
growth that is the source of constraint on economic growth, rather it is the 
physical dependency of the economic system on the environment and its 
resources. 
Ricardo 
David Ricardo differs to Malthus in that he viewed the scarcity of natural 
resources as a 'relative' scarcity phenomenon. As Barnett and Morse describe: 
'The [Ricardian] version viewed diminishing returns as a current 
phenomenon, reflecting decline in the quality of land as successive parcels 
were brought within the margin of profitable cultivation" (Barnett and 
Morse 1963, p 51). 
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In the Ricardian system then, unlike Malthus, diminishing returns to agriculture 
set in as soon as the land was cultivated. The better quality land would be used 
first and the cause of increasing resource scarcity was the declining quality of the 
land. In this case costs would start to rise as lower quality land was brought into 
CUltivation, whereas for Malthus the costs do not start to rise until the absolute 
limit of land is reached. This increase in costs results from the rise in labour 
costs. As the land is declining in quality, further cultivation of land requires a 
more disproportionate use of labour and it is the rise in the labour cost that is the 
only way this scarcity effect will lead to higher prices for agricultural products. 
Thus, for Ricardo, the increasing scarcity of natural resources (land), will only 
lead to increased agricultural prices if more labour is required to work the land. 
Increasing natural resource scarcity alone is not enough to raise prices. 
Ricardo also implies that there is not necessarily an absolute limit to the 
availability of resources, as po~tulated by Malthus. 
that: 
Barnett and Morse state 
'there is always another extensive margm, another plateau of lower 
quality, which will be reached before the increasing intensity of utilisation 
becomes intolerable" (Barnett and Morse 1963, p 63). 
Ricardo also saw population expansion as the central ingredient in his system, the 
SOurce of economic stagnation. The effect of increasing populations would be to 
push cultivation to ever poorer land and this would continue until very poor 
quality land was worked. This desolate soil would eventually return only the 
minimum necessary for the lives of those who worked on the land and this would 
determine their wages. Better quality land would return a surplus over cost and 
the system would result in differential rents being earned. Rent being defined as: 
'the portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landlord for 
the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil" (Ricardo 
1821, p 67). 
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In the long run then, increased population forces the increasing use of less fertile 
land requiring larger quantities of labour. This results in the inevitable decline in 
profits as a greater proportion of output would be distributed in the form of 
wages. As long as profits are positive, then investment is increasing. The 
increased demand for labour would cause the wage rate to rise. But when wages 
rise above the subsistence level, then population is encouraged to increase. 
Eventually a minimum profit rate would be reached at which new investment and 
additional capital accumulation would cease. Ricardo referred to this as the 
stationary state. 
In both Malthusian and Ricardian systems, population growth is the primary 
constraint on economic growth. In the alternative view it is the environmental 
consequences of economic exploitation of the limited supply of natural resources 
that is considered to be the ultimate constraint on economic growth. 
Smith 
Smith took the view of the Physiocrats that nature was in abundance and that 
agriculture could produce output far in excess of the inputs required. There is no 
suggestion by Smith that there is a finite limit to the earth's resources and so there 
was no threat of an absolute constraint on economic growth. Both Smith and 
Quesnay saw capital as the principle constraint on agricultural output. In Smith's 
economic system, economic growth is dependent on agricultural production but 
the constraint on growth did not come from the diminishing returns to agriculture 
arising from the absolute limits of natural resource (land) availability. Rather, that 
the reliance on agricultural production would eventually result in excess demand 
for agricultural output. This excess demand would result in a situation of 
profound distributional consequences. 
It Was these distributional consequences that would constrain growth. He did 
then seem to share the alternative view that there would be a constraint on growth 
arising from the dependency of the economic system on the environment. But to 
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Smith this did not result from any absolute limits of nature. He attributed this 
situation not only to the relative scarcity of agricultural output but to the pattern 
of income distribution brought about by the pattern of land ownership and tenure, 
the high living consumption of the landlords, the institution of rent and the 
distributional effects of higher agricultural prices, the consequence of excess 
demand. For Smith it was the combined effect of these social factors and relative 
scarcity of agricultural output that would lead to long run economic stagnation. 
Thus Smith incorporates social relations and distributional consequences into his 
doctrine. 
Mill 
Like Ricardo, Mill saw that one of the limiting factors of economic growth was 
the diminishing returns to agriculture. He also viewed the declining incentive to 
invest as another limit to growth. He allocated a crucial role to capital and 
capital accumulation for production, just as the classical economists had done. In 
general, Mill focused his discussion of the theory of economic development upon 
capital accumulation, population growth and technology. He combined this with 
the theory of diminishing returns to agriculture. Mill saw economic growth being 
a race between technical change and diminishing returns to agriculture and 
combined with lack of incentives to invest he argued that the economy was being 
driven to a stationary state. However, Mill viewed the distant prospect of this 
stationary state with optimism; here he differed with the other classical 
economists, he did not view this stationary state as being undesirable. He 
postulated that by the time the steady state had been reached, technical progress 
Would have provided for much of man's needs. He viewed that once this was 
reached then the important social reforms could proceed, the problems of 
inequality of wealth and opportunity could be dealt with. He saw the steady state 
as a necessary precondition for social reform. 
Mill criticised the idea of accumulating wealth merely for the sake of 
aCCumulation, and in this he is attacking economic growth for its own sake. He 
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seems to be the first to take this view and has been echoed by many economists 
since (Galbraith (1958) and Mishan (1967)). In his doctrine, Mill is describing 
the problems of today and can thus be credited with great foresight. 
"It is only in the backward countries of the world that increased production is still 
an important object: in those most advanced, what is economically needed is a 
better distribution, of which one indispensable means is a stricter restraint on 
population" (Mill 1848, P 749). 
Mill saw, unlike the other classical economists, that technical progress could 
broaden the resource base by increasing output per unit of input. He also can be 
credited with providing us with quite a different view of the environment than that 
Which had preceded him. He viewed the environment as providing society not 
only with the resources that are necessary for the inputs to production, but he saw 
the environment as a source of amenity services, surrounding us with natural 
beauty and providing us with a quality of life. He saw the environment as 
perfOrming services to humans that are essential for human welfare. Since these 
services represent an alternative use of the natural resources, Mill made an 
Important extension away from the classical economists before him who only 
Were concerned with the allocation ofland for agricultural production. 
Mill saw that the increasing scarcity of natural resources brought about by the 
extension of economic activities, would lead to increasing scarcity of these 
amenity services. He goes onto say that the increasing scarcity of these essential 
services to mankind would have a detrimental impact on human welfare and this 
Would Occur long before diminishing returns imposes an absolute constraint. He 
argued that society should wish to preserve these essential amenity services and 
desire should lead to the steady state being viewed as a desirable outcome. 
Others have taken Mill's view and argued that a steady state· is essential for the 
preservation of nature's services (Daly (1973), (1974) and (1977)). 
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Jevons 
Jevons spread the concern of a constraint on economic growth to the concern 
OVer mineral deposits in Britain. In 1865 he published The Coal Question, in 
which he observed the physical limitations of the coal deposits in Britain and 
predicted the end of the Industrial Revolution. He saw Britain's economic growth 
being dependent on the reserves of coal. Given that these supplies were limited 
and there were no feasible substitutes and no way of effectively increasing 
supplies, then the inevitable increase in costs would lead to a stationary state. 
His theory was analogous to Malthu's theory of population where population 
growth outstripped food supplies. 
Jevons work, like Mills, was in contrast to the classical treatment of natural 
resource scarcity in which economists were preoccupied with the scarcity of 
agricultural land. He saw the economy shifting from being agriculturally based to 
, 
one that is industrially based and this meant replacing corn as the means of 
subsistence with coal. 
"Our subsistence no longer depends upon our produce of corn. The 
momentous repeal of the Corn Laws throws us from corn upon coal. It 
marks, at any rate, the epoch when coal was finally recognised as the 
staple produce of the country: .. .it marks the ascendancy of the 
manufacturing interest, which is only another name for the development of 
the use of coal" (Jevons 1909, p 195). 
Jevons was the first to analyse the economic effects of the depletion of fossil fuel 
resources and he anticipated the modern concerns of the exhaustion of non 
renewable resources. However, Jevons did not consider the environmental 
effects of the economic dependency on the environment. 
Jevons other contribution to the economic literature was his connection between 
cycles in sunspots and commercial activity, the 'sunspot theory'. The theory 
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goes that there are rhythms of temperature caused by solar activity which would 
then effect crop yields and thereafter, economic activity. He put it: 
'If the planets govern the sun, and the sun governs the vintages and 
harvests, and thus the prices offood and raw materials and the state of the 
money market, it foUows that the configurations of the planets may prove 
to be the remote causes of the greatest commercial disasters." (Jevons 
1909, p 185). 
Firstly Jev~ns is implying that the economic system is dependent on agricultural 
production and secondly, he is signifying a direct link between economic activity 
and the state of the environment. levon's explanation of commercial crisis on the 
basis of periodic changes in sunspots was ridiculed. But in the light of concerns 
of global warming, the idea of a sunspot theory today does not seem so 
farfetched! 
Marshall 
The first person to approach an economic analysis of environmental problems was 
Alfred MarshaU. His economic analysis concerns the general area of 
'txternalities': property rights, and 'hlarket failure'~ He introduced the concept 
of external economies where by the development of certain industries had a 
positive effect on other firms within that industry - a positive externality. 
Marshall linked external economies to location of the industry. He argued that 
with the growth and localisation of an industry in a particular region there would 
become a localised market for skilled labour. As the industry expands further, 
then skilled labour would be encouraged to locate in that region where the 
demand for that service was high. The availability of specialised labour is 
therefore expanded. The existing firms will find that the cost of labour turnover 
and training would decline. Marshall talks about external economies arising from 
. 
Improved communication between firms. As the industry reaches a certain size 
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then it would be feasible to publish infonnation and this could be made cheaply 
available to all. 
Also Marshall states that advantages would accrue to the individual finn through 
general industrial development such as inventions and improvements in 
machinery. 
'Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in 
machinery, in processes, and the general organisation of the business have 
their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken 
up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it 
becomes the source of further new ideas. And presently subsidiary trades 
grow up in the neighborhood, supplying it with implements and materials, 
organising its traffic, and in many ways conducing to the economy of its 
material" (Marshall 1920, p 271). 
Here he also mentioned that supportive industries would grow and this would 
create external economies for the finns in the industry. The growth of 
specialised industries to service the needs of the parent industry would have the 
effect of lowering costs for the industry as the specialised industry would gain the 
advantages of the division of labour. As Marshall put it: 
'The economic use of expensive machinery can sometimes be attained in a 
very high degree in a district in which there is a large aggregate 
production of the same kind, even though no individual capital employed 
in the trade be very large. For subsidiary industries devoting themselves 
each to one small branch of the process of production, and working for a 
great many of their neighbors, are able to keep in constant use machinery 
of the most highly specialised character, and to make it pay its expenses, 
though its original cost may have been high, and its rate of depreciation 
very rapid." (Marshall 1920, p271). 
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Admittedly, Marshall was talking about the benefits that accrued to the firm 
without payment and it is from this concept that came the key to the economic 
analysis of environmental deterioration. Therefore, in principle the step had been 
taken that in the production of goods and services, it was possible for there to 
accrue benefits outside the market that could affect the conditions for other firms 
within the industry. It was from expansion of this idea that Pigou developed the 
idea of market failure. 
Pigon 
Pigou was Marshall's protege. He expanded Marshall's ideas and in his 
publication entitled The economics of Welfare (1920) he distinguished between 
social net product and private net product. The two net products diverge 
because there exist costs or benefits of a transaction that are incurred or received 
by persons Who are not involved in production and these externalities are not 
taken into account by the parti~s to the transaction. In Pigou's theory not only 
could the production conditions of a third party be affected but also the welfare of 
private individuals. An example of a negative externality would be a factory 
pumping out smoke or discharging etlluent into a nearby stream. Fishermen 
downstream would be affected by lower quality, and perhaps quantity of fish, also 
the tourist industry could lose revenue and the general welfare of the residents 
Would be adversely affected. 
Pigou himself mentions the damage done to surrounding woods by sparks from 
railway engines. This damage is uncompensated as the train company would not 
take this cost into account as their profits are not affected by the external costs of 
its actions. 
Pigou's remedy was to impose a tax on the offending firm that was equal to the 
difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost. This 
Would then internalise the externality as the producer would include the cost he 
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was imposing on society in his private costs and so he would bear the full cost of 
production. 
Kapp 
In 1950 there was the first awareness of the serious adverse affects of production 
and consumption in the economic literature. Kapp was not given due credit for 
foreseeing the future debate of the far reaching consequences of environmental 
deterioration and natural resource depletion. 
The focal point of Kapp's book The Social Costs of Private Enterprise (1950), is 
the place that social costs hold in the social system. He defines social costs as 
those losses either indirect or direct that are incurred by third persons in society as 
a consequence of uncontrolled economic activities. 
Kapp gives a description of the effects of environmental deterioration and natural 
resOurce depletion. He talks about the harmful effects of air and water pollution, 
the health effects, effects on nature and the dangers to aquatic life. 
Kapp discusses the over exploitation of renewable resources and attributes the 
cause of this to uncontrolled competition in the utilisation of these resources. 
Kapp recognised that over-hunting, over-fishing and excess timber harvesting lead 
to the destruction of species and the deterioration of fertile land. This 
irreversible destruction of the earth's renewable resources will eventually lead to 
an impoverished state of the world for future generations. Thus man is himself 
blOcking his path to further economic growth. Kapp argues that the only way to 
prevent this from happening is to keep exploitation of these resources within close 
limits. He also recognised that there were severe consequences from congestion 
in urban environments being caused in part by the over concentration of industry. 
Kapp was the first to discuss in the economic literature, the adverse effects of our 
econ . 
omlc process on the environment. 
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Boulding 
In his publication The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth (1966), 
Boulding described the economy of yesterday and today as being an open system. 
Inputs to the system are taken from the earth's reservoir in the form of natural 
resources. This is considered unlimited and so not of economic concern. Then 
these are used up in the production and consumption process (the throughput 
sphere) and then they vanish into the reservoir as outputs. The through put is 
measured as gross national product. Boulding argues that economic growth and 
national income will have no importance in the future. 
The result is that the concentrations of natural resources that are taken from the 
earth's supplies are used up in production and consumption and then they are 
diffused and scattered across the earth's surface. Boulding goes on to say that 
this process cannot go on forever. The earth's resources are being depleted, 
there is increasing environment~l pollution and thus from now on, man will have 
to think of the economic system as closed. Here output from the production and 
consumption activities will be used again as an input, so that the whole economic 
system is a cyclical process. Boulding compares this system to that of a 
spaceship. 
Energy that is stored mainly in fossil fuels and is not contained in the product 
itself, will disappear into space. This energy is lost after use and so cannot be 
r' I eClrcu ated. Therefore renewable energy that does not pollute the reservoir to 
such an extent that the carrying capacity of the earth's reservoir is destroyed will 
be crucial to the spaceship economy. . 
. In BOulding's spaceship economy, economic growth and nation product are no 
longer relevant. What is important is the nature and state of the capital stock, 
interpreted to mean the state of society. The economy does not have to have a 
high national income to be successful. The concern is to minimise the gross 
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national costs, the fewer means necessary to maintain the capital stock, the better 
the economy is. 
Boulding was the first economist to describe the circular nature of the economic 
and environmental system and recognise that the one of the most important 
factors that will determine the possible future level of economic activity, is the 
input of clean energy into this cyclical system. 
Mishan 
The work of Kapp didn't receive the attention amongst economists and those 
outside the profession that it deserved. In 1967 Mishan wrote The Costs of 
Economic Growth and it wasn't until then that people were really interested in the 
economic implications of environmental deterioration. This was mainly due to 
the fact that at the end of the 1960s, it was becoming obvious that the 
environment was being over burdened and so the time was right for a publication 
of this subject. 
According to Mishan, the cause of the adverse external effects is the uncontrolled 
attitudes of commercial society. He criticises the emphasis that is placed on the 
dissatisfaction of old products and creation of new wants thereby increasing 
production. Mishan does not believe that this will improve society. This is in 
league with other earlier economists who denounce economic growth for its own 
sake (Galbraith (1958) and Mill (1848)). 
Mishan argues that economic policy places too high an emphasis on matters that 
are statistically measured, such as the price level, employment and production 
figures. Mishan regards the concern over current economic quantities as being 
. greatly exaggerated. He regards the happiness of society as being far more 
important and this is affected by the external effects of production that are not 
quantitatively measured. He talks about the congestion of traffic in cities, the 
effect of mass tourism in historic towns and he places great emphasis on the oil 
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and sewage pollution of beaches, air pollution and the effect of uncontrolled 
pesticides on wildlife and fauna. 
Mishan recognises that things that were once available to the people are now 
becoming scarce and natural beauty is being destroyed for the current generation 
as well as the future. The only way to stop this happening is to direct private 
resources towards restoration of the environment through economic policy and to 
change the way people view the environment. 
Forrester and Meadows 
In the early 1970's there were some econometric studies that like Jevons, 
predicted an absolute scarcity constraint on economic growth. Forrester (1971) 
Was the first to simulate the worldwide relations between a number of key 
variables in his work entitled World Dynamics (1971). The model that 
Meadows et al formulated a' year later was more extensive and set up the 
mathematical relations between population, non-renewable resources, capital, 
land and pollution, (The Limits to Growth (1972». Each of these is subdivided 
into categories, for instance land is subdivided into applications, including 
agriculture, development, industry; population is divided up into age groups, and 
so on. 
There are numerous feedback loops in which variables are interlinked and have an 
effect on each other at some point in time and this goes on throughout the time 
periOd. These feedback loops can be negative or positive. F or example, the 
level of pollution is influenced by the previous level and on the other assimilative 
capacities that the environment has of abatement, be it natural or manmade. This 
. can affect the birth rate along with industrial production and food consumption 
which will cause the population to change. From this highly complicated 
Computer model with all the changes, levels and variables linked by mathematical 




Meadows et aI, who had extended Forrester's model, shows that natural resources 
are being depleted at increasing rates, and that population, industrial output per 
capita and food per capita all increase then fall dramatically. This is attributed to 
the fast decline of resources and by reaching the limits of the environment. 
Output possibilities increase, food production falls and pollution rises and 
population starts to fall. Meadows and Forrester forecast a world disaster. 
Meadows et al go on to investigate the effects of new technologies such as the 
availability of large quantities of nuclear energy, the recycling of resources, 
pollution control and birth control. 
They then go on to do simulations with these variations of the standard model. 
For instance, the effect of new technologies doubling of the resource reserves by 
the use of unlimited nuclear energy. They show that not a single combination of 
any of these new changes would avert the disaster. The conclusion is clear -
growth cannot continue indefini,tely in a finite world. 
A more optimistic view was taken by Kahn (1976), who argued that The Limits to 
Growth was not accurate. He based his optimism on the evolution of technical 
progress and argued that this would push back the limits of nature. 
Daly and Cobb 
Cobb and Daly in their book For the Common Good, offer a critique of the 
standard economic doctrine on economic growth and demonstrate how economic 
growth can lead to environmental disaster. They disagree with the assumption of 
neo-classical economics that the market allocates resources in the best interests of 
society. Conventional economics has tended to exclude aspects of this world 
that are now desirable to analyse. They postulate that the increasing production 
of consumer goods has meant the sacrifice of the environment and supportive 
local communities. The cause of the destruction of the environment and the 
community results from the pursuit of self-interest and the unlimited production 
grOwth in a world that has a limited environment. They postulate that emphasis 
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in economics should be moved from money to real life resource management. We 
should shift from individualism in favour of community commitments and there 
needs to be a focus on the physical realities of the environment. 
The authors claim that there is an optimal size for the community; ten thousand 
people living in one community can be relatively self sufficient. 
Daly (1977) mentions that there are ecological and environmental limits to growth 
and he proposes that we should strive for a steady state where economic capital 
and population are constant. In an earlier paper (1974) he states that: 
'Our economy is a subsystem of the earth, and the earth is apparently a 
steady-state open system. The subsystem cannot grow beyond the 
frontiers of the total system and, if it is not to disrupt the functioning of 
the latter, must at some much earlier point conform to the steady state 
mode. The techocratic project of redesigning the world (substituting 
techno sphere with ecosphere) so as to allow for indefinite growth is a bit 
of hubris that has received the insufficiently pejorative label of 
"growthmania"" (Daly 1974 P 17). 
SECTION II 
Literature on the optimal exploitation of natural resources 
lIotelling 
Economists have been stimulated into considering the optimal extraction of 
resources by the necessity for natural resources as inputs to the production 
process. In Hotelling's classic article - The Economics of Exhaustible Resources 
(1931), the notion of "social value" of an exhaustible resource is used for judging 
the desirability of any extraction plan for the resource. According to Hotelling, 
the competitive firm's aim is to maximise present value profits. Therefore they 
Would manage exhaustible resource stocks so as to meet this objective. He states 
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that the gross value to society of a marginal unit of output or extraction of the 
resource is measured by the price society is willing to pay to bring forth that 
particular unit of output, and the net value to society is the gross value less the 
cost of extracting that unit. Competitive extraction paths would therefore he 
identical to that chosen by a social planner seeking to maximise intertemporal 
Social surplus. One major conclusion of the Hotelling paper is that pure 
Competition can yield an extraction path that matches the socially optimal one, 
Whereas a monopolistic firm will adopt an extraction path that is more 
conservationist, but sociaUy suboptimal. 
Subject to a condition specifically noted by Hotelling, that social and private 
discount rates must be the same, the conclusion that the competitive market 
extraction plan and the work of a rational social planner were identical meant that 
the invisible hand was sufficient and that the use of policy intervention is 
inappropriate as the market out~ome is optimal. 
There was a rediscovery of the Hotelling (1931) model for the efficient depletion 
of a fixed homogeneous resource stock after the first oil shocks in late 1973. 
The now familiar 'Hotelling Rule' which governs this efficient depletion, states 
that net price (price less marginal cost) - should rise at the rate of interest in order 
for producers to be indifferent to the timing of extraction and in order for 
remaining reserves to be competitive asset holdings. 
Conventional view - Economic Growth and Resource use 
Dasgupta and Heal, Solow and Stiglitz 
From the mid-1970s, through to the early 1980s, there has been a substantial 
literature on the optimal growth paths for an economy with depletable resources. 
The Symposium sponsored by the Review of Economic Studies in 1974 was a 
major contribution in this field. These papers were based on the one-sector 
model of growth in which a depletable resource is extracted from the environment 
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and used along with capital and labour in the production function. Thus the 
resource is an essential input in the production process. Three papers by 
Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974a), published in the 
Symposium, exemplify the contribution of this literature. 
The earlier literature stressed the case that in the long run the limited availability 
of non-renewable resources would act as a constraint on the growth potential of 
the economic system (Forrester (1971) and Meadows et al (1972». This issue 
dates back to the nineteenth century to the concerns of Mill and Jevons . 
Exhaustible resources would only pose a problem if they are essential to 
production, i.e. output is zero if none of the resource is used. The question 
would then be, would output fall to zero in an economy that possessed a non-
renewable resource that was essential in production. The three papers by 
Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974a) examine the 
feasibility of sustained or growing per-capita consumption paths and the 
conditions under which such consumption paths might be achieved. 
Dasgupta and Heal show that for the class of production functions with a constant 
elasticity of substitution between capital and resource inputs, and with a constant 
population, it is feasible to have a sustained consumption path across generations. 
This conclusion depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital services 
and the non-renewable resource being at least equal to one. This implies that 
capital services are sufficiently substitutable for the depletable resource. 
Solow and Stiglitz show that if this elasticity is equal to one, as in the Cobb-
Douglas technology, it must also be the case for sustained growth in per-capita 
consumption to be feasible, that population growth must be zero and that the 
elasticity of output with respect to capital exceeds the elasticity of output with 
respect to exhaustible resources. But there is an upper bound on the magnitude 
of the consumption that can be sustained in this case. Here then, it is capital 
accumulation that can offset the effects of declining resource inputs, so long as 
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capital is more 'important' than the resource, i.e. the share of capital exceeds that 
of the natural resource. 
Stiglitz shows however-increasing technical progress can, in theory, alleviate the 
resource constraints. He postulates that sustained growth in per-capita 
consumption, and thus utility, may be feasible and optimal with a positive rate of 
population growth. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the ratio of the 
rate of technical change to the rate of population growth must be greater than or 
equal to the share of natural resources. 
Dasgupta and Heal, Solow, Stiglitz and Kamien and Schwartz (1978), show that 
it may be optimal to completely exhaust the non-renewable resource if the 
availability of perfect substitutes and future technology render the resource no 
longer essential for future production. 
Clark and Smith 
The same conclusion as Dasgupta and Heal, Solow and Stiglitz came to has also 
been reached about renewable resources. Clark (1976) and Smith (1977) 
examine renewable resources and find that complete exhaustion of the resource 
may be optimal if the cost of harvesting the resource is low, the resource is 
growing at a slow rate and the value of the resource appreciates more slowly than 
the market rate of interest. 
However, these studies do not consider another aspect of resource use and that is 
the environmental effects and the amenity values that the environment provides us 
With. The conventional way of dealing with natural resources has been to treat 
them as those environmental resources that provide economically valuable 
productive inputs. Thus natural resources were seen as having only one 
function, and that is as supplier of raw materials and energy used as inputs in the 
economic process. 
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But not only does our environment provide useful material and energy inputs to 
the economic process, but the natural environment also provides us with 
important services that are essential in supporting the economic system and 
human welfare. The following is a discussion of this alternative approach. 
SECTION III 
Alternative View - Stock effects and Preservation of 'Natural 
Capital' 
The literature has taken a different route with regard to sustainability issues and 
that is that there is now concern for the preservation of natural environments. 
This alternative approach to natural resource scarcity recognises that the 
environment and its scarce resources have other valuable functions as well as 
providing new materials for the production of goods and services. We know that 
the natural environment provides us with the essential inputs for production, but it 
also assimilates waste that is generated by the economic process and provides us 
with utility yielding services. These utility yielding services range from 
recreational, educational scientific aesthetic cultural to maintenance of the , , 
ecological and climatic cycles and functions. 
The economic system and human welfare are thus dependent on the environment 
ad' 
n Its scarce natural resources. Given that natural capital provides us with 
valuable services to society and human welfare and essential inputs in the 
production process, the issue of preservation is an important concern in the 
Overall debate on sustainability. Therefore, as the environment is being 
increasingly exploited to provide us with the essential inputs for economic activity 
and as a dumping ground for waste, the quantity and quality of the environment is 
deteriorating. The result of this is the increasing scarcity of essential 
environmental and ecological services and functions, (Barbier (1986». Hueting 
(1980), had previously stated that the destruction and exploitation of the natural 
environment is also an economic problem. 
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This part of the literature is concerned with the conditions under which partial 
preservation of natural environments is optimal. 
Amenity values and stock preservation. 
Given that the flow of amenity services that the environment provides i~ positively 
related to the stock of the preserved natural environments, a simple way of 
including the value of these amenity services in a growth model is to include the 
resource stock in the utility function. Krautkraemer (1985) includes the amenity 
services of the environment in this way: 
"If A, E and S denote amenity services, preserved environments, and the 
remaining resource stock, the U(C,A) = U(C, A(E(S» = U(C,S)." 
(Krautkraemer (1985) p 169n). 
Vousden (I973), was perhaps the earliest to represent the 'conservation motive' 
by using the resource stock i~ the utility function. He finds that when the 
conservative motive - "a tendency to value the resource for its own sake 
independently of its value as a source of future consumption", (p. 127) - is 
incorporated into the social welfare function it is no longer optimal to completely 
exhaust the resource. 
Referring back to the conventional approach discussed earlier, technological 
progress and capital-resource substitution are two ways in which it is possible for 
an economy to maintain consumption in the presence of a non-renewable resource 
that is an essential input in the production process. Krautkraemer (1985), 
ex . . 
aounes the effects of these factors on the permanent preservation of natural 
environments and examines the conditions under which it is optimal to 
permanently preserve natural environments that contain the natural productive 
resources. 
Krautkraemer shows that if society has a large enough initial capital stock and 
that capital is sufficiently productive and substitutable for the depletable resource, 
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some permanent preservation is optimal. Under these conditions it is possible to 
have sustained consumption and also permanently preserve part of the 
environment. However, Krautraemer also shows that it can be optimal to 
eXhaust the resource stock even though the marginal value of consumption is 
falling to zero. This is because technological progress, as well as allowing 
growth in consumption, also increases the productivity of the resource. 
Consequently the marginal value of the flow of resource inputs is increasing even 
though the marginal value of consumption is falling. The same forces which 
cause consumption to grow, i.e. technical progress, also raise the marginal value 
product of the resource and this drives the incentive to exhaust the resource. 
There is another aspect of resource exploitation which has been considered and 
that is the concern about the loss of amenity services associated with unspoiled 
environments. Krutilla (I967), was one of the first to argue that the problem of 
providing the amenity servic~s that are associated with preserved natural 
environments has become more of a pressing issue than the problem of providing 
future generations with resource inputs. 
While Krautraemer had broadened the conventional approach to optimal resource 
depletion and looked at the conditions that allow preservation of natural 
environments that contain productive inputs, an earlier paper by Fisher, KrutiUa 
and Cichetti (1972), looked at the environmental costs from irreversibly 
transferring land for development purposes. In their paper they argue that not 
onI ' , y IS (t necessary to preserve our environment but there is also the need to 
develop land for production and housing. Their paper emphasises the direct 
com t" pe (tlon between preservation and development. As Fisher and Krutilla 
(1985) point out, by irreversibly converting natural areas the future possibilities of 
obt' , ' 
ammg environmental services from these areas are lost. Another reason for 
preserving the environmental stock relates to fairness and justice to future 
generations; access to it by different generations must be ensured for reasons of 
intergenerational equity. In many cases environmental losses that occur are 
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irreversible and this irreversibility means the removal of an option for future 
generations. 
Fisher et al formulate a model for the allocation of natural environments between 
preservation and development. They show that the optimal development path for 
a given area of land is given by a sequence of investment intervals. They find 
that when optimal development begins to fall, implying that marginal benefits 
from development are less than marginal costs, there has been too much 
development and we need to disinvest or reverse previous development. But if 
development of natural environments is irreversible, they find that development 
should then stop short of the level that is indicated by current valuations if in the 
near future reduced development is desirable. Investment should cease until 
future values indicate that the marginal benefits of development are greater than 
the marginal costs. Then the optimal growth path for development would be an 
alternating sequence of period~ of investment in development and periods of no 
. 
Investment. Their analysis presents a strong case for the permanent preservation 
of some natural environments. It may even be optimal to permanently preserve 
some natural environments whose current return to preservation is less than the 
current return to development. The optimum level of preservation, therefore, 
may be greater than current values would indicate. 
Barrett (I 992), shows that the conditions for permanently preserving natural 
en . 
vlronments are more general than Fisher et al postulated and so therefore his 
paper adds weight to the argument that it is optimal to permanently preserve 
some natural areas and protect our environment. For a more detailed discussion 
see Chapter 4. 
The idea of including the stock of natural capital in the utility function, has also 
been used by Barbier and Markandya (1990). They analyse a model where 
Substitution between capital and the natural capital is not so free. They maintain 
that there is a minimum positive level of natural capital that is necessary to 
prevent ecological catastrophe. Again Barbier and Markyanda include the stock 
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of natural capital along with consumption in the utility function. They start with 
the problem of maximising utility subject to the condition that the stock of 
natural capital is prevented from falling below a catastrophe threshold. They 
conclude that where there are multiple equilibria if the initial level of natural 
capital is below a critical value (which is still higher than the threshold): 
Maximising discounted utility may cause catastrophe. A higher discount rate 
Increases this critical value and so increases the likelihood of catastrophe. In 
their work, they have highlighted an important point. They show that while it 
might be suggested that efficiency criteria such as internalising externalities would 
stop natural capital falling below the critical value, if these market failures have 
already caused the natural capital to fall below the critical value then efficiency 
criteria cannot achieve sustainability. This could be important when evaluating 
policies that call for improved efficiency in natural resource use in developing 
cOuntries (see World Bank, 1992). These actions may then not be sufficient for 
Sustainability as these countries may have natural capital below the threshold level 
and will 'opt' to drive themselves to environmental catastrophe. The policy 
implication for this is that aid specifically for improving the natural resource base 
will help countries to achieve an environmentally sustainable optimal growth path. 
Pollution models 
The generation of pollution has also been included in a number of studies on 
Optimal growth and resource depletion. (Plourde (1972), d'Arge and Kogiku 
(1973), Forster (I973b), Barbier (1989), Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993». 
For a more detailed analysis of these models see Chapter 5. 
POllution enters these models in a variety of ways, as a stock which indicates the 
level of environmental quality, or as a flow, to show the rate of emission. 
POllution can flow from the economic system either from production or 
consumption. There are a diverse range of modelling possibilities and because of 
this the literature has produced a wide variety of results. Most of the literature 
argues that an economy that follows an optimal path will progress to a steady 
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state equilibrium where marginal cost of production which includes the 
environmental cost of pollution, is equal to the marginal value of consumption, 
see for example Forster (1973a). 
Forster (1973b) presented one of the first models of economic growth and 
pollution. In his model, the consumption of a composite commodity generates 
emissions and the problem for the central planner is to determine the optimal 
consumption plan. He shows that the equilibrium of the system is a saddle point. 
In the literature some of the models include both capital accumulation and 
Pollution stock accumulation and there can be more than one optimal steady state 
equilibrium. Thus models of optimal economic growth with stock pollution may 
lead to multiple equilibria and cyclical paths around an unstable steady state 
{Becker (1982), Brock (1977), Ryder and Heal (1973), Heal (1982)}. 
In these models, the optimal steady state depends on the initial level of resources. 
A capital rich economy may choose a path that will lead to a relatively clean 
steady state. Whereas a resource-poor economy may choose a lower level of 
pollution abatement activity in order to allocate capital to the production of 
consumption goods. This is the argument we face today in that it is the rich 
industrialised countries that can afford to care about the environment, they have 
already reached a position where industrialisation has provided for much of man's 
needs and so now they can direct attention to the concerns of the environment. 
POor developing countries have not reached this position and they cannot afford 
the 'luxury' of caring about the environment and its natural resources. 
Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993) and Brock (1977), have shown that if the 
available technology allows a high level of substitution between capital and 
emissions, an optimal solution exists and approaches a unique steady state and the 
rich-poor situation described above is avoided. 
Other models have analysed the case where output can be allocated to 
consumption, investment and abatement of the pollution stock. In a paper by 
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Keeler et al (1972), welfare depends on the consumption of a composite 
commodity and the accumulation of pollution, i. e. the pollution stock. Pollution 
is generated from production and builds up into a stock which decays naturally 
and can also be decreased by the allocation of output to abatement. The result of 
their analysis is that a unique steady state can exist with either positive or zero 
pollution abatement. However Keeler et al do not include natural resources in 
their model. 
d'Arge and Kogiku (1973), examine a model in which a non-renewable resource is 
an input in the production process and pollution is a by-product of production. 
The authors show that in this model, it is impossible for the economy to sustain 
itself forever, even with recycling. 
Population models 
Another strand of the literature relevant to sustainable development has explored 
the consequences of a growing population in models involving extraction of non-
renewable natural resources: Stiglitz (1974a), Ingham and Simmons (1975), 
Cigno (1981) and Stiglitz (1974b). Previously the literature has treated 
population as stationary, Solow (1974), Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Dasgupta and 
Heal (1979) and Krautkraemer (1985). Beddington, Watts and Wright (1975), 
look at the optimal paths of extraction of renewable resources with a stationary 
Population. 
Empirical evidence shows that the worlds population is increasing and Stiglitz 
(1974b), analyses the standard neo-classical growth model with constant rate of 
population growth and examines the implications of introducing exhaustible 
resources as an essential input into the production process. He shows that if a 
steady state exists, it is a saddle point. Hence introducing exhaustible resources 
into the model has the effect of making an otherwise stable system unstable. 
Stiglitz (I974a), shows that steadily growing per capita consumption may be 
feaSible forever if a wasting and non-replenishable resource is an essential input 
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into production and if the population is growing at a constant exponential rate. 
He shows that necessary and sufficient conditions for a steadily growing per 
capita consumption is that the rate of technical progress is greater than or equal to 
the share of the natural resources multiplied by the rate of population growth. 
However, in the limit, with a finite stock of the resource and a growing 
population, productivity would have to be infinite to mantain per-capita 
consumption and the only possible steady state would have zero resource and 
thus zero consumption. 
Stiglitz assumes that there is a steady exponential improvement in the economy's 
technical productivity. The rate of technical change is assumed exogenous. He 
also assumes that the productivity of production factors are independent of the 
resource stock, hence the last unit of resource extracted is as easy to extract as 
the one previous. Susuki (1976), modifies the Stiglitz (1974a) model by making 
production dependent on the level of resource stock. He concludes that the 
necessary and sufficient condition for steady growth of per capita consumption is 
the same as the conclusion reached by Stiglitz. The previous model, and that of 
Stiglitz, assumes that the steady growing per capita consumption is not possible 
without sustained technical improvement and this is assumed to be costless. He 
goes on to modify the model further by assuming that there is no technical 
progress without there being a prior commitment of productive factors to 
research and development. He shows that if the population is growing at a 
constant exponential rate, then the necessary and sufficient condition for a steady 
growth in per capita consumption is that the share of investment in research and 
development is greater than the share of resource input. 
Another paper by Fisher (1992), analyses economic growth in a model which 
exhibits over-lapping generations, i.e. where the labout force live for finitely many 
periods. He shows that the rate of growth of the economy depends on the 
marginal efficiency of investment and the share of capital devoted to investment. 
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Most of the past literature on economic activity and the natural environment with 
a growing population focuses on studies in which population of the economy is 
determined exogenously. Clearly, there are interactions between population, 
economic activity and natural resource use and this should be a central element of 
concerns about sustainability. Cigno (1981) presented a paper where the 
Population growth rate was endogenously determined. He shows that an 
economy with non-renewable resource exploitation, and where population is a 
function of per-capita income and the degree of industrialisation, is capable of 
stable growth. However, this depends on the choice of the savings to income 
ratio - i.e. how much the economy saves out of income. He postulates then the 
economy can be put on a stable growth path if a policy maker can control the 
savings ratio. 
Global Warming 
Another strand of the literatur~ has looked at the problem of global warming. 
There is the growing concern that global warming and other accompanying 
climatic changes will occur as a result of growing concentrations of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere. The main green house gas, CO2, is emitted chiefly as a 
result of burning fossil fuels. The increasing use of fossil fuels is closely related 
to the growth of economic activity worldwide and since gross domestic product 
(GOP), a crude measure of a countries economic activity, is expected to continue 
to rise, the emissions of CO2 and its concentration in the atmosphere will also 
increase. 
Clearly this adds to the problem of the optimal exploitation of non-renewable 
reSOurces and has a direct implication for energy use. If global warming is to be 
limited, then we cannot simply burn fossil fuels to our hearts content. The 
generation of CO2 emissions and the damage caused by global warming have been 
InCorporated into various growth models. For instance, Nordhaus (1993b) 
formulated a model where the optimal growth model is extended to include a 
climate module and a damage sector which both feed back into the economy. In 
55 
the DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy) model, the objective is to 
maximise the discounted sum of the utilities of consumption summed over time, 
subject to economic, climate, emissions and damage constraints. He uses a 
computer programme to run several different policy scenarios; for instance, he 
looks at the optimal tax on carbon emissions that would be necessary to raise 
fossil fuel and other prices sufficiently to induce substitution between carbon-
intensive goods and services for ones that are less carbon-intensive. 
Peck and Tiesburg (1991) provide an assessment of what the optimal trajectory of 
a carbon tax might be. Both Peck and Tiesburg and Nordhaus show that the 
carbon tax should rise over time. For a more detailed review of these and 
further papers see Chapter 7. Neither of these papers include non-renewable 
resource constraints in their models. 
A paper by Ulph and Ulph (1994) incorporates non-renewable resources as a 
constraint on economic growth as well as including emissions flows and a damage 
function. They conclude that an optimal carbon tax would rise sharply and then 
faU. Sinclair (1992 and 1994), formulates a model of endogenous growth, oil 
ext . 
ractlon and global warming. He show that the optimal carbon tax should fall 
overtime. 
A number of papers explore the likely impact of imposing a carbon tax at levels 
SUfficient to reduce CO2 emissions significantly and many have indicated the 
probability of such a tax entailing substantial economic costs. Nordhaus (1993a) 
has estimated the global GDP loss of US$762 billion if a US$56 per ton carbon 
tax was implemented to reduce C02 emissions by 20%. A number of studies 
have looked at the possible positive effects of using the revenue from carbon 
taxes to reduce distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy; for instance 
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993). They show that this would lower the net cost 
of a carbon tax by removing inefficiencies elsewhere in the economy. 
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Other areas of research 
There have been several studies modelling the effects of economic activity on the 
environment and the feedback effects that occur as a result. Many of these 
models are extremely complicated and require computer simulation to obtain their 
reSUlts. For example, Agostini et al (1992) examine the effects of introducing a 
carbon tax produced by the combustion processes in OECD- European countries. 
They formulate a model of energy consumption in different sectors and analyse 
the energy saving effects of introducing a carbon tax. Their simulation provides 
support for the role of carbon taxes to encourage energy savings and fuel 
sUbstitution and thereby stabilise carbon emissions. However, there should not 
be a uniform tax across the OECD, but there should be a country specific tax 
depending on the economic situation and technological choices facing each 
country. 
Nicoletti and Oliveira-Martins (1992) studied the potential effects of the 
carbon/energy tax that was proposed by the European Union on global CO2 
emissions and economic activity. They formulated a global dynamic applied 
generaJ equilibrium model known as GREEN. Also Birkelund et al (1993) have 
studied the effects on energy use and CO2 emissions using a multi sectoral energy 
demand model in Western Europe. 
In a paper by Walker and Birol (1992) the long run impacts on the world energy 
markets, of implementing a carbon tax to reduce CO2 emissions is examined. To 
investigate this they use a long term time series CES (constant elasticity of 
SUbstitution) econometric model with over 150 equations. There are five main 
modules that make up the model, the macroeconomic module, and energy 
demand module, an energy supply module, an energy pricing module and an 
environmental module. There are feedback mechanisms that exist between these 
modules. They find that by implementing a carbon tax world energy 
consumption by the year 2010 will be at least 20% lower than if no action was 
taken. 
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Haugland et al (1992) provide an empirical analysis of the effect on international 
energy markets of policy measures to curb CO2 emissions. Their analysis is 
carried out using a global energy demand model called ECON-ENERGY. They 
show that if CO2 emissions are to be stabalised by means of a carbon tax, then the 
tax level needs to be very high. A main conclusion from their work is that taxing 
carbon emissions alone will not stabilise CO2 concentrations. Additional efforts 
are needed to encourage conservation of fossil fuels and this could come from 
Supply side measures, such as incentives for renewable resource exploitation. 
Backstop Technology 
Non-renewable resources are difficult to deal with in infinite horizon problems. 
There has been a fair amount of work done on non-renewable resources and 
technological progress, but most of the literature deals with this in the sense that 
technological improvement will effectively increase the supply of the resource by 
increasing productivity of the r~source. In this case the supply of the resource 
will never run out as progressively less of the resource will be needed to produce 
a . 
gIVen amount of output. As there is a finite limit to the amount of the non-
renewable resource, it is wrong to suggest that the supply of the resource can go 
on forever, obviously it cannot. In the limit, with a finite stock of the resource, 
productivity would have to be infinite to maintain per-capita consumption and the 
only Possible steady state would have zero resource and thus zero consumption. 
Traditionally, in neo-classical economics, the effect of natural resource scarcity is 
reflected in rising prices. This will result in the substitution of capital for the 
scarce resOurce and thus will effectively increase its supply, and a decrease in 
demand for the resource since the price will have risen. The market will again be 
in equilibrium and thus the market for the resource will clear. Therefore in a 
perfectly competitive market, provided that the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and the resource is large enough, there will never be an actual shortage. 
Going back to the classical doctrine, the presence of non-renewable resources do 
not Pose a threat to economic growth, which can, then, last forever. 
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Stiglitz (1974a) states, as shown previously, that the limitations imposed by 
natural resources can be offset by technical change, capital resource substitution 
and returns to scale. He analyses the conditions under which a sustainable level 
of per-capita consumption is feasible. He finds that sustained levels of per-capita 
consumption are feasible if the elasticity of substitution between capital and the 
resource is greater than unity. 
I<rautkraemer (1985) looked at the impact of technological progress and capital-
resource substitution on the permanent preservation of natural environments. He 
found that a necessary condition for permanently preserving natural environments 
is that consumption must be prevented from dropping to zero as the marginal 
value of the extractive resource will become infinite in this case. Thus it is never 
optimal to leave any of the resource in the ground. 
However there has been s~me work that doesn't treat technological improvement 
in this way. An optimistic view is taken of the role which technology plays in 
freeing us from the dependence on natural resources. This is that some almost 
indefinitely renewable resource will eventually take over when the exhaustible 
resource has fUn out. This in the literature is called a back-stop technology. 
Examples of backstop technologies are energy from converting shale oil, energy 
from fusion reactors or solar energy. Krautkraemer (1986) examines the optimal 
depletion of a non-renewable resource in the presence of a backstop technology 
and reSOurce amenities. His analysis emphasises the impact the backstop 
technology has on the optimal preservation of natural environments. 
He shows that the outlook for the permanent preservation of natural 
environments is more favourable if there are upper limits on the marginal 
productivity of the exhaustible resource and the marginal value of consumption. 
There will be Upper limits if there is an alternative source of consumption or 
reSOurce input because then it is possible to maintain the positive flow of 
consumption without having the marginal product of the resource increasing to 
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infinity. Renewable resources and a backstop technology are ways in which this 
may occur. 
Krautkraemer (1986), analyses the optimal depletion ofa non-renewable resource 
when there are amenity values from the resource stock and there is a backstop 
technology. He examines the impact the backstop technology has on the the 
optimal preservation of natural environments. The problem is to choose the 
optimal extraction of the resource, use of the backstop, and optimal consumption 
plan which will maximise the present value of utility. Utility depends on the flow 
of consumption and the amenity services that the natural resource stock provides. 
This utility function is the same as that in Krautkraemer (1985), described above. 
The backstop is included in two ways; 
First it is a sector of the economy that provides output independent of the 
resource. Therefore the optimal control problem is to: 
Subject to: 
and 
max f' U(C(/),S(/»e-& .dl 
K(t) = Q + F(K(t), R(t» - C(t) 
Set) = -R(t) 
C(/), R(t), Set), K(t) are non-negative 
K(O) = KO and S(O) = So 
where K(/), S(/) and C(/) denote capital, resource stocks and consumption 
respectively, Q denotes the production from the backstop technology, 0 is the rate 
of discount, and U(C,S) and F(K,R) denote the utility function and the production 
function respectively. 
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The first differential equation shows that the rate of change of the stock of capital 
increases with production from the backstop technology and production from 
resOurce use, and decreases as the level of consumption increases. The second 
differential equation shows that the rate of change of the resource stock is 
negatively related to the extraction rate. 
He shows that production from the backstop technology will increase the steady 
state level of consumption; this will have the effect of reducing the productive 
value of the non-renewable resource and so the optimal level of permanently 
preserved environments will increase. Also a lower discount rate increases the 
present value of the amenity services from the preserved environments. This will 
increase the demand for capital for production. The higher demand for capital 
will increase the demand for the resource as an input as higher capital intensity 
will result in an increase in production. The increase in the extractive demand for 
the resource will outweigh the increase in demand for preserved environments if 
the output elasticity with respec~ to the non-renewable resource input is lower 
than the output elasticity with respect to capital. 
The second way that Krautkraemer models the use of a backstop technology is as 
a perfect substitute input for the non-renewable resource. The optimal control 
problem is to: 
subject to: 
and 
max f' U(C(t),S(t)e-& .dt 
K(t) = F(K(t), R(t) + M(t») - ¢(M(t» - C(t) 
Set) = -R(t) 
C(t), R(t), Set), K(t} are non-negative 
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K(O) = KO and S(O) = So 
where M(t) denotes the quantity of the substitute input and ¢i...M(t)) denotes the 
physical cost of providing the substitute. 
The differential equation for the capital stock shows that the rate of change of the 
capital stock increases as output increases and decreases as consumption and the 
physical cost of providing the substitute increases. 
He shows that it is optimal to completely exhaust the resource stock if the 
marginal cost of the backstop is high enough so that it isn't used until after the 
marginal productivity of capital falls below the rate of discount. The capital stock 
will then decline, output and consumption will fall to zero and the productive 
value of the resource input increases without bound. Therefore there is no 
preservation. 
He also shows that some permanent preservation can be optimal. If the marginal 
cost of the backstop technology is relatively low then it will be used before the 
marginal productivity of capital falls below the rate of discount. Capital will 
Continue to increase, consumption will rise, the resource price will drop to zero 
and permanent preservation can be optimal. If the marginal productivity of 
capital does fall to the rate of discount, then the economy will converge to a 
steady state with positive values of consumption and environmental preservation. 
Differential Games 
So far the literature reviewed has been dynamic optimisation models with a single 
decision maker. For example, problems involving a single industry country. 
These are optimal control problems in which it is a single individuals choice of the 
Control trajectory that changes the state of the system. The problems so far have 
been formulated so that there is only one decision maker and there has been no 
allOWance for the fact that often decision-making may be carried out by more than 
one country or individual. There are many situations in which the overall state 
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of the system is determined by more than one individual. Situations in which the 
joint actions of several individuals, each acting independently, affect a common 
state variable are modelled as differential games. Non-cooperative games are 
those in which individuals, referred to as players, do not co-operate in selecting 
the values of the control variables, and for which the state of the system changes 
according to one or more state equations. Thus in a differential game the players 
interact continuously through time. 
There has been much literature concerning the theory and application of 
differential games. See for example, Starr and Ho (1969). This literature has 
been extended to include environmental concerns and the control strategies of 
different countries 
Dockner and Long (1993) develop a dynamic game model of international 
pollution control involving- two countries. Each country produces goods that, 
when consumed by domestic houdeholds, generates pollution emissions. Each 
household's utility is positively related to consumption and negatively related to 
the stock of pollution. The Governments aim is to maximise the discounted 
stream of net benefits ofa representative consumer. They examine two strategies 
- cooperative and non-cooperative. Cooperative assumes that both countries 
have a high degree of commitment to follow an agreed strategy. Non-
cOOperative scenario is when each country's emission policy is based on self 
interest, which is based on the other country's pollution emissions. 
,They find that when the Governments follow a linear strategy, non-cooperative 
behaviour results in a high level of pollution stock and overall losses for both 
cou t' . 
n nes. The steady state pollution stock that results when both countnes 
adopt linear strategies is greater than that under a fully cooperative behaviour and 
the level of welfare for both countries is lower. A linear strategy will cause a 
COuntry to adopt a decision rule which implies a negative linear relationship 
between the permitted emission rate and the level of pollution stock at any time. 
If COuntry one found that it would be optimal to decrease its pollution emissions, 
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the Overall level of pollution stock will fall. The environment will now be cleaner 
and, as a clean environment is a public good, then country two will benefit from 
this fall in pollution. According to the linear decision rule, country two can now 
increase its emissions and so in the long run a higher steady state pollution stock 
will result. 
They find that if the countries adopt non-linear strategies and the discount rate is 
SUfficiently low, then the use of these strategies will enable the two countries to 
reach a self-enforcing agreement that approximates to the fully cooperative 
scenario. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed .. economic growth theory involving natural resources 
and the environment and the bearing this has on sustainable development. In 
Chapter 1 we saw the basic issues'in addressing sustainability and it can been seen 
that the literature has developed in such a way as to address these concerns. The 
alternative approach to natural resource scarcity recognises that the environment 
prOvides us with services essential to human welfare Here, this is contrasted with 
the conventional approach to natural resource scarcity which is mainly concerned 
with the optimal allocation of economically valuable exhaustible resources. 
It is clear that there has been a change in the way that the environment has been 
perceived in economics, not just through past history dating back to Malthus but 
since the 1970' s. The environmental effects of economic activity used to be 
regarded as a mistake, an externality to the economic process. More recently, 
however, Concerns have been focused on the physical dependency of economic 
activity and human welfare on the sustainability of crucial natural resource 
systems and ecological functions. Now the issue of sustainability figures 
prominently in contemporary discussions of natural resource use and 
enVironmental management and economic development. 
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It has not been the purpose of this chapter to attempt the task of reviewing the 
methodological critiques of neo-classical growth theory, but to identify the most 
notable issues in formal economic analysis of sustainability and give a review of 
the literature that is within the mainstream of neo-cIassical economics. 
This chapter gives an overview of how this literature has developed since the 
Work of Hotelling (I 93 1) and shows that changes over time of economic 
approaches to environmental issues is linked to the emergence of the concept of 
SUstainable development. 
In the following five chapters I have selected the various issues concerning 
SUstainability, i.e. the preservation ofland, the generation of pollution, the optimal 
extraction of non-renewable resources, endogenous population growth and the 
Use of carbon taxes and developed them further. Each chapter contains a far 







In this and subsequent chapters, the problems posed are problems of dynamic 
Optimisation. The methodology employed is the Maximum Principle of 
L.S.Pontryagin and his associates (pontryagin et al 1962). This is a modem and 
much more powerful version of the classical calculus of variations as developed by 
Euler, Lagrange, Legendre, Hamilton and Jacobi. In Section I, a typical optimal 
Control problem with a finite time horizon will be set out. Section II will detail 
POntryagin's Maximum Principle which is used to determine the optimal solution 
to the problem. Section III will examine the current value Hamiltonian where the 
value of the variables at time T a;e discounted back to give their equivalent value 
at time zero, i.e. their present value. Section IV will look at infinite horizon 
problems and Section V will examine how one can solve an optimisation problems 
when the Hamiltonian is linear in the control variables. In Section VI we will 
show how one can establish whether it is optima) to reach the optimal solution in 
the minimum amount of time Section VII will look at the steady state solutions 
to oPtimisation problems and the stability of the dynamic systems and in Section 
VIII We wilJ look at how this methodology can take into consideration issues of 
SUstainable development. 
SECTION I 
A TYPical Optimal Control Problem 
A tyPical optimal control problem contains the following elements: 
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1). An objective functional which it is desired to be maximised (or minimised) 
OVer some time interval. Typically we may wish to maximise; 
r
T 
F( x(/), u(/), I). dl Jlo (I). 
Where F(x(t), u(t), t) is a continuously differentiable function, u is a piecewise 
Continuous vector of instruments/control variables (u l , .... ,Uk), X is a continuous 
piecewise differentiable vector of target/state variables (x\ ... ,xn)and I represents 
time. Here the objective functional is to be maximised over a finite time period, 
T. This however, may be infinite as will be discussed later. 
2). A set of differential equation constraints (which show how the state variable 
changes OVer time); 
.t = g(x(t),u(t),t) (2) . 
together with initial conditions' , 
x(to) = xo (3). 
3). In addition there may be some terminal time requirements on the state 
va . bi 
na es and both state and control variables may have to satisfy a set of 
ineq l' ua Ity constraints. For example; 
x'(T) = X'r i = I, ............ ,m 
x'(T):?; X'r i = m+I, ........ ,q 
x'(T) free i = q+l, ......... ,n (4). 
4). A Control variable restriction 
u(t) eU U given set in Rr (5) 
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where U denotes some bounded control set, (which may be Rr). Admissable 
controls are the class for all piecewise continuous real functions u(t) defined on 
o S t STand satisfying (5). 
The problem essentially consists of finding a feasible piecewise continuous time 
path for the vector of control variables, u , defined on the time interval tE(O,1) 
that maximises the criterion functional. This will generate a time path for the 
state variables as the solution to the first order differential equations (2). 
If a pair (x(t), u(t» satisfies (2) - (5) it is a feasible pair. A feasible pair is an 
optimal pair if it maximises the integral in (1). 
For example, consider the differential equation; 
dS 
-=-R(t) dt (6) 
where S denotes the stock of a natural exhaustible resource, as in the Hotelling 
model (see Hotelling 1931) with S(O) = So and R(t) denotes the rate of resource 
extraction at time t. Equation (6) is known as the state equation, it describes the 
evolution of the system from its initial state So resulting from the application of a 
given control R(t). R(t) is a control variable because it is something that is 
subject to Our discretionary choice. R(t) is like a steering mechanism, it drives 
the state variable Set) to various positions via the state equation at any time t. 
The aim is to optimise some performance criterion. Suppose society wants to 
maximise total utility which is derived from using the exhaustible resource over a 
time p . d 






S(O) = So 
Note: The path of the control variable over time does not have to be continuous 
throughout the time period for it to be feasible. However, it does need to be 
piecewise continuous which means that it is allowed to have discontinuities, i.e. it 
Can jump in value within the time period. See Fig 1 in the appendix to this 
chapter for the general case where the control variable is denoted by u and the 
state variable is denoted by x. All diagrams relating to this chapter are contained 
in the Appendix to this chapter. 
The path for the state variable over time does have to be continuous but may have 
a finite number of points where it is not differentiable. For the state path to be 
feasible it only needs to be piece~ise differentiable. See Fig 2: 
The non-differentiable points along the state path occur at the same time that the 
discont" " hi . I ' mUltles Occur along the optimal control path. T s IS easy to exp am. 
Once the control path for the time interval (Oh) has been determined, say the 
curve ab in fig (1), the corresponding state path for the time interval (O,t}) must be 
determined. Suppose this is given by the curve AB in fig (2), whose initial point 
is given in the initial condition. Next we need to determine the optimal state path 
for the next time interval (1},12), corresponding to the optimal control path curve 
cd in Fig 1. But now B is the starting point of the optimal state path segment. 
Therefore for the first time interval point B is the end point and for the second 
time interval B is the initial point for the optimal state path. Therefore at point B 
there may b' b d' " e a non-dIfferentiable point but there can e no IscontmUlty. 
This can be explained using the previous example of an exhaustible resource. The 
Control which is the rate of extraction R(t) can vary as it is subject to our 
discretionary choice. Therefore the optimal control path can have discontinuities 
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• i.e. it is piecewise continuous. As the resource is extracted, it runs down the 
stock of the resource Set} • the state variable. For the time interval (O,tl) the 
extraction rate of the resource, R(t} is shown by the curve ab in fig (1). In fig (2), 
B is the terminal point for the first time interval. The extraction rate at time tl 
jumps to a higher rate indicated by point C, but the stock of the resource must 
start from point B. Therefore the optimal state path must be continuous but the 
COntrol path need only be piecewise continuous. 
SECTION II 
The Maximum Principle 
The Maximum Principle is expressed in terms of the Hamiltonian: 
H(x(t},u(t),t:..t(t)} = f(x(t),u(t},t} + ..t(t}g(x(t},u(t},t} 
Where ACt) = (Al(t), .... ,An(t)} is a'vector of adjoint or costate variables which are 
valuation variables measuring the shadow price of an associated state variable. In 
the same way as the state and control variables, the costates are piecewise 
Continuous functions of time. The first term on the right hand side is the 
objective functional at time t. Using the previous example this is the utility 
function at time t based on the current resource stock and the current policy 
decision at t. It is the present utility corresponding to policy R(t}, (in the general 
case - u(t». The second term on the right hand side, g(x(t},u(t},t), shows the 
rate of change of the resource stock (5), (in the general case (x» corresponding 
to policy R(t). The whole of this expression relates to the future utility effect of 
policy R(t). Here A.(t) converts this expression to a monetary value, it is the 
imputed value of future utility streams. The Hamiltonian represents overall utility 
prospects of various policy decisions with both the immediate and future prospects 
taken into consideration. 
It is conv' h .. . I entent ere to state the Maximum Pnnclp e: 
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For (x(t),u(t» to be a feasible pair it is necessary that there exists a constant Ao 
and a continuous n-vector function A(t) = (Al(1), .... ,An(/» where for all liE (10,1), 
(.10, ..t(t» -:i; (0,0) and such that; 
For any tiE (to, 1) 
H(x(t),u(t), A(t),t) ~ H(x(t),U(t),A(t),t) for all u EU (7) 
Except at the points of discontinuity of u(t), 
~i(t) = - H'Xi(X(t), u(t), ;'(/), t) i = 1, ....... ,n (8) 
Furthermore the following transversality conditions must be satisfied: 
Ai(T) no conditions i = l, ........ ,p 
(= 0 ifxi(T) > Xii) i = p+ l, .... ,q 
Ai(T) = 0 i = q+1, .... ,n (9) 
(Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1977» 
Equations (7), (8) and (9) are thus the necessary conditions that must be satisfied 
by an optimal control. Equation (8) is known as the adjoint equation and 
sim l'fi Plies to: ,(from now on, for notational simplicity we suppress explicit 
dependence upon time) 
. aH A; =--
ax; 
which when . . . 
wntten 10 full IS: 
(10) 
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The left hand side of (I 0) denotes the change in the shadow price over time. The 
first of the two terms on the right hand side, iJ f , represents the marginal 
iJ Xi 
contribution of the state variable to the instantaneous utility. The second term, 
2 ~, represents the value of the marginal contribution of the state variable to the 
future utility prospects. 
The Maximum Principle requires that the shadow price of the state variable, x (I), 
depreciates at the rate at which the state variable is contributing to the current and 
future pay oft's. 
The transversality conditions 
Equations (9) depend on_ the particular end point constraint dictated by the 
problem. When no terminal value for the state variable x(t) is specified - i.e. 
free terminal value, the transversality condition is: 
2(T) = 0 
This means that at the terminal time T, the shadow price of the state should be 
driven down to zero. Using the example used earlier, the reason for this is that 
the benefits of the resource to Society arise solely from its potential for producing 
utility. Given that the terminal time is fixed, T, only the utility derived in that 
period (0,1) matters and that Society derives no utility from remaining resource 
stocks. Therefore the shadow price of the resource should be set equal to zero at 
time T. 
If there is some minimum acceptable level for the terminal resource stock, say 
S nUn, the transversality condition is now: 
2(T) ~ 0 and [S * min(T) - S min]2(T) = 0 
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If the optimal level of resource stock at time T, [S*(T)], is greater than Smin , the 
restriction placed on the terminal resource stock does not hold. This would be 
the same as in the previous case and the transversality condition A(T) = 0 still 
applies. But if the shadow price of the resource at the terminal time,A(T), is 
Optimally positive then the optimal amount of the resource stock left at time Twill 
be exactly the same as the required minimum level S min • 
For a problem in which there is a prespecified level of resource stock at the 
terminal time T, but the time horizon may be freely chosen, there is an additional 
condition and that is that T should be chosen such that the maximised value of the 
Hamiltonian should be zero at terminal time. This means that at T the sum of the 
current and future utility levels must be zero. Therefore we should not achieve 
the prespecified level of resource stock when the sum of the current and future 
utility levels is positive, i.e; Hr> O. This would imply that there was additional 
utility to be gained and the full utility potential had not been maximised. We 
should reach S(1) when no more utility can be derived, i.e. when the sum is zero. 
In general terms again, the Maximum Principle requires the maximisation of the 
Hamiltonian with respect to the controls u. Referring back to equation (7), the 
Control set is often of the form: UI(t) e[lli,pi] where i = l, ...... ,n and a; < fJi ; 
CXi and p, are either constants or functions of t and/or x( t). If the control set is 
unrestricted then u e (-00, (0) and the range ofui is the real line. 
For each t e[O, T] either: 
') aH 
1. 8;> 0 \:lUI e[apPi] then we have a boundary solution and set U/ = ft. 
Thi ' 
. s IS the upper boundary solution (fig 3). 
") aH 11. -<:0 
au \;lUI e[apPI] then we have a lower boundary solution and set 
U, :::: CXi (fig 4). 
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''') oR 
111 , -= 0 and Vu e[a p.] ou j i' I then uj = U ... j and this is called an interior 
solution (fig 5), 
The Sufficiency Conditions 
suppose an admissible pair [x(t),u(t)] is found that satisfies (7) - (9), Will it be 
an optimal pair? The above conditions are necessary but not necessarily 
sUfficient. However when certain concavity conditions are satisfied, the necessary 
Conditions stipulated by the Maximum Principle are also sufficient for 
maximisation. 
Let [X(t),U(t)] be a feasible pair satisfying (7) - (9). Then if H(x,u,A.,t) is 
jOintly concave in X and u, [x'" (t), u'" (t)] is an optimal pair, (Mangasarian 1966). 
SECTION III 
The Current Value Hamiltonian: 
With many economic applications of optimal control theory, the payoff function g 
often contains a discount factor e·pt. To explain this it is best to look at a small 
example. If A pounds (£A) were invested at an interest rate ,010 per year, after 1 
year the amount would grow to £(I+r)A, after 2 years £[(I+r)A + r(l+r)A] = 
£(l+r?A, and after Tyears £(1 +r)TA , 
If the interest Were compounded not annually but twice a year, then for a 6 month 
period the interest rate would be (rI2)%. So if £A were invested, after 1 year it 
Would grow to £(1 +rI2)2A and after T years it would be (1 +rI2)2T, If interest 
Was cOmpounded m times a year then the rate per period would be (rlm)%. Then 
£.4 Would grow to £(l+rlm)mA after 1 year and £(l+rlm)mTA after Tyears. 
Continuous d' , d ' compoun 109 means lettmg m~oo an smce: 
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lim (1 + r / m)mT = e-rT 
m-l>OO 
This means that £A invested at an annual rate of ,.010, if continuously compounded, 
grows to £AerT in T years time. If we call this amount D, then, in other words, 
£A is worth AerT in T years time and AerT = B. Thus A = e-rTB. The term, 
e-rTB' h 
, IS t e present value of £B available T years in the future. 
This is called discounting. We are discounting the value of £B to find it's present 
value, i.e. it's value at time zero. 
The same procedure is employed in optimal control theory. The value of the 
variables at time T is discounted back to give their equivalent value at time zero, 
i.e. their present value. The optimal control problem is now: 
maxJ = f'F(x,u)e-pt.dt 
s b' . 
u ~ect tox = g(x, u) and boundary conditions as before. 
Where F(x,u)e-pt = f(t,x,u) and p is the rate of (subjective) time preference. 
It is co ' 
nventent to define the current value costate as: 
y(t) == 2(t) ept 
Thus: 
2(t) == y(t)e-pt (11) 
and then the Hamiltonian may be written as: 
H = e-pt [F(x,u) + yg(x,u)] 
Then the d' , , 
a ~OInt equations are: 
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The remaining necessary conditions are as before. The result of this is to enable 
us to express all the necessary conditions in a simple non time dependent form . 
.1.(/) represents the marginal valuation of the state variable at time t discounted 
back to zero. But it is more convenient to use terms of current value - that is 
value at time t rather than their equivalent at time zero. It is desirable to define a 
new Hamiltonian called the current value Hamiltonian. This can be written: 
He= Rept= F(x,u) + yg(x, u) 
H' 
e IS now free of the discount factor. 
We need to re-examine aU the conditions of the Maximum Principle. The first 
Condition is to maximise He with respect to u at every point in time. Because 
e-pt is a Constant for any given t and it is always strictly positive, using the current 
value Hamiltonian the condition is unchanged. The particular u that maximises H 
will therefore also maximise He. Therefore equation (7) is unchanged. 
Looking at the equation of motion for the costate variable: 
, iH 
A.; = --j 
ik; 
i = l, ..... ,n (12) 
we need to transform each side of (12) into expressions involving y. By 
differentiating (II): 
. 
A. = ye-pt - pye-pt 






by using R=Bce-pt 
By equating these two results we get: 





As compared with the original equation of motion for A(t), the new equation of 
mot' .t:'. Ion Lor yet) now has an extra term, py. 
Next we·need to look at the trans~ersality conditions. For the condition where no 
ternunal value for the state variable is prescribed the transversality condition is: 
A(T)= 0 (equation (9». 
Using (11) this implies that: 
[ ye-pt] t=T= 0 
Therefore: 
Y(T)e-pT = 0 
For the case where there is a minimum acceptable level for the state variable the 
transvers I't '" a I Y condItion IS: 
A(T) ~ 0 
Therefore 
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y(T)e-pT ~ 0 =::) y(1) = 0 since e-pT> O. 
For the case where the terminal time is free but the state variable is fixed to some 




Infinite Horizon Problems 
So far the time horizon considered has been finite. But most economic models 
have a planning horizon which is infinite ( T = (0). But with an infinite horizon 
two methodological issue~ need to be addressed. One is a matter of the 
transversality conditions, the other has to do with the convergence of the objective 
functional. The convergence problem arises because the objective functional (l) 
may itself become infinite. In this case there may be difficulties in discriminating 
between alternative optimal policy options where there are more than one pair 
(x(t), u(t)) that satisfies the optimality conditions. 
A simple criterion has been proposed by Von Weizsac ker (1965) called the 
, 
OVertaking' criterion which deals with the problem of infinite integrals. 
By putting T = 00 and assuming that the necessary and sufficient conditions hold, 
(With the possible exception of the transversality conditions), (x * (/),U * (I»), 
SUggests itself to be an optimal pair, (x(t),u(t» is any other feasible pair. 
Define: 
&(/) = r' f(x *(t),u * (t),t).dt - r' f(x(t),u(t),t).dt J,O J,o 
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If there exists a finite number t such that ~(t) ~ 0 for all t ~ l' then we say that 
(x III (t), u*(t» "overtakes" (x * (t), u*(t» and (x * (t), U III (t» is an optimal pair. 
M[x(t), A(t)] = Sup H[x(t), u(t), t, A(t)] 
{u } 
Transversality Conditions for 
Problems 
Infinite Horizon 
Balkin (1974) has shown that while the necessary conditions carry over to the 
case where T is infinite, the transversality conditions may not. The problem arises 
because the planning horizon is infinite, and the terminal state value may also be 
free. Arrow (1968) however, has shown that the transversality conditions do 
carry over for an infinite horizon problem where the sufficiency conditions hold. 
The transversality condition for a free terminal state is: 
lim2(t):O 
1-+00 
Similarly, in the case of the terminal state which is subject to a pre-specified 
minimum level x min as t ~ 00 the infinite horizon transversality condition is: 
lim A(t) ~ 0 
1-+00 
and lim A(t)[y(t) - ymin] = 0 
I-+ao 
Sufficiency Conditions Re-examined 
The sufficiency conditions for the optimality of a feasible pair (x * (t), u * (t» 
requires that the Hamiltonian function of the optimal control problem is concave 
with respect to x and u or H * (x) is concave in x, where H * (x) is the 
maximised Hamiltonian. But Sorger (1992) presents new sufficiency conditions 
that do not require the Hamiltonian function to be concave with respect to x and 
u. 
The Hamiltonian is defined as before as: 
H[x(t), t, u(t), A(t)] 
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and let 
M[x(t),2(t)] = Sup H[x(t), u(t), t, 2(t)] (II ) 
If M(x, 2) turns out to be convex in (x*, 2 *) the usual sufficiency conditions 
cannot be satisfied. Sorger showed that for a problem with a single state variable 
a sUfficiency condition for a stationary state to be (locally) optimal is that: 
i). There exists a stationary state (x*, 2 *)and an open neighbourhood N of 
(x*,A,*) such that the function H[x,u,2,t] has a unique maximum with respect to 
feasible values of u for all (x, 2) EN and such that M(x,2) is twice continuously 
differentiable on N. 
ii). At the stationary state (x*,2*), the Hamiltonian function is strictly convex 
with respect to 2 and M;.;.> 0 at (x*,2*). 
iii), If i). and ii). are satisfied and M 2 xl - rMxl - Mdvf;.;. > 0 at (x*, 2 *), then 
(x*, A, *) is a locally stable optimal stationary state. 
See Sorger (1992) Corollary 2.1 p150, also see Chappell and Dury (1994) for an 
example of how these new sufficiency conditions are used. 
SECTION V 
Singular Arc solutions to Optimal Control 
The Hamiltonian (6) may sometimes be linear in the control variables and for an 
unbounded control set the control can take any value. The necessary conditions 
for optimality that iH = 0 cannot be solved for the optimal value of the controls 
iii 
and therefore the choice of control cannot be determined in the usual way. Under 
these circumstances, the natural solution to look for is a singular arc solution. 
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In this thesis, problems of this type do arise from time to time but in a relatively 
simple form with scalar state and control variables and an infinite time horizon. 
The most general formulation of such a problem is: 
subject to: 
q1ax ret> e-pt [a(x) + b(x)u].dt 
\11 } Jo 
i = c(x)+d(x)u 
x(o) = Xo for scalar u and x . 
The present value Hamiltonian is defined as: 
H = e-pt {a(x) +b(x)u + y[c(x) +d(x)u]} 
The current value hamiltonian is therfbre: 
Hc=Hept = {a(x) + b(x)u + y[c(x)+d(x)u]} 
Note that the control set is unbounded (also for notational simlicity we suppress 
the dependence on x) and: 
CH 
---.£.. = [b +dy] = 0 dJ (1) 
Thi s does not enable us to solve for the control. However in these circumstances 




b+dy= 0 (2) 
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The equation for the costate is: 
and therefore 
y = py-a' -b'u-c'y-d'uy (3) 
It fOllows that along the singular arc: 
d 
-(iJH / au) = 0 dt e 
therefore 
! (iJHe / au) = dy + (b' + d'y)i = 0 
SUbstituting in (3) gives: 
d(py-a' -b'u -c'y-d'u) + (b' +d')(c+du)=O 
SimplifYing gives: 
pdy-a'd - c'dy+b'c+ cd'y = 0 (4) 
Note that this expression still does not enable us to solve for the control variable 
so We must differentiate again. It also follows that along the singular arc 
. Therefore 
(pj-c'd +cd')y+~' -a"d -a'd' -c"dy-c'd'y+b"c+b'c' + c'dy + aI''y)i=O 
SUbstituting for y and i and simplifying gives: 
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(pel -c'd +cd')(ry-a' -b'u -c'y-d'yu) (5) 
+(c+du)(PYd' -a"d -a'd' -c"dy+b"c+b'c' +cd'y) = 0 
Note that this condition can in fact be solved for u in terms of x and y and, 
(provided the "coefficient" on u is non-zero), these three equations, (2), (4) and 
(5), can be solved for the optimal values of x, u and y along the singular arc. 
Denoting optimal values with a * superscript, it follows that from (2): 
* _ -b(x*) 
Y - d(x*) 
Substituting this into (4) and simplifying gives: 
-pb(x*) - a'(x*)d(x*) 









Clearly multiply solutions are possible. 
satisfy an additional necessary condition. 
However any candidate solution must 
Necessary Conditions for Singular Optimal Controls 
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle does not yield any information directly on 
Singular controls, so new necessary conditions for optimality are needed. 
I<elIeY(1964) discovered, and Robbins (1967), Tait (1965) and Kelley et al (1967) 
. generalised, a new necessary condition known as the Generalised Legendre 
Clebsch, (GLC), for the optimality of singular arcs. Along a singular arc Kelley 
et ai, Robbins and Tait prove that an additional necessary condition of optimality 
is as fOllows. , 
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(9) 
Where u is the control variable and the 2kth time derivative of Hu is the first to 
Contain explicitly the control u. If this condition holds then the singular arc 
solution is optimal. 
SECTION VI 
Next it is necessary to establish whether it is optimal to reach the optimal solution 
in the minimum amount of time. This property may be established by writing the 
objective functional as a line integral and applying Green's Theorem, see Kamien 
and Schwartz (1991) . 
. Line Integrals 
By Solving the state equation for the' control and substituting into the objective 
functional, this can then be written as a line integral. 
Consider the linear control problem with scalar state and control variables of the 
form· , 
max f' [Jo(/,x) + go{/,x)u].dt 
Subject to: 
.t = !t(t,x) + gt(t,x)u 
Therefore rearranging (II) gives 





We can then eliminate u from our problem by substituting (12) into (10). The 
problem then becomes: 
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max I' [G(t,x)+H(t,x)x].dt (13) 
Where G(t,x) = (fo(t,x)- [go(t, X)/I(t, x)]/ gl(t,X)}, H(t, x) = go(t,x)/ gl(t, x). 
(13) can then be written as a line integral, Kamien and Schwartz (1991): 
fo<O[G(t,X)+H(t,x)x].dt = f G.dx + H.dt (14) 
l 
where .e is the Curve x = x(t), t ~ o. Suppose that the situation is as shown in 
Fig 6 where the curve jet) is the asserted optimal trajectory denoted by mn. 
Consider an alternative feasible path, the curve q(t), denoted by mp which takes 
longer to reach x *, the optimal level of the state variable x. Let tp be the time 
q(t) gets to x *. Then jet) and q(t) coincide for t ~ tp, i.e. both paths have 
X(I) = x * for t ~ tp. For jet) to reach x* quicker than q(t) we need to show that 
jet) gives a higher value to the integral from 0 to tp than q(t)does, i.e: 
I G.dx + H.dl - I G.dx + H.dt ~ 0 (15) 
mn mp 
Using Green's Theorem (see Kamien and Schwartz (1991»: 
f Gdx + Hdt = II[dH / dt -dG / dx]dxdt (16) 
pnmp R 
Where R is the closed and bounded region pnmp. 
If equation (1 S) is ~ 0, i. e.: 
then the curve jet) gives a higher value to the integral from 0 - tp than q(t) does. 
This means that it is optimal to reach x * in the minimum amout of time. 
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SECTION VII 
Steady states and their stability 
In the long run the optimal solution may converge to an equilibrium, or rest point. 
This Constant solution of a system of differential equations is known as the steady 
state or the particular solution. 
A typical first order system of differential equations in K' is: 
Or in vector notation y = F(y), where F == (/" ... ,/n)' Since eachy(t) = 0 for a 
steady state solution to the system, a point y* = (YI *'''''Y2 *)is a steady state if 
and only if: 
II (YI *"",Yn *) = 0 
and in vector notation, F(y*) = O. Therefore to find the steady state solutions is 
a Jllatter of solving n algebaic equations in n variables. 
Stability 
If Y* is the equilibrium point for the n-dimensional first order system of differential 
equations, as above, then y* is locally asymptotically stable if every solution y(t) 
wh' h 
lC starts near y*, converges to y* as t ~ 00. 
If every solution to the system of equations y = F(y) tends to y* as t ~ 00 for 
any initial values, Yo, the equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable. 
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If an equilibrium y* is neither globally or locally asymptotically stable, then the 
system is unstable and yet) may not converge to the steady state equilibrium as 
t ~ <Xl. 
To ascertain the stability of the steady states it is necessary to determine the 
characteristic roots (eigenvalues) of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady 
state, DF(y*). 
In a system y = F(y) with n variables and steady state y*, the Jacobian matrix 
DF(y*) is defined as: 
all (y*) 
aYI 
al2 ( *) 
DF(y*) = aYI. Y 
. 
. 
If each eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix DF(y*) is negative or has negative real 
parts, then y* is a locally asymptotically stable steady state. 
If DF(y*) has at least one positive real eigenvalue or one complex eigenvalue with 
a Positive real part, then y* is an unstable steady state, possibly a saddle point. 
This method is not valid if any of the eigenvalues are purely imaginery. 
There may be no simple closed-form expression for the eigenvalues of this matrix. 
For example if n > 4 a different method is then required to analyse the stability of 
the steady state. 
Using corollary 2c in Sorger (1989), the equilibrium point of the system y = F(y) 




is negative definite, where H* is the maximised Hamiltonian, i represents the state 
Variables, j represents the costate variables of the system, n is the number of 
equality constraints and 8 is the time rate of preference. 
Cass and Shell (1976) show that the Hamiltonian is convex in the costate and 
concave in the state for problems with a concave objective function and so the 
matrices H*i/ and H*jj are negative definite. 
Brock and Scheinkman (1976) show that if the matrices H*i/ and H*jj are negative 
definite with minimum eigenvalues below zero, the curvature matrix is negative 
defi' , 
. nlte With a low rate of time preference. 
Sorger (1989) shows that if the curvature matrix C is negative definite then the 
equilibrium point i.e. the steady state, is globally stable for bounded solutions. 
This implies that with any initial levels of state variables the optimal path will 
Converge toward a unique steady state. 
SECTION VIII 
Dynamic optimisation modelling is used as the analytical tool for the theoretical 
analYsis of sustainable development. Models are formulated that combine the 
economic and environmental processes from a long term point of view, In this 
Section, the elements of these models that incoporate sustainable development 
con'd ' SI eratlons are discussed . 
. The Concept central to sustainable development is the idea that we have a 
responsibility for the well being of future generations. 
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'Development is sustainable if it satisfies present needs without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs." (WCED, 1987). 
Optimal control modelling can incorporate intergenerational concerns. It can do 
this through certain elements of the models; the use of social discount rates, social 
welfare function, time horizon and constraints imposed on variables in the model. 
Discounting 
The problems addressed in this thesis are dynamic optimisation problems. These 
are economic problems in an inter-temporal setting, i.e. where the variables and 
the objective function are not timeless. They pose the question of what is the 
Optimal magnitude of a choice variable at each point in time in the planning 
hOrizon. The solution of these problems will take the form of an optimal time 
path for each choice variable and will give the optimal value of the variable today, 
tomorrow and for each point in time in the whole planning period. 
Those that may be affected by a decision today may not be involved in the 
decision making process, i.e. future generations. Thus there is the potential for an 
intertemporal externality. Today's generation must decide how to allocate, for 
instance, the natural resources over time based on their considerations of equity. 
Discounting is a process by which the costs and benefits of different time periods 
are compared. A discount rate is applied to future costs and benefits to yield their 
present value. It can be said that a high discount rate may discriminate against 
future generations. This is because a high discount rate will favour projects 
Where social costs occur in the long term and social benefits occur in the short 
term .. Costs are therefore shifted to later generations and there are fewer 
. InCentives for projects that have a long term payoff. Projects that yield benefits 
in the long term are less likely to be undertaken with a high discount rate. These 
are Very likely to be environmentally favourable projects, Opschoor (1987). If a 
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high discount rate is applied in natural resource management, renewable resources 
will tend to be depleted at higher rates as current consumption is favoured. This 
will lead to a lower level of resource stock or may even lead to exhaustion of the 
resOurce before the planning period has ended. It can be argued that there is a 
case for lowering the discount rate for natural resource management as this will 
tend to result in a larger stock of natural resources and thereby create more 
o f p Ions for current and future generations. 
Many environmentalists would prefer a lower discount rate to allow for 
e . 
nVlronmentally sound projects to be undertaken. Pearce (1991) makes the case 
that if the discount rate is above 1 - 2 %, then global warming considerations are 
not taken into account seriously enough and that the cost of this would be borne 
by future generations. Krautkraemer (1988), argued that lower discount rates 
would Worsen environmental degradation because lower discount rates would 
lower the cost of capital and thus lower the cost of production; so more would be 
consumed in the short term than if higher discount rates were used. 
Some would argue for a zero discount rate to be used so that future generations 
interest can be protected. But this would also be inequitable. It would 
disCriminate against current generations as it would imply a policy of total current 
sacrifice and this would be inconsistent with the aim of intergenerational equity, 
In developing countries there is a great urgency to satisfY immediate wants rather 
than guaranteeing long term, say food security. Therefore here the rate of time 
preference is very high. 
It can also be argued that a consequence of higher discount rates is a low level of 
development due to less investment in general and this may benefit 
en ' 
vlronmentally sound projects as there would be less demand for resources and 
less '. 
emissions, Markandya and Pearce (1988). So there seems to be a 
Contradiction here. 
Barnett and Morse (1963) argued that: 
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'By devoting itself to improving the lot of the living, therefore, 
each generation, whether recognising a future orientated obligation 
to do so or not, transmits a more productive world to those who 
follow." (Barnett and Morse p 288). 
They argue that current generations should use a high rate of discount as future 
generations will almost certainly be much wealthier. Goodland and Ledec (1987), 
point out that today's affluence can be attributed to the irreversible consumption 
and depletion of cheap petroleum and, since the oil price shocks, poorer countries 
have found it hard to adjust to higher energy prices. Between 1960 and 1982, oil 
importing countries in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced negative per-capita 
growth rates, (World Bank (1984». They therefore argue that it would be 
prudent for planners to entertain the possibility that because of higher energy 
prices alone, future generations might live more frugally, rather than become 
wealthier and have a more lavish life~tyle. They state that if this is a plausible 
argument, then the equity case for higher discount rates loses its validity. In any 
case, since the future is uncertain, discounting valuable natural resources at a high 
rate is not a prudent option in view of the future. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss the ongoing controversy about the 
apprOPriate level of the discount rate. However, it can be said that discounting 
reflects considerations of intergenerational equity. As future generations cannot 
be here, the current generation must decide on its behalf, therefore we must decide 
on a fair distribution of costs and benefits between generations. Discounting, 
then, is a way of incorporating intergenerational equity into optimisation 
problems. 
T' line Horizon 
The notion of sustainable development implies a long term planning horizon, 
although the exact choice of time span is arbitrary. It is argued that if we are to 
take into 'd . ... ful h ConSl eratJon the needs of future generatIOns 10 a meamng way t en 
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the time span should cover at least a period long enough to include the next 
generation after the current one has disappeared, (van den Bergh (1991». For 
Sustainable development it is the long run behaviour of economic and ecological 
systems that is relevant. Individuals may plan for a finite time horizon as even the 
most farsighted people are likely not to plan very far beyond their expected 
lifetime. But for society, or even some corporations, it is reasonable to expect or 
assume that its existence will be permanent. It will therefore be desirable to 
extend the planning period indefinitely into the future. Dynamic optimisation 
modelling in an optimal control framework aJ)ows for long term planning periods, 
indeed the time horizon can be finite or infinite. It therefore allows for the 
conSideration of future generations. It is also possible to include the notion of 
OVer lapping-generations, (See Fisher (1992». 
Welfare function 
A social welfare function is an ordinal index of society's welfare and is a function 
that attempts to aggregate the utility functions of all individuals in that society. 
The form of the welfare function depends on the judgement of the person who is 
formulating the problem and its arguments depend on what that person deems 
appropriate to have an effect on human welfare. Therefore welfare functions can 
inclUde consumption, output, population levels. Pollution stocks and resource 
stacks can be included then to recognise that the quality of the environment has an 
effect on the welfare of society. In this way the welfare of society can be 
maximised with environmental concerns being taken into account. This is 
essential for the analysis of sustainable development. 
Long Term Uncertainty 
. SUstainable development implies a long term time horizon and this concerns the 
iSsue of uncertainty. Uncertainty surrounds the future behaviour of economic and 
ecological systems. Uncertainty comes from unforeseen changes that can occur 
in a system which are caused by exogenous impacts. Timmerman (1986), 
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classifies five patterns of behaviour that a system can take: (1) perfectly stable, 
(2) resilient, (3) cyclical, (4) switching between mUltiple stability points, and (5) 
catastrophic. 
If an equilibrium of the system exists, then there is the problem of actually 
attaining it and whether or not the equilibrium is optimal. With regard to long run 
uncertainty, it is important to determine the stability of the system. If the time 
\ 
paths of the variables eventually reach equilibrium or steady state, then the 
underlying dynamic system is stable. A system that is perturbed from a stable 
steady state will eventually return to it. For an unstable steady state, any 
perturbation will move the system away from the equilibrium. The steady state is 
lOCally stable if the equilibrium is eventually reached with initial values of the 
variables sufficiently close to the equilibrium point. The steady state is globally 
stable if the equilibrium is eventually reached for any set of initial values. Global 
stability implies local stability but loca~ stability does not imply global stability. 
Therefore if it can be determined that the system is stable, something can be said 
about the certainty of the system to reach the optimal equilibrium point. If the 
init' I la values places us on a stable path the uncertainty over the future state of the 
system is reduced. 
Long term uncertainty can also be handled with the use of sensitivity analysis to 
determine how sensitive the model is to parameter values. This will show which 
parameter values affect the outcome of the model and identify which parameter 
values to concentrate research on to try and improve their estimates. If the 
system is highly sensitive to a particular parameter then this will indicate that 
research could be carried out into the value of this parameter, so that an accurate 
as Possible estimate is obtained. 
Economic-Ecological Interactions. 
It is very '. d h . Important to mtegrate development, the economy an t e enVIronment 
So that insight can be gained into sustainable development. An approach that is 
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frequently used to describe the interactions between the economy and the 
environment is to use formal models. These models are useful for the study of 
Sustainable development in that they can provide us with the dynamic features of 
economic-environmental systems and with the long run steady states of such 
systems. 
The impact that the economic productive system has on the environment needs to 
be considered in terms of resource extraction, waste emissions and disturbing 
activities. Production can have a positive effect on the environment, for instance 
environmental protection or abatement activities. The impact that the 
environment may have on the economy can also be considered, for instance soil 
quality for agricultural productivity, and also considered here is the material 
outtlow from the environment as resources are extracted and are used as inputs in 
the production process. It is also possible to consider the negative effects that the 
environment may have on productivity, for example the quality of the air from 
Pollution activities that may affect wo'rkers health. Not only material services or 
services that can be tagged with a price label can be included in these models, but 
other services such as amenity services that the environment provides us with, for 
instance, recreational, aesthetic or scientific. These services can be included in 
the welfare function. 
AU these considerations show that it is the dynamic behaviour of the systems that 
is essential to the study of sustainable development. Dynamic optimisation 
mOdelling can allow us to take account of these positive and negative feedbacks 
from the economy to the environment and vice versa. 
Many of the economic activities and the natural processes may be independent of 
each other. But some processes that yield services to society may result in contlict 
. between the users, for instance the recreational and aesthetic uses of lakes and 
their commercial exploitation. Thus the multiple use of resources can be dealt 
With in formal modelling to include the different independent and conflicting uses 
orecon . 
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ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRESERVATION 
=== 
Preservation versus Development 
Society has a desire for both the preservation and development of natural 
environments. The natural environment is valued for both the natural resources 
and the environmental amenities it provides - recreational, educational, scientific, 
aesthetic as well as regulating the climate and the global atmosphere. The need 
for preserv' , . b ' , 'I 'rt t' Ing our environment IS ecomIng an IncreaSIng y more Impo an Issue. 
However, not only is it necessary to preserve our natural environment but there is 
also the need to develop land for production and for living. The environment also 
provides us with the natural resources we require for these purposes. Land does 
need to be developed, we need to be able to produce commodities, develop land 
for agriculture and for housing etc., we need all this to live. Developing land 
however renders these resources more scarce and so puts our future prosperity at 
risk. 
Preserv t' " d' a Ion and development of our natural environment are In Irect 
competition with each other. One of the best examples that illustrates this is the 
Cutting down of the Brazilian tropical rain forests to make way for agricultural 
production and with the world population growing, there is increasing competition 
between the two uses. Destroying natural capital invariably means that the 
environmental losses that occur are irreversible. Fisher and KrutiIJa (1985), point 
. Out that by irreversible conversion of natural areas the future possibilities of 
Obtaining environmental services from these areas are lost. One may argue that 
technology· of the future may make it possible to restore the area back to its 
original state. It may be possible to clean up pollution that has caused damage to 
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the environment that so far has been viewed as permanent. But what if that 
Pollution has destroyed the natural habitat of a particular plant or animal which 
Subsequently becomes extinct. Once a species is lost it is gone forever; no 
amOunt of future technology will give it back to us. The tropical rain forests 
harbour a diversity of life. Pulling down a forest and using the land for 
development will destroy the natural habitat of thousands of species. The land 
will also become fully degraded, soil fertility will be lost and other essential 
services provided by the forest ecosystem such as watershed protection and 
regulation will be destroyed. Deforestation will also have serious impacts on 
global, regional and local climates. Also other areas of land such as desertified 
land are very difficult to reclaim once development has been undertaken. It must 
be realised that it is necessary to achieve a balance between preservation and 
development - only then will it be possible to sustain human life. 
Literature on land use models 
Irrever 'bl ' , ' , 
Sl e Investments have received a great amount of attention In the 
environmental economics literature. Fisher, Krutilla and Cicchetti (1972), 
(hereafter FKC), formulated a model for the allocation of natural environments 
between, preservation and development. They make the assumption that 
conVersion of the natural area for development purposes represents an irreversible 
development. Their examples of irreversible development include: 
'transformation and loss of whole environments as could result 
from clear cutting a redwood forest, or developing a hydroelectric 
project in the Grand Canyon." (p 605). 
CUmmings and Norton (1974), (hereafter C and N), criticise FKC for assuming 
that dev I ' 'bl' 
. e opment of natural environments represents an lrreverSl e Investment. 
They state that it may be impossible to restore a natural area, such as a flooded 
canYon, to its exact original state and that it is not necessarily desirable to do so. 
They argue that such exactness is not necessarily a prerequisite for the future 
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generation of environmental benefits from that area and that an area can be 
restored to some kind of natural environment in the future - even a flooded 
canyon. C and N agree that investment can be irreversible but that is unlikely, 
and so irreversible investment should be treated as a special case. The 
implicatt'ons from FKC arguments is that their development begins with 
irreversible investment and they state that: 
'\vere the transformations reversible, much of the conflict between 
preservation and development would vanish." (p607). 
FKC make it clear from their paper that it is irreversible development that is the 
issue - so why the criticism from C and N? 
C and N recognise that irreversible investment is a special case but also that the 
Cost of reverting back to its original state may be so large relative to the benefits 
of restoration that investment for development is economically irreversible. C 
and N formulate a model that incorporates this view and show that FKC's model 





D'+I = D' + a/' - ~' 
pHI = pI + ~' _ a/' 
pI +D' = L 
(1) 
(2) 
}J t d t 
1 an B2 are the net benefits at time t, from preservation, pi , and development, 
, Ii , respectively. f represents the investment in developing the land. All 
correspond to FKC's model. The difference is that G' is investment in preserving 
the land' G' . hid b k' . ,. I 
' I.e. allows for reversibility, by convertlOg t e an ac lOto Its ongma 
State. The first equation in (2) states that development in period t plus investment 
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in development less the investment in preservation gives the amount of land 
developed in the next period. The second equation in (2) is a transition equation 
for the preserved land. It states that preservation in period t plus investment in 
preservation less investment in development gives the amount of land preserved in 
the next period. The third equation shows that there is a fixed amount of land 
and that it can either be developed of preserved. Their model uses the same 
assumption as FKC in that the benefits of the alternative uses of the land, i.e. 
preservation and development, change with time in a known way. They view the 
problem in a much broader perspective and it is a valid extension of the literature. 
However the main concern in this chapter is irreversible development and it is 
wrong to criticise FKC for concentrating on such an issue. 
Miller et al (1981) uses the irreversibility concept but applies it to the preservation 
of endangered species. The same concept applies in that the problem is the 
alloc t' a Ion of land between preservation and development, except the area of land 
is home to a particular endangered species. Therefore a model is developed 
which analyses the problem of the allocation of land between the production of 
econOmic goods (development), and the preservation of the species 
(preservation). Conversion of the land is assumed to be irreversible - once the 
land has been developed for the production of goods it is not possible to use the 
habitat in the future, i.e. the species will become extinct. For example a lake or 
sOme body of water may be used for irrigation purposes that results in the 
extinction of some aquatic species. The arguments of an individual's utility 
function are the aggregate of economic goods and services, Q and the stock of a 
species of Wildlife, X. 
U1 = UI (Q: , .... 'Q~;Xl· .. XT) 
. X is not used in the production of output, but production requires the use of land, 
L, and non-land resources, R. 
The welfare function for society defined over the utility of S individuals is: 
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V=V[Ut, .... ,lf] 
The problem posed is to maximise the welfare function over a finite time horizon 
t == T subject to a species growth constraint, constraints on land and non-land 
resources, the irreversibility condition, an adding up constraint in produced goods, 
and the production constraint for output. These are respectively: 
Where: 
XI = G(XI_1,R/" L:) 
L = LQ + LX 
I I 
If =RQ +R x I I I 
L; S L~I 
'LQ: = QI 
Qt = Q(RtQ ,L?) 
Qt == goods produced in time t 
X, == species stock in time t 
x,.) == species stock in (I - I) 
R,Q == non-land resources used to produce Q in time t 
L¥ == land used to produce Q in time t 
R; == nonland resources used to produce X in time t 
V; == land used to produce X in time t 
Miller' . d . s results are comparable to FKC's when applIed to an endangere speCies, 
in that there is less conversion of the species habitat than would occur in the 
absence of irreversibility. 
Arrow and Fisher (1974) focus on irreversible development, but they ask the 
qUestion - does the introduction of uncertainty as to the benefits and costs of the 
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proposed development affect the investment decision? They consider a two 
period model consisting of the first period, the present, followed by all future 
intervals being compressed into the second period. The second period 
expectations are conditional on what happens in the first period. Some amount of 
development is planned at the start of the first period. Information about benefits 
in the first period accumulate and plans can be revised at the start of the second 
period, (but only in the direction of more investment). Results show that the 
natural area is Jess likely to be developed under these uncertainties. 
Benry (1974) makes it clear how the prospect of receiving more information in the 
future will affect the decisions taken in the initial period. He also incorporates an 
information structure into his investment decision and shows that a decision maker 
is led to adopt an irreversible decision more often than he should. lones and 
Olstroy (1984) incorporated an information structure that incorporates the amount 
ofIearning in the future about future values. 
Haspel and Johnson (I982) argue there is a limited number of cases that satisfY 
the irreversibility condition and argue that 'many areas do have physical 
SUbstitutes and are as a result not unique", They give some examples: 
'There are some designated wilderness areas in the western United 
States which are located in close proximity to other designated 
wilderness areas. The terrain, flora, fauna and climate are 
extremely similar if not identical. That is the same plant or pond 
cannot exist in each area", but 'the same species of plant and a 
similar pond may, making the areas extremely alike", (p, 80), 
They treat irreversibility as a special case and develop a model that considers 
revers'b'l' 
I llty through man-made technology and natural processes, but goes further 
than C and N and incorporates the substitution in the demand for natural 
resOurces, They show that the availability of substitutes and the reversibility of 
an area reduces the social cost of using the resource and so there will be an 
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increased level of development. They argue that if substitution is ignored by 
making the assumption that the asset is unique, then the potential benefits from the 
preservation of the asset may be overestimated. But the example they give above 
seems to be a very rare case and maybe this is the special case, not the irreversible 
situation. 
USategui, (I990) analyses the problem of the allocation of land between 
preservation and development in a 2 period model with uncertainty about future 
benefits of those uses, about the irreversibility of development and about the costs 
of changing the allocation of resources. The decision maker receives information 
at the end of the first period which completely solves these uncertainties and 
therefore the decision maker can act accordingly. 
Some of the later literature mentioned above, that incorporates uncertainty about 
irreversibility of investment, may be a feasible extension to the existing literature 
but, 
In many cases, as argued previously, environmental losses that occur are 
irreversible; there is no uncertainty. Also some of the above literature 
incorporates uncertainty about the future benefits of preservation and 
development. It can be argued that we know how these benefits change over 
time Iffut ' , 'I' , h 
' ure generatIons place a higher value on envlronmenta amenIties t an 
the current generation does, then it would be desirable to develop less of our 
irreplaceable resources. It is very likely that there will be an upward movement in 
the relativ ' f ' . . " I h" , e pnce 0 environmental amenIties. Society s wea t IS increasing over 
time and so one would expect increased future demand for environmental quality, 
Therefore there will be a positive income elasticity of demand. Also, the fact that 
unique ' "b hi environmental areas are becoming increasmgly scarce contn utes to t s 
UPWard shift in values. Thus we can argue that the benefits of alternative uses of 
land, preservation and development change over time in a known way. For these 
reasons this chapter concentrates on FKC's paper (1972), where irreversibility of 
investment decisions is a constraint on the model and changes in the benefits of 
preservat' Ion and development are known. 
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FKC formulate a model for the optimal a]]ocation of land between preservation 
and development. They find that development should stop short of the level 
indicated by current valuations whenever future values indicate that reduced 
development is desirable. Their analysis presents a strong case for the permanent 
preservation of some natural environments whose current return to preservation is 
less than the current return to development, i.e. inter temporal optimisation is 
required. Preservation, therefore, should possibly be greater than current values 
would indicate. 
I<rautkraemer (1985), shows that even if the value of the amenity services rise 
relative to the value of commodities, then it may be optimal to completely exhaust 
the resOurce stock. He argues that technical progress will increase the 
prod " 
ucttvlty of the resource, and the productive value of the resource may be 
riSing even though the value of commodities may be falling. Therefore it may be 
OPtimal to fully develop natural environments where a productive resource is 
found. ' 
In I<rautkraemer's model the economy seeks to maximise the present value of 
utility h' h ' f' , W IC IS a function of consumption and the flow 0 resource amerutles, 
which in tum is a function of the level of resource stock. Therefore the problem 
is to: 
Subject to: 
$(/) = -R(/) 
With' , , Inttlal conditions: 
S(O) = So 
R(t) ~ 0 
S(/) ~ 0 
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where C is the level of consumption, R is the level of resource extraction and S is 
the level of resource stock aU at time I. The rate of technical progress is given by 
t. 
He proves that it may be optimal to extract the whole resource stock. However, 
he does not include the fact that that there are benefits to the stock of developed 
land. 
Barrett (I992), presents a more general model of optimal economic growth and 
en ' Vlronmental preservation and shows that the results of FKC and Krautkraemer 
are special cases. He shows that Krautkraemer's sombe result breaks down if 
developing the environment produces a form of capital from which it is possible to 
obtain future consumption, and also if technical progress in resource extraction is 
accompanied by technical progress in the developed sector. Barrett's paper adds 
weight to the arguement that it is optimal to permanently preserve some natural 
areas and protect our environment. 
lnh' 
IS mOdel, the problem is to: 
max J; U[ C(/), S(/)]e -ot dl 
Subject to: 
Set) = -ret) 
C = (1f!rt + f(S(t»e OJt 
where C is consumption, S is the resource stock, rand OJ are the rates of technical 
progress in the extraction and development sectors respectively, C1 is the constant 
thatcha . h "'1 'd' h nges the rate of extraction of the resource 10 t e 100tta peno mto t e 
conSUmption rate. The production frunction in the development sector is F(D(t». 
But in the above problem this is expressed in the original state variable, Set). It is 
assumed h ' t at the amount of resources IS fixed, therefore: 
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D(t) - Do = So - S(t) 
And since So and Do are fixed, 
F(D(t» = F(So + Do - S(/» = I(S(I» 
hence the presence of j{S(t» in the consumption function. Therefore, here, 
aCCOunt is being taken of the benefits from development. However Barrett 
argues that he has shown that FKC's results hold under more general conditions. 
But, FI<C do not fully develop the solution. The conclusion they reach is derived 
from an incomplete analysis of the model. It is argued here that the solution 
derived in this chapter is the full correct solution and that from this different 
results are obtained to that ofFKC. 
FI<.c begin their paper with a general model for the allocation of land between 
. preservation and development. Their model is described in Section I. By 
applying Pontryagin's Maximum Prin~iple, the investment path is chosen so as to 
maximise the discounted utility subject to the constraint that investment is 
irreversible ( i.e. I ~ 0). In their paper, FKC (I972), they show that the optimal 
development path for a given area of land is given by a sequence of investment 
intervals. They define periods of investment as free intervals, and periods of no 
investment as blocked intervals. 
But Why should investment in developing the land be undertaken in stages. If 
there is an optimal level of development, surely it would be ideal to proceed with 
investment as soon as possible and achieve that optimal state. 
In Se f 
c Ion II of their paper they present a different result for the proposed 
development of a hydroelectric power project in the Grand Canyon. They argue 
that the benefits from developing the hydro project (i.e. the difference in costs 
between the most economic alternative source of energy and the hydro project), 
are decreasing over time because the costs of the best alternative source of energy 
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decrease as new technologies are brought in. They also argue that the benefits 
from preservation will be increasing over time. 
They show that if the benefits from development are decreasing over time relative 
to the benefits from preservation then the optimal level of development decreases. 
If D*. the optimal level of development, is monotone decreasing, then there is an 
infinite blocked interval where investment is zero and the level of development 
remains constant. They argue that development should be frozen at the initial 
level or jump to the optimal level D* at time t = 0 and remain there. 
But development of a given area of land cannot be completed at t = 0, this is 
impossible. It takes time to construct buildings, build roads, erect factories, it 
cannot be done instantaneously. 
Section II will extend their paper by showing that there is a singular arc solution 
. to the optimal control problem. It will be shown that it is optimal to reach the 
singular arc in the shortest amount of time possible and then the level of 
development should be frozen. This means that all investment is concentrated at 
the beginning of the plan. This is in direct contrast to both the conclusions 
reached by FKC and is arguably a far more realistic result. 
In Section III, specific functional forms are used for the benefit functions of 
preserv t' a Ion and development. This enables us to fully characterise the solution 
to the problem. 
In Section IV a different dynamic constraint is applied to the model to allow for 
decreasl'n 'd'ffi' I ' , g returns to investment. This produces a 1 erent optIma tranSItIOn 




SUppose there is an area of land which can be divided between two uses _ 
preservation and development. Allocation of the latter is to the highest valued 
Use and the same assumption applies to preservation - optimal use is for 
recreation. The objective, then, is to develop a model to help us choose the 
OPtimum division between these two uses. 
The problem is to choose a path for investment, (the cost of transforming 
preserved areas into developed areas), so as to maximise discounted net social 
benefits OVer the whole future, from the quantities of the preserved area and the 
developed area. 
IfL' 
IS the fixed amount of land then: , 
P+D=L (1) 
Where P is the amount of preserved land and D is the amount of developed land. 
The problem then is to maximise: 
(2) 
SUbject to: 
D(I) = (J' /(1) (3) 
Where BP is the net social benefit from preserved land, BD is the net social benefit 
from developed land, / is total investment and (J' is a positive constant. The first 
two terms of the criterion functional (2) show the discounted flow of expected 
net social benefits (from P and D). The third term shows the total investment in 
devel . 
OPIng the area. Equation (3) indicates that the change in the area of 
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developed land is proportional to total investment. This implies constant returns 
to investment at any point in time. 
We assume that returns to increasing preservation and development are positive 
but di .. hi . . 
nunts ng I.e. concave benefit functlons:-
The problem posed is an optimal control problem solved by using Pontryagin's 
Maximum Principle [1962]. The present value Hamiltonian is: 
H = e-pt[ B P (P,t) + BD (D,t) - I(t)] + p(t)aI(t) (4) 
where pet) is the costate variable, measuring the value of future benefits of 
development. I is the control variable for which we need to find the optimal path 
and D is the state variable. Rearranging (4) gives: 
Let q(t) = op(t) - e-pl 
Then (5) simplifies to: 
Given that L=P+D 
(i.e. P=L -D) 
Then (7) becomes: 







pet) = [q(t) + e-pt ] 
u 
pet) = £jet) - pe-pt 
u 
(9) 
The Hamiltonian is linear in the control variable and, for an unbounded control set, 
the Control can take any value. Under these circumstances the natural solution to 
look for is a singular arc solution. To make economic sense, 1 must be bounded 
from below (i.e. l(t) ~ 0). In what foHows we will derive the singular arc 
solution in cases when the control set is bounded from above and when it is 
unbounded from above. 
SECTION II 
The Unbounded Case 




SUbstit t' . . u 109 (II) tOto (9) gIves: 
-e-pt[- dBP + dfIJ] = £jet) - pe-pt 
dP dD u 
Rearra' . nglOg gIves: 







It fallows that along the singular arc: 
!!-.[iH] == 0 dt OJ 
i.e. q = 0 
From (13) 
[ dBP dB
D J e-pt p+u dP «L-D),t)-u dD (D,t) =0 (14) 
In the same way it follows that: 
~[iH]=O dt 2 if 
Therefore: 
- - == _pe-pt p+u-«L-D),t)-u-(D,t) + d
2 [iB] [dBP dB D ] 
dt 2 OJ dP dD 
SUbstituting (3) into the above equation gives: 
d
2 [iB]= _pe-pt[p+u dBP -u~]+ 
dt 2 a dP dD 
(IS) 
The equations (10), (14) and (IS) are a set of 3 algebraic equations in 3 




--(L-D*)+-(D*) = p 
dP dD 0' (17) 
SUbstituting (17) into (IS) gives: 
1*=0 (IS) 
this result corresponds to that of FKC. Equation (17) indicates that at the 
OPtimal level of investment in development the marginal benefits of development 
~ e I h I dBP ( h' , dD qua s t e sum of the marginal costs of deve opment dP t IS IS 
equivalent to the marginal benefits of preservation because the opportunity cost of 
developing the land is the benefits lost from preservation), and the direct 
oPPOrtunity costs P, 
0' 
For the singular arc solution to give a maximum there is an additional necessary 
Condition, the Generalised Legendre Clebsch condition (henceforth GLC ), Lewis 
(1980). This condition is stated as : 
(19) 
Where 2k is the order of the first time derivative of OR that explicitly depends on 
tV 
U. therefore for this problem k = 1 and U = 1 ; 
Using (IS) 
d
2 [iH] = _pe-Pt[p+ 0' dBP - 0' ~J+ 
dt 2 iJ/ dP dD 
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(IS) 
and differentiating with respect to I gives; 
Therefore: 
Therefore the GLe condition is satisfied and the singular arc solution is optimal. 
Next it . *. h .. . 
IS necessary to establish that it is optimal to reach DInt e mInimum time, 
if Do ¢ D*. This may be established by writing the objective functional as a line 
integral and then applying Green's Theorem (Kamien and Schwarz (1991». 
SOlving (3) for I and substituting into (2) gives: 
Writing (20) as a line integral: 
f;[F(D,t) + G(D,t)D]dt = fFdD+Gdt 
, 
(20) 
WhereF(D,t) ~ IB P (L - D,I) + BD(D,t)je-pt; G(D,I) = [~I}_pI and ~ is the 









SUppose that Do < D* then the optimal initial control solution is a shift from Do 
~~. . 
as soon as possIble. Let ABC be the path that reaches D* as qUIckly as 
Possible and let some other feasible path be ADE which takes longer to reach D*. 
Let T.s be th ' , b h h . 'd I:'. t e time It takes for ADE to reach D* , Then at pat s comcl e lor > 
Ts. 
We need to show that: 




JFdD + Gdt? fFdD + Gdt 
ABC ADE 
(22) 
A.PPI . Ylng Green's Theorem: 
lIS 
fFdD + Gdt = ff[dG - dF }iDdt 
ECBADE R dt dD 
(23) 
where R is the bounded region ECBADE dF = e-pt[- dBP + dBDJ and 
'dD dP dD 
5!. _ [p] _.¥ dt-;;e~ 
Therefore: 




(equation (17» for D <D* . 
Therefore 't '. , f . Thi" I IS optimal to reach D* in the minimum amount 0 time. S IS in 
direct c . d 
ontrast to the result of FKC. Here the optimal growth path of develope 
land OVer time takes the form of alternating sequences of rising segments and 
Plateaus. Over a free interval where q(t) = 0, D*(t) is rising. Since to is the end 
ofa fr . 
ee Interval, 1=0 and q(to) < O. FKC find that D(t) is constant over the 
blocked interval (t t) 
o· I . 
This is ill . 






Over the full interval (to. t1) the sum of discounted marginal benefits of 
development equal the sum of discounted marginal costs. However within this 
interval FI<C specify a myopic or short-sighted path (D*(/» for development. At 
some point (/0 5.1 5. 11) optimal development begins to fall implying that marginal 
benefits are less than marginal costs. There has been too much development and 
We need to disinvest or reverse previous development. But if development of 
natural environments is irreversible, FKC find that development then should stop 
short of the level that is indicated by current valuations if in the near future 
reduced development is desirable. Investment in development should then cease 
Until another free interval (11)' This gives the corrected path for development 
(D(t». Then the optimal growth path for development would be an alternating 
sequence of periods of investment in development and periods of no investment 
where D(t) is constant over the blocked interval. 
The Bounded Case 
Looking at the case where the level of investment is bounded, i.e. [5. k: 
First of all looking at when [= k; the solution of equation (3) is 
D(t) = Do + a kl 
When the level of development is at the optimum then: 
D(1) = Do +akT= D* 
1'huSD* . D*-D 
will be reached at some time T i.e. 1= ok 0 
1'herefore the optimal control is that the level of investment between t = 0 and t = 
Tis k' I ." 
, I.e. = k te[O, 1]. For t greater than T Investment IS zero as the optimum 
leVel h b ..' 




To throw more light on the type of solution we may expect to get, we now tum to 
a Specific example. 
We assume the functional forms of the benefit functions at time t for Preservation, 
P , and Development, D, are given by: 
(1) 
(2) 
Where C1 and C2 are positive constants 
Equ f 
a Ions (I) and (2) show us the expected net social benefits to P and D 




dP P and 
dBD C2 
-=->0 
dD D and 
The proble h' , , 
m t en IS to maxImIse: 
rrJ rt Jo e- [C1 In (L • D) + C2 In D - /] dt (3) 
SUbject to: 
D = a/ D(O)=Do >0 (4) 
TheRa 'I ' 





q==pu- e-pt [ equation (6) in Section I ] 
The'lJ ., . 
naml tom an becomes: 
H = e-pt[ C1ln(L - D) + C2 In(D)] + q/ (6) 




p = _ oR = -e-pt[- C1 + C2 ] 
CD (L-D) D 
(8) 
Using e . quatJon (9) from page 3; 
[ . _ -Pt] p= q pe a 
and sub t' . . S Itutmg mto (8) gives; 
-e-pt[_ q + C2] = [q -pe-Pt] 
(L-D) D u 
Rearranging gives: 
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q == -e-pt[-O' q +0' C2J+ pe-pi (L-D) D 
Therefore: 
q == e-pt[p + 0' C} - 0' C2J (L-D) D (9) 
It fOlIo h ' 
ws t at along the singular arc : 
~[~]==o dt 8I (10) 
i.e. q == 0 (11) 
Therefore: 
e-pt p+cr 1 -crJ = 0 [ C' C J (L-D) D (12) 
It also fOllows that: 
SUbstituting l'n D' - t ' 
- 0:. gIves: 
e-p'[a2 _ q 2 C2 } - [ C1 C2J (L 2" + 0' - - pe pi p + 0' - cr- = 0 -~ & ~-~ D (14) 
To see if this I' , , I k h GLe d' , so utlOn IS a maximum we must again 00 at t e con Itlon (equaf Jon (I9) in Section II). 
liere k~ 1 
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- - - - a 2e pi 1 + _2 > 0 O[d2 [iJHJ] - [C C ] 
a dt2 iJJ - (L-D)2 D2 
given the concavity assumptions of the functional forms. 
Therefore: 
The GLe c d" '. . I'" ] on 11Ion IS satisfied and the sIngular arc so utJon IS optima. 
To find the steady state solution for q, D and I (denoted by q*, D* and 1*) we 
need to solve equations (7), (11) and (14) which are a set of 3 algebraic equations 
in 3 unknowns. Solving for q, D and I along the singular arc: 
q* =0 (16) 
1* =0 (17) 
C C 
P+CT 1 -CT_2 = 0 (L-D*) D'" (18) 
Rearranging 18 gives: 
- q + C2 = P (equivalent to equation 17 in Section II) (L-D*) D* CT 
This sho h .. I b fi fr ws t at the optimal investment poltcy equates margIn a ene ts om 
develop 
Illent to the sum of the direct and marginal opportunity costs of 
develop 
Illent at any point in time. 
Rearrang' . d fi d D* Ing agaIn gives a quadratic which can be solve to In 
i.e. 
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SOlving the quadratic for the equilibrium point, the steady state of the system 
gives (see appendix): 
D'= D.! = [pi. +0-( Ct + c:,) - J[d - oC2»)" + Ct2 q2 + 2u(d.Ct + oCtc:,} } 2p 
1* == 0 
and 0 <DIIe <L for p> 0 
If p == 0 then: 
Which also satisfies 0 < D* < L 
Again using line integrals and applying Green's Theorem we can establish that it is 
a f Pima) to reach D* in the minimum amount of time, 
Writing (4) I" as a me mtegra]: 
JFdD + Gdt 
x 
Where F(D,t) == [ C J In (L - D) + C 2 In D ] e-pt, G(t) = [-11 a] e-pt and ~ is the 
CUrve D == D(t) , t ~ 0 (as shown in previous diagram) 
As before, we need to show that the value of the integral along the path ABC from 
o to 1', . 
S IS greater than the value of the integral along the path ADE from 0 to Ts, 
i.e, 
JFdD + Gdt- fFdD + Gdt ~ 0 
ABC ADE 
(20) 
ApPI' Ytng Green's Theorem: 
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iF dD + Gdt? JJ[dG / dt - dF I dD] dDdt (21) 
ECBADE R 
where R is the bounded region ECBADE and dG = [pJe-pt and 
dt a 
!!..=[-_ q C2 ] - pt 
dJ) (L-D*) + D* e 
Therefore (21) becomes: 
From (17) 
== JJ[pl s + CI/(L-D*) - C2 1 D* ] e-
pt 
.dt ~ 0 (22) 
R 
p= C1 _C2 
a (L-D*) D* 
Therefore it is optimal to reach D* i~ the shortest time possible. 
The next s t' . , 
ec Ion Will now consider the case when the returns to Investment are 
not constant but in fact decreasing as more marginal land is developed. 
SECTION IV 
Decreasing Returns to Investment 
FI<c III ' • 
IDclllllse the present value of net social benefits from the area of land 
Sub' ~ect to the constraint that: 
D(t) = aI(t) 
Where D(t) is the amount of developed land, I(t) is the level of total investment 
and a ' 
• IS a positive constant. This constraint implies constant returns to 
Increas' . . 
109 Investment. But wouldn't it be the case that the eaSiest land to be 
develop d 
e would be developed first and then from then on the land would become 
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tnore difficult to develop? Developing this more 'marginal land' would require 
greater investment. This would imply decreasing returns to increasing investment. 
Thedyn , 
arruc constraint would thus change to: 
1J = af(l) 




A.t first, a small increase in investment induces a relatively large increase in the 
amOunt of developed land, However as investment increases through time, 
successiv 1 I ' "at ' , e yarger amounts are required to induce the same mltl mcrease 10 
development. This implies that the more marginal land is developed last as it 
reqU' . Ires greater investment. 
Gi' VIng the dynamic equation a specific form say; 
iJ = CTln(1 + I) (1) 
chano h 
oes t e problem to: 
max fo~[Clln(L - D) + C2 In(D) -l]e-pt .dt 
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SUbject to (1). 
The Hamiltonian is therefore: 
H == e-pt {Clln(L - D) + C2 In(D) - J + AO'ln(I + J)} 
where k-pt is the costate variable. 
The Current Value Hamiltonian is: 
H = Hept = {Clln(L - D) + C2 In(D) - J + AO'ln(1 + J)} 
The necessary conditions for an interior solution are: 
~==-1+ O'A 
iJJ (1 + J) (I) 
, C C' A == PA __ 2 + I 
D (L-D) (2) 
1'L! , 
"ms IS I ' " I' 'th no onger a singular arc problem as the Hamdtoruan IS not mear 10 e 
Control. From (1): 





SUbstituting (3) into (2) and rearranging gives: 
J- (1 J) C20' C10' 
- P + - -D- + -(L--'-'--D-) 
and iJ == O'ln(l + /) 
A.t th ' 






Where 1* is the steady state level of investment. 
SUbstituting (5) into (4)and rearranging gives: 
Where D* is the steady state level of development 
(5) 
Solving gives the equilibrium point, (the steady state of the system), therefore we 
get: 
J* =:0 
and 0 < D* < L is satisfied, (see appendix). 
It should be noted here that this is the same equilibrium point as in the original 
case where b = (j J. We will now look at the transition path to D*. 
Analysisg the stability of the system 
D = (jln(1 + I) 
. CG' CG' J = p(1+J) __ 2_+ J 
D (L-D) 
Different' . . 





-=---a I (1+1*) 
a J = c"2O" + Cto" = K sa 
aDD *2 (L _ D*)2 ' Y 
aD =0 
aD 
Putf . Ing Into matrix form gives: 
[i] [P KJ 1* ] b = (l:l) 0 D-D* 
Th . 
e eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix satisfy: 
2 uK Z -pZ- =0 (I +/) 
Therefore: 
+ 2 4uK 
P- P + (1+/) 
Z = ---'---~~ 
2 
The eigenvalues are real and opposite in sign, therefore (/*, D*) is a saddle point 
Phase Diagram 
~~t . . . 
s ruct a phase diagram we first need to draw the I = 0 and D = 0 curves. T ' 
hese curves represent the subset of points in the (I, D) space where I and D 
resp t' 
ec Ively are stationary. Where these two curves intersect determines the 
equilib . . . 
num point - the steady state _ of the system, i.e. where! = D = 0 . 
Setting i = 0 
and solving for ! we get: 
• CO" CO" 1= p(I+l) __ 2_+ I = 0 
D (L-D) 
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=> 1 = -1 + aC2 _ aC, 
pD p(L-D) 
Different' t" , la Ing wIth respect to D gIVes: 
dIi _ aC2 aC1) 
dD J=o - - pD2 - p(L-D)2 
The gradient of this curve is negative, As D ~ 0, 1 ~ !Xl and as D ~ L , 
J~.~. 
Sol' 1J Vlng = 0 for 1 gives: 
iJ = O'ln(1 + J) = 0 
and So: 
1=0 
Therefore the curveD = 0 is a horizontal line going through J = 0 and is shown 
below. 
The phase diagram below shows the saddle point equilibrium at D*, this occurs 
where th t '. All' h 
e wo curves J = 0 and D = 0 intersect. POInts on t e 
1:::0 ' 
and D = 0 are stationary in J and D respectively. Points off these curves 
are not t ' , l'. 11 ' 
s atlOnary, they are involved in the dynamic motIOn and the 10 oWing 
analYsis explains the dynamics of the system. The arrowheads depict the 
d' 
1rection of movement of trajectories from any starting point in the (1, D) space. 
Letuse ' 
xanune the equations: 
i> = O'ln(I + I) 




For 1:-> 0, D =: aln(1 + I) >0 which means that D increases when I is positive. 
This is shown by rightward pointing arrowheads in quadrants A and B. 
For I < 0, D = aln(l + I) < 0 which means that D in decreasing and this is shown 
by the leftward pointing arrowheads in the C and D quadrant. 
For D ~ L, then i ~ 00, therefore I is increasing and this is shown by upward 
po' , 
IntIng arrowheads in the Band C quadrants. 
As D ~ 0, then i ~ _ 00, therefore I is decreasing in the A and D quadrant and 
this is shown by the downward pointing arrowheads. 











depicts a typical optimal trajectory 
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There are two stable branches leading towards the equilibrium point. All paths 
starting off the stable branch diverge. It is a saddle-point equilibrium and the only 
Way to reach D* is to follow one of the stable branches. Given the initial 
development Do we must chose the initial level of investment 1*0 as this will 
ensure that the level of development will reach the optimum level D*. This is 
indicated by the typical trajectory path in the phase diagram with Do < D*. Any 
initial level of investment greater than 12 will result in excessive investment and 
development and failure to reach the optimum point D*. 
FollOwing this stable path we can see that the level of development is steadily 
increasing and the gap between D* and the Do is gradually falling. With the 
increase in D there is a steady fall in the level of investment I. This is consistent 
With the earlier negative value for the derivative of I with respect to D - as D 
increa 1 ses, decreases. 
Looki 
. ng at the phase diagram it can be seen that in quadrants C and D the level of 
InVestrnent is negative. This is inadmissable in this problem as investment is 
irrevers'bl 
1 e and so can never be negative. 
Therefore there is only one meaningful stable path leading to the optimal level of 
developrnent, D*. There are an infinite number of unstable paths which lead to 
eXcessiv . d h 
. e Investment and development. Whether D* is reached depen s on t e 
Initial I I . 




apter has demonstrated a different result to that presented by FKC, In that 
there is a . h .. . I SIngular arc solution to the optimal control problem and t at It IS optIma 
~o reach D* as Soon as possible. FKC showed in their theoretical work that 
Investment should be undertaken in intervals whereas in their empirical work they 
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argued that development should jump to D* at time t = 0, i.e. an impulse respon~e. 
It is argued here that the solution derived in this chapter is a correct solution and 
that Fl(C do not fully develop their solution. The conclusion they reach is 
derived from an incomplete analysis of the model. 
The results presented in this chapter are much more realistic. Investment cannot 
jump to Some specified optimal level instantly, nor does it seem optimal to have 
periods of investment and periods of no investment. Surely if there is some 
Optimal development level then this should be achieved as quickly as possible, and 
this is what has been shown to be the optimal solution. 
A. different dynamic constraint was applied to the model to capture the 
charact ' , 
enstlc of decreasing returns to investment instead of the constant returns 
implied by Fisher et al in their dynamic constraint iJ = (II. This gives the same 
OPtimal solution as the case where there are constant returns to investment but the 
transition path is entirely different. ' The optimal solution is now a saddle point 
With the optimal investment being undertaken gradually through time. The 
stability f h 'If ' , 'al o t e system depends on the initial level of Investment. Imtl 
investme t ' h'b' , 
, n IS too high then the system will become unstable and ex I It excessIve 
1nvestm 
ent and development. 
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Appendix 




Both roots are real and positive. We need to check which lie between 0 and L, i.e. 
We need to satisfy the condition that L _ D ~ O. It cannot be the case that the 
atllount of developed land is greater than the amount of land that we started with. 
There a 
re two alternatives for D* (D J and D2); 
D, "'[PL + a(C, +C,)-~[pL-oC,)I' +C,'u' +2u(pLC, +oC,C,} }2P 
Both 
rOots are real. We now need to satisfy the condition D* < L, 
i.e. L - D* > 0 (19) 
First tak' 
109 D, and substituting into (19) gives: 
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rearranging gives: 
SqUaring both sides gives: 
This cancels to: 
This Co d' , 
, n ItlOn obviously doesn't hold therefore L - Dl < 0 (i.e. Dl > L) which is 
ltladrnissable. The area of developed land obviously cannot be bigger that the 
area ofJand to start with. 
NoW' lOOking at D
2
: 
SUbstitu' D' Ing 2 Into (I 9) and rearranging gives: 
~2)12 +CI2c:r2 + 2 c:r(pLC1 +oC1C2 ) > pL-2pL+c:r(C1 +C2 ) 
Squaring both 'd ' SI es gIVes: 
2apLC1 > -2pLoC} 
l'h . 
e Inequality holds, i.e. 0 < D* < L and so the equilibrium point, the steady state 
()f the system is: 
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and 0 <D* <L for p> 0 
This cancels to: 
-2pLaC1 > 2(JpLC1 
This Co d' , , , h' 
n Ihon obviously doesn't hold therefore L - Dl < 0 (i.e. DJ > L) whlc JS 
inadmissable. The area of developed land obviously cannot be bigger that the 
area ofland to start with. 
Now lOoking at D2: 
Substit ' UIng D2 into (19) and rearranging gives: 
~o(2)12 +C12U 2 +2u(pLCI +oC1C2 ) > pL-2pL+u(CI +C2 ) 
SqU ' 
artng both sides gives: 
2apLC) > -2pLoC) 
The inequality holds, i.e. 0 < D* < L and so the equilibrium point, the steady state 
of the system is: 
/).~ 1l.z "[pL + a(CI + C2 ) - ~[pL - oC,) t + Ct' u'l + 20VLCi +"yc,) Jt 2p 
]l/l ~ 0 
and 0 < D* < L for p> 0 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AND NATURAL RESOURCE USE IN A 
!OLLUTED ENVIRONMENT 
Pollution issues 
Society derives utility from the consumption of produced goods. Evidence shows 
that pollution flows from the production processes in the economic system to a 
stock in the natural environment. Pollution as a stock in the environment 
generates disutility - no one likes to see a river or lake polluted with waste 
products or visit the beach when the sea is foaming with toxic substances. Fumes 
from industrial works can spoil the countryside, not to mention playing havoc with 
ones health. The stock of pollution therefore has a negative effect on human 
Welfare. 
Sut there is a dilemma: By reducing present production, and thereby reducing 
Utility, the level of pollution in the future may be reduced and increase future 
Utility. There is therefore a trade-off between producing output for consumption 
and the level of pollution. Maximising the utility from consumption of produced 
800ds is not the same as maximising society's welfare. The welfare effect that the 
stock of pollution has on society must be taken into account. But pollution can 
also have other effects on the environment. Pollution stock can have a negative 
influence on the regenerative and assimilative capacity of the environment. 
Renewable resources have a natural regeneration rate and this can be reduced as 
the level of pollution increases. For example, a forest will regenerate itself, but its 
grOwth rate will be reduced as more acid rain is deposited over the trees. The 
stOck of pollution can also affect the assimiliative capacity of the environment. 
The rate at which the environment can clean itself up can be depressed as the level 
of Pollution stock increases. A small amount of pollution may be cleaned up by 
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of pollution stock increases. A small amount of pollution may be cleaned up by 
the environment very easHy and quickly but as the level of polJution stock 
increases the environment will find it increasingly difficult to clean itself up. 
Therefore the assimilative rate will fall. It is these negative effects that pollution 
has on the regenerative and assimiliative capacity of the environment and the 
negative effect on human welfare that will be investigated in this chapter. 
In section I there follows an overview of the literature concerning pollution. 
Section II formulates a model where a renewable resource is extracted from the 
environment and used in the production process along with capital and labour 
services. Productive activity generates a flow of pollution, which in tum builds 
up as a stock in the environment. This stock of pollution has a negative impact 
on the regenerative capacity of the renewable natural resource and also affects the 
assimilative capacity (the natural self-purification process) of the environment. 
The problem is to choose a time path for harvesting the resource so as to 
maximise some objective functional whose arguments are the time path of 
consumption and the stock of pollution. Thus indicating that social welfare at any 
Point in time depends on the flow of consumption and the quality of the 
environment. In section III Pontryagin's Maximum Principle (1962) is used to 
discover the optimal solution and the steady state values. Section IV analyses the 
stability of the system. Section V considers the effects that changes in the 
parameters of the model have on the steady state solutions. 
SECTION I 
POllution Models 
In the past, the consequences of pollution that have been considered important 
have been the direct disutility to consumers and abatement costs to producers, 
Keeler et al (I 972). Pollution is usually treated as a flow that dissipates and does 
not build up into a stock, Keeler et al (1972), Forster (1980), Gruver (1976) and 
Forster (I973a), i.e. a flow variable. This assumption is used by Forster (1980), 
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to gain analytical simplicity. Treating pollution as a flow variable and not as a 
stock reduces the number of differential equations in the problem. Forster 
presents a model in which there is assumed to be a single energy source, such as a 
fossil fuel that produces a non-accumulating pollutant when it is used. 
Consumption creates utility, but the use of the fuel generates a flow of pollution as 
a by-product which creates disutility. An example of this type of pollution is that 
which is emitted by automobiles. The level of utility will therefore depend upon 
the level of consumption and the flow of pollution as society is concerned about 
the quality of the environment. Withdrawing the natural resource from the 
environment for energy use reduces the stock of the resource An Energy Board 
is appointed to plan the optimal path for energy use over a specified time. The 
dynamic optimisation problem that must be solved is: 
Max f:U(C(E), P(E».dt 
subject to S = - E 
S(O) = So 
S(1)~O 
Where consumption, C and the flow of pollution, P are functions of energy use, E. 
S is the stock of fuel, S is the change in the resource stock and E is the rate of 
extraction (energy use) at time t. 
fie shows that when pollution is treated as a flow variable, the rate of use of the 
resource is constant over time. The level of extraction depends on the length of 
time of the planning horizon and the initial resource endowment. For long time 
Periods and small resource endowments, environmental considerations are ignored 
and are not a constraint on extraction. An extraction rate is chosen which 
e'Chausts the resource by the end of the time period. When the endowments of 
resource are large relative to the time period then the level of resource stock at the 
end of the time period is positiv~. The extraction rate is chosen which balances 
the COsts and benefits of additional fuel use from an environmental stand point. 
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However evidence shows that pollution flows into the environment and does build 
up into a stock. Pollution such as radioactive waste and oil spills, do emerge as a 
stock and produce lasting effects. The accumulating stock of pollutants has 
direct negative marginal effects on human welfare. 
Forster (1977), also presents a model in which the level of consumption and the 
stock of pollution, instead of the flow, are arguments in the utility function. 
Utility is derived from consumption but by consuming output a flow of pollution is 
generated which in this model builds up into a stock in the environment, causing 
disutility. Therefore the utility function is: 
U=U(C,P) 
Where C is the level of consumption and P is the stock of pollution. Forster 
assumes that a fixed amount of output, fjJ is produced each time period and this is 
allocated to consumption, C and pollution control activities, E. Therefore: 
fjJ=C+E 
However, Forster does not include the production process in the model, nor does 
he include natural resources. The flow of pollution or the change in the stock of 
Pollution increases with respect to consumption at a constant rate, g where g>O . 
The environment has the capacity to clean itself up and get rid of the waste at a 
constant rate a where a > 0 , this is known as the assimiliative capacity. 
Therefore the flow is reduced in a proportionate manner with respect to the level 
of Pollution. The change in the stock of the resource when there is no 
expenditure on anti-pollution activities is thus given by: 
P=g(C)-aP 
The am . . I···· fu . f Ount of pollutIon cleaned up by pollutIon contro actIvItIes IS a nctlon 0 
the amount of expenditure on pollution control activities, E. Therefore the 
differential equation relating to the change in the stock of pollution now becomes 
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P = g(C)-h(E)- aP 
where h is the constant rate at which pollution stock is cleaned up and h>O. 
The problem then is to maximise the discounted flow of utility, i.e.: 
Subject to 
P =g(C)-h(E)-aP 
where future utility is discounted at a constant exponential rate r. 
Forster shows that if the marginal utility of consumption is greater than the cost of 
additional consumption then it is not optimal to eliminate the pollution. The 
equilibrium of the system is characterised by non-zero level of pollution and a 
consumption level greater than the initial level, Co. If the marginal utility of 
consumption is less than the marginal cost of consumption then the optimal policy 
results in a clean environment and once it has been cleaned up consumption is at 
Co. 
Siebert (1982), also treats pollution as a stock variable and, again, his model does 
not include a capital good in the production process but he does include the 
extraction of a natural resource. It differs from the basic economic growth model 
as only naturally produced goods or services are consumed. The economic 
Process he describes is that society gains utility from consumption of extracted 
amOunts ofa renewable resource. Consumption and/or extraction of the resource 
causes accumulation of a stock of pollution, and the stock of pollution has a 
negative impact on the regenerative capacity of the renewable resource. The 
resource grows at a natural rate which depends on the amount of resource stock 
at time t. The stock of the resource is affected by the level of pollution. In each 
time . penod the level of pollution reduces the resource stock at a constant rate a, 
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Where a>O. The stock is also reduced by the extraction of the resource from the 
environment which is then consumed. Therefore the change in the resource stock 
at time t is given by: 
R = g(R)-aS-C 
where R is the level of resource stock, R is the change in the resource stock, g is 
the natural growth rate, S is stock of pollution in the environment and C is 
consumption. 
The consumption process generates pollutants at a constant proportion, p, per unit 
of reSOurce consumed. The stock of pollution is cleaned up by the environment 
at a constant rate 1(. The change in the stock of pollution increases due to 
Pollution flowing into the environment from consumption and decreases due to the 
assimilative capacity of the environment. Therefore the change in the stock of 
PolJution is given by the equation: 
where S is the change in the stock of pollutants. 
Formally his model is specified as follows: 
Subject to: 
R = g(R)-aS-C 
S=f3C-nS 
C,R,S '? 0 
N(O) = No 
S(O) = So 
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Siebert does not take into account that the stock of pollution has a negative effect 
on social welfare, the welfare function has only the flow of consumption as its 
argument and there is no productive activity in the economy. 
Siebert shows that if the initial levels of resource and pollution stock are lower 
than their steady state levels, then the system can move towards the optimal steady 
state by a policy of low extraction rate, thereby slowly increasing the stock of 
resources and the stock of pollution. If the initial level of resource stock is less 
than its steady state value and the initial level of pollution stock is greater than its 
steady state value, then the system will not reach the optimal steady state. The 
negative effect of pollution will not allow regeneration to occur fast enough and 
the resource stock will decline. 
Forster (1980) formulates a model in the same paper cited previously, where 
Pollution does build up into a stock and he does take into account the negative 
effects that this pollution stock has on social welfare. Therefore consumption and 
Pollution are arguments in the utility function, showing that society gains utility 
from consumption and disutility from pollution. But again it is only natural 
resOurces that are consumed, there is no productive process in the model. Forster 
Specifies the utility function as follows: 
U = U(C,P) 
The stock of the resource can be thought of again as a fossil fuel which is 
extracted from the environment and makes it possible for goods and services to be 
produced. These goods and services are consumed by society, which creates 
Utility. Therefore consumption is a function of the energy use. As in his 
pr . 
eVIOus model, the use of energy generates a flow of pollution, but here the flow 
of Pollution builds up into a stock in the environment. The change in the stock of 
pol1ution, i.e. flow of pollution increases by a constant proportion, a ,of the 
energy used where a > O,and is also affected by antipollution activities. It is 
assumed that these activities can reduce the flow of pollution by some proportion 
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P. where p > O. Furthermore the change in pollution stock is subject to 
eXponential decay at a constant rate 0, where 8> O. The stock of fuel is reduced 
by extraction of the resource. Also, as abatement activities requires the use of 
energy, then this also reduces the stock of the resource. 
The dynamic optimisation problem is stated as: 
Subject to: 
max J:U(C(E), P).dt 
p= aE-PA-OP 
S=-A-E 
P(O) = Po > 0 P(1) ~ 0 
S(O) = So > 0 S(1) ~ 0 
E(O) = 0 0 S A S A 
Where P is the stock of pollution, C is the level of consumption, E is the energy 
Used (a. > 0), A is the level of anti pollution activities and A is an upper limit 
on A and S is the level of resource stock. 
Forster shows that it may not be optimal to undertake pollution abatement 
activities which are energy using. Rather in the initial stages the resource should 
be used more slowely so that the level of environmental damage is lowered. 
Over the planning period the resource use is increased and by the end, the 
resource is completely exhausted and there is a positive stock of pollution. 
Barbier (1989), presents a similar model in that he does treat pollution as a stock, 
but in the form of an environmental degradation variable. Barbier's model 
recognises the fact that as the natural environment supplies more and more 
resOurces to society, it is forced to absorb more and more waste products and 
there may be a point at which ecological stability is threatened. However, again 
no productive activity is included in the model. His argument is that resources 
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are harvested from the environment to provide for consumption, therefore the 
flow of emissions and resource extraction are still functions of the economic 
process but Barbier makes them dependent on the flow of consumption. 
Pollution is not a product of the productive process. Barbier formulates a model 
in which the degradation of the environment is increased as a result of waste 
emissions and renewable and nonrenewable resource extraction, and is decreased 
by the natural assimiliative capacity of the environment and the natural 
regeneration of the renewable resource. He explains this in the form of a 
differential equation for environmental degradation and is defined as: 
where iJ is the change in environmental degradation, W is the level of waste 
emissions, A is the level of assimilated waste, RN is the level of renewable resource 
extraction, G is the level of natural regeneration and Rs is the level of 
nonrenewable resource extraction. 
As resources are extracted and wastes are emitted by the economic process to 
provide for consumption then: 
:Barbier does include in his model that the regeneration of the resource and the 
assimiliative capacity of the environment are affected by the quality of the 
environment. Let X be some measure of environmental quality, which is 
measured by a stock of environmental goods that yield a flow of services 
proportional to that stock at each point in time, then: 
A=A(X) G=G(X) 
Therefore: 
iJ = [W(C)+RN(C)+Rs(C)]-[A(X)+G(X)] 
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i.e. 
b = [N(C) -Q(X)] 
where N( C) is the increasing environmental degradation resulting from the various 
resOurce demands that are being put on the environment. Q(X) is the resilience of 
the environment. He assumes an inverse relationship between the change in 
environmental degradation and the change in environmental quality; 
i.e. 
X=-aD 
If environmental degradation is increasing over time then environmental quality is 
falling at a constant proportional rate a, where a>O. 
Therefore: 
x = a[Q(X)-N(C)] 
Formally his problem is defined as optimising a social welfare function that has the 
flow of consumption and the level of environmental quality as its arguments: 
i.e. 
max I' e-rtU(C,X).dt 
Subject to . 
x = a[Q(X) - N(C)] 
X(O) = Xo X~free 
lie examines the optimal conditions that would lead an economy to choose a 
SUstainable or unsustainable economic growth path. He finds that if the initial 
level of environmental quality is less than the minimum sustainable level - the level 
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at which the flow of waste emitted is equal to the assimilative capacity of the 
environment - then environmentally unsustainable economic growth may be the 
Optimal strategy. In this case the assimilative capacity of the environment will 
have been destroyed and the economy will be forced to exhaust existing resource 
stocks and so the economy will collapse. 
If the initial level of environmental quality is equal to the minimum sustainable 
level, then it is optimal to remain at that growth rate forever. If it is greater, then 
the economic growth path will end up at a stable equilibrium which represents 
environmentally sustainable economic growth. In this case and where they are 
equal, the biophysical constraints are being adhered to - harvesting of the 
renewable resource is within its regeneration rate, non-renewable resources are 
being extracted at a rate at which renewables can be substituted for them, and 
emissions of pollutants are within the assimilative capacity of the environment. 
lie Concludes that it is the initial level of environmental quality and the rate of 
discount that are significant factors in determining whether a sustainable or 
unSUstainable economic growth path is the optimal strategy. In his analysis a 
decrease in the discount rate will lead to a unique stable equilibrium and so the 
OPtimal strategy is to follow a sustainable growth path regardless of the initial 
environmental quality. A sufficient increase in the discount rate will lead to a 
unique unstable eqUilibrium and so there is only one optimal strategy to follow and 
that is an unsustainable growth path regardless of the initial level of environmental 
qUality. These conclusions are as one would expect, a high discount rate will 
faVOur current consumption and so here it is optimal to deplete resources at higher 
rates leading to lower levels of resource stock and maybe even total exhaustion. 
A. higher discount rate will favour projects where the benefits occur in the short 
term and so there are fewer incentives for projects that have a long term payoff. 
Projects that yield benefits in the long term are less likely to be undertaken with a 
high discount rate, and these are very likely to be environmentally favourable 
projects. 
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However, a more meaningful analysis would include a production function with 
capital services and natural resources as inputs. Such a model is developed in 
section II. 
Van de Bergh and Nijkamp (1991), present a model, similar to Keeler et ai's 
(1972), but take both the flow and stock of pollution into account. The welfare 
function includes both of these as well as the flow of consumption. The stock of 
Pollution accumulates as a result of waste generation by the production and 
consumption process. However they do not include natural resources in their 
model. The production function Q has inputs of capital, K} and material input, M 
and it is assumed that the effects of pollution may harm the production process. 
Therefore the production function is decreasing in the stock of pollution and is 
given below: 
Q(/}=~[K.(/},J>(/},M(/}] 
Capital is allocated between pollution control activities, K2 and in the productive 
process where it is used as an input, K}. Therefore: 
K(t} = K. (I) + K2 (I) 
The change in the capital stock , or the flow of capital, increases with respect to 
the level of output and decreases with respect to the level of expenditure on 
Pollution control activities, the level of consumption and the amount of 
depreciated capital. Therefore the change in the capital stock is given by the 
differential equation: 
K = (1- fJ)Q(/) - C(/} - OkK(/} 
Where consumption is denoted by C, P is a fixed constant where O<f3<1 showing 
the proportion of total expenditure allocated to pollution control activities and 
capital depreciates at a constant rate oKwhere O<oK<l. 
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The flow of pollution increases with respect to emissions into the environment 
which is generated by the production and the consumption processes. 
Consumption generates the material outflow, M , into the environment and 
emissions from the production process is a proportion, w of the amount of capital 
used in production, where w is constant and w>O. Pollution is reduced by 
Pollution control expenditure, at a constant rate h where capital input K2 is 
allocated to pollution reduction activities. The environment assimilates waste 
products at a rate op, which may depend on the level of P, because pollution may 
affect the capacity of the environment to cleanse itself. The amount of 
eXpenditure allocated to pollution control activities is fJQ and pollution is reduced 
at a rate d, where 0<d<1. Formally their model is: 
Subject to: 
where: 
K = (1- fJ)Q(/) - C(t) - OkK(t) 
P = w[K,(t)]+ M(t)-h[K2 (/)]-df3Q(t) -OpP(/) 
Q(/) = l'[K,(I), J>(/),M(/)] 
K(/) = K\ (I) + K2 (I) 
C(/),K;(/)(i = 1,2),J>(/) ~ 0 
Kj(O) = KiO(i = 1,2),P(0) = Po 
This model does include a production function and the fact that pollution can build 
up into a stock in the environment. It also takes into account that the stock of 
Pollution affects utility and therefore includes this in the utility function. Another 
interesting aspect of the model is that the rate of assimilated waste, op may 
depend on the level of po]]ution in the environment. This aspect of a non-
COnstant rate of decay will be dealt with later in the chapter. The main critisms of 
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van den Bergh and Nijkamp's work is that the extraction of natural resources is 
not included in the model and the fact that they do not solve the system, thereby 
offering no conclusions to their work. 
Another important work is that presented by Brock (1977). Brock analyses the 
problem of growth and stock pollution. He argues that because of the inputs of 
energy in production, emissions that are generated are closely related to the 
production level rather than the level of consumption. In his model he presents a 
production function with capital and emissions as factors of production. He also 
includes the stock of pollution as an argument in the social welfare function. 
The change in the capital stock increases with respect to output and is reduced by 
the level of consumption, therefore: 
K= P(K,E)-C 
Where K is the stock of capital, E is ~missions flow and C is consumption. 
The stock of pollution increases as emissions increase and is reduced by the 
natural decay of the environment. Therefore the evolution of the stock of 
Pollution over time is given by: 
t=E-aZ 
Where Z is the pollution stock, E is the emissions flow and a > 0 is the rate of 
decay. The problem is to maximise a social welfare function subject to the 
constraint of capital accumulation and pollution stock. Formally, the problem is 
to: 





lie shows that an optimal solution does exist and that the steady state is a local 
saddle point. 
Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993), (original version in Tahvonen and 
l<uuluvainen (1991», extend Brock's model to include natural resources. Also, 
they take into account the negative effect pollution has on social welfare by 
including the stock of pollution in the welfare function. The production function, 
Q now includes the renewable resource inputs; Q has the stock of capital, K, the 
rate of harvest, h and emissions, e as inputs. The change in the capital stock 
increases with respect to output and is reduced by the amount of output that is 
consumed by society, C. Therefore: 
k = Q(K,h,e)-C 
)( is the stock of the renewable nat~ral resource which is sensitive to the stock of 
Pollution, Z. The regeneration of the resource also depends on the amount of 
resOurce in stock at time t, X therefore the growth function is given by: 
F=F(X,Z) 
The change in the resource stock, or the flow of the resource, increases with 
respect to the growth function F, and decreases as the resource is harvested for 
produ . 
ctlon. Therefore: 
x = F(X,Z)-h 
EmiSSions accumulate from the productive process into the environment and this 
therefi . Ore Increases the stock of pollution, Z. The pollution stock also decays 
naturaUyat a constant rate, a where a> O. Therefore: 
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where the change in the stock of pollution at time t is equal to the amount of 
emissions at time t minus the amount of pollution naturally assimilated by the 
environment at time t, at rate a. 
Formally, the problem is to choose time paths for consumption, resource 
harvesting and emissions in an economy where production is based on renewable 
resources. The problem for a social planner is to: 
Subject to: 
It = Q(K,h,e)-C 
X=F(X,Z)-h 
Z=e-aZ 
Where r ~ 0 is the discount rate. 
Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen show that the optimal steady state in Brock's model is 
independent of the discount rate. When they include renewable resources in the 
model, the steady state also has the saddle point propery but this depends on the 
discount rate being small. 
liowever, in both Brock and Tahvonen and Kuuluvainens' models, emissions are 
dealt with as inputs in the production process. In the model to be developed in 
this chapter, the view is taken that it would be more meaningful to show emissions 
as an outflow from the production process, not as a necessary factor of 
prOduction. Brock and Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen also include a decay rate for 
the stock of pollution but treat this as constant. They also neglect the decay of 
the capital stock. 
Van den Bergh (1991), identifies a weakness in the literature on the development 
of ecological-economic models in that they fail to be complete models, he argues 
that models must include every aspect of interaction between the environment and 
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the economic system. He goes on to present an aggregate economic-ecological 
tnodel which is consistent with a macroeconomic system. However such a model 
is very complex and intractable. In section II in this chapter, a comprehensive 
tnodel is formulated that takes into account all the previous weaknesses in the 
literature and still allows for mathematical tractability. 
Most of the past work on pollution has been concerned with a constant 
eXponential decay rate [see Forster (1980), Siebert (1982), Tahvonen and 
I<.uuluvainen (1993), Forster (1973b), Plourde (1972), D'Arge (1971) and Forster 
(I?77)]. If the decay rate is constant, it is true that for any level of pollution, the 
stock of pollution would eventually completely decay if there were no new 
additions. In this situation the pollution does not destroy the natural purification 
process of the environment. D'Arge (1971), for instance, assumes a constant 
decay rate that is completely independent of the level of pollution. He assumes 
that it is the density of waste that is the proper measure of environmental quality. 
He specifies that the average chan~e in the density of waste, or the average flow 
of Waste density, increases with respect to the flow of waste per unit measure of 
the natural environment less the flow of waste cleaned up by capital that is 
inVested specifically for waste control minus the natural decay rate. Therefore: 
. 1 D=-W-hI -0 V Ie 
where W is the waste flow, D is the average density of waste, V is a volume 
tneasure of the natural environment. The example D'arge gives is the size of the 
global natural life zone which is assumed fixed. The coefficient on Ik reflects the 
fate at Which capital investment can clean up the environment. The natural decay 
fate of Waste density is 0 and is constant. 
The assumption of a constant decay rate is very limiting. Forster (1975), argues 
that the rate of self-purification may depend upon the amount and nature of the 
Waste load. Certain toxic substances may inhibit the self-purification properties 
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of water by killing the bacteria that is required to break down the organic wastes. 
For example if the amount of pollution is great enough it may cause a waterway to 
be biologically dead and unable to cleanse itself This is the problem associated 
With lakes such as lake Erie in North America, Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1970). 
Forster formulates a model to allow for the fact that pollution may depress the 
rate of self-purification. Social welfare is measured by a utility function with 
consumption and the stock of pollution as arguments in the utility function. 
However, he doesn't include production and natural resources in his model. 
Pollution is therefore a function of consumption. Forster's decay function ./{P) 






Variable Decay Function 
M* M the level of pollution 
Over the interval (0, M*), the decay rate is increasing at a decreasing rate; 
therefcor th . "Co" " d"" d Aft M* th I I e, e more pollutIOn there IS the laster It IS Isslpate . er e eve 
of Pollution depresses the natural decay process. When M is reached the 
POllution has killed off the natural clean up process. But why should it be that 
oVer the interval (0, M*) the more pollution, the faster it is cleaned up? This 
SUrely d ' oesn t make sense. 
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Smith (1977), treats poHution as a stock variable and also assumes that the natural 
decay rate heW) depends on the level of pollution (W), where h'>O and h"<O - i.e. 
pollution decay increases at a decreasing rate with respect to the stock of 
Pollution. The decay function would have the shape shown below: 
decay function 
o W levelofpolJution 
But again, why should the rate of assimilation increase as there is more polJution. 
The difference between Smith and Forster is that Forster assumes that there is an 
upper limit on the level of polJution at which point the decay rate becomes zero. 
It is fi 'bI ." I east e that there wi]] be some pomt when the envIronment stmp y caMot 
cOPe with the polJution level and the self-purification powers will have been 
destroyed. This critism will be dealt with in section III. 
SECTION II 
the Mathematical Model. 
COnside ' . ,. r a simple closed economy with no government mterventlOn. Therefore 
OUtput' . . 
IS either consumed or mvested; 
i.e. 
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Y(t) = c(t) + I (I) (1) 
where yet) represents output, C(t) represents consumption and I(t) represents 
investment, all at time t. Note that for the rest of the chapter dependence on time 
is not explicitly shown for notational simplicity. Technology in the economy is 
sUllUnarised by a Cobb Douglas production function with inputs of capital services 
and a renewable natural resource and which exhibits constant returns to scale, 
hence' , 
(2) 
a is some constant where 0 < a < 1 , K is the flow of capital services and U is the 
flow of services from the renewable natural resource, i.e. the harvest rate since all 
of the extracted resource is used up in production. It is assumed in this model 
that there is a constant labour input, L into production, and without loss of 
generality L == I. The labour input is subsumed within the constant A and the 
production function is normalised so that A == 1. 
Let S equal the savings rate (which is assumed constant); then total savings is a 
constant proportion of output and total savings equals total investment. 
Total Savings = Total Investment 
= (new investment + replacement investment) 
where ¢> >0 is the constant rate of depreciation of the capital stock. 
1'Otal sa" .. . VIngs IS a constant proportIOn, S of output, I.e. 
Total Savings = SKau l- a · 





Using the original income identity Y = C + I: 
Kau J- a = SKau J- a + C 
Therefore: 
(4) 
Consumption in this economy is simply the amount of output not saved (i.e. 
invested). We assume that society wishes to choose a production and extraction 
plan so as to maximise a discounted linear combination of consumption and the 
stock of pollution. 
i.e. 
Where WI and w1 are weights on consumption, C and pollution stock, Z. It is 
fUrther assumed that WI is positive and w2 is negative. To simplify, since only 
relative . . 
weIghts matter, we can normalise the weight on consumptIon to equal 
Unity a d h .. n t en maXImise: 
(5) 
Wherew' .. 
IS a posItive constant and 0 < W < 1. Therefore substituting equation (4) 
into (5) gives: 
(6) 
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The instantaneous utility function exhibits positive but diminishing marginal utility 
from consumption and negative, but constant, marginal disutility from pollution. 
Future utility is discounted at a constant exponential rate r, where r > O. 
The change in the capital stock at time t will increase as new capital is invested 
and will decrease as the stock of capital depreciates. We can obtain a differential 
equation for the change in the stock of capital by using the condition: 
Total Savings = Total Investment 
= new investment + replacement investment 
Therefore: 
and 
Let Xbe the stock of the renewable resource at time t which is harvested and used 
for the production of output. Pollution is generated by this production process 
and bUilds Up into a stock Z at time I. The natural regeneration of the resource is 
given by g - PZ where g and p are both positive constants. It is assumed that 
when there is no pollution, g is the natural growth rate. As the level of pollution 
grows, the rate of regeneration falls at a constant rate, p. When Z = g/ P there is 
no more regeneration of the resource and the pollution has destroyed its natural 
grOwth rate. Therefore it follows that the rate of change in the stock of the 
resour . . h h ce IS equal to the rate of regenerated resource minus t e arvest rate, U; 
{Jis also the flow of the resource used in production at time I, i.e: 
X= (g-PZ)X-U 
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We assume that the rate of change of pollution stock (2) into the environment is 
the difference between the flow of pollution into the environment (which is 
proportional to the rate of output, where 0 < y < I, i.e. yKaut- a), and the rate of 
assimilative capacity of the environment (i.e. the natural clean up process). 
Forster (1975) has argued that the rate of assimilated capacity of the environment 
may depend on the amount of pollution in the environment. Forster's decay 
fUnctionj{p) is shown in section I. But repeating the previous critism of Barbier's 
function, why should it be that over the interval (O,M*) the more pollution the 




Z the level of pollution 
o 
Where the assimilative capacity of the environment is modelled by A(Z) = 8- 8Z, 
where, 8 > 0, 0 < 0 < 1 and Z > 0 . It is assumed that production has taken 
place in the past therefore there is a stock of pollution already existing in the 
environment. It shows that as the stock of pollution rises the rate of clean up falls 
at a constant rate O. When Z has risen to : the decay rate is zero and the 
environment is unable to cleanse itself. Therefore if follows that the stock of 
Pollution wilJ evolve over time according to: 
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SECTION III 
The Formal Problem 
Formally, the problem we wish to address is to: 
Subject to; 
k = SKau l- a - t/K 
X= (g-PZ)X-U 
i = yKau1- a - ({}- bZ) 
With initial conditions: 
K(O) =Ko> 0 
X(O) =Xo > 0 
Z(O) = Zo > 0 
The transversality consitions are: 
lim e-rtA,2X=0, 
t -.:; 00 
lim e-rt A,3Z = 0 
t -.:; 00 
Where A,)e-I'I ,A,2e-1'I and A,3e-rt are costate variables which are valuation variables 
measUring the shadow price of capital, the renewable resource and the stock of 
polIut' . Ion respectIVely. 
Therefore the problem posed is a dynamic optimisation problem and the method 
emploYed is the Maximum Principle ofL.S. Pontryagin et a] (1962). 
The present value Hamiltonian is defined as; 
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Assuming an interior solution the the first necessary condition is: 




(~) =[(1-aXI-::Sl , +rlJ (2) 
The second necessary condition is: ' 
Therefore: 
(3) 
SUbstituting (2) into (3) gives: 
a-I 
Al ::::(r+¢)Al-[ A2 ]7[a(l-S+SAI +YA,3)] 
(1- a)(I- S + SAl + rA3) 
Therefore simplifying gives: 
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I 
..i = (r + ~)A _ aA. 2 [0 -a)(I- S + SAt + rA3 )J-;; (4) 
I 'I' I (I-a) A2 
'the third necessary condition is: 
i.e. 
(5) 
And the fourth necessary condition is: 
i.e. 
. 
A3 = rA3 - iff / iJZ = w+(r- O)A3 + PA2X (6) 




Z = i«[ (1- aXI- ~:SAJ + rA3) J~ +SZ - () (9) 
Note that these conditions are also sufficient because of the concavity of the 
objective functional, see Mangasarian (1966) and the appendix A to this chapter. 
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This implies that if a path is found that converges towards a steady state then it is 
an optimal path. 
In the long run the optimal solution may converge to an equilibrium point. This 
constant solution of a system of differential equations is known as the steady state. 
If the steady state exists then the system, given the initial state values, is 
SUstainable and there is an optimal extraction and consumption plan that will lead 
to this sustainable equilibrium state. The analysis continues by deriving the steady 
state. 








Q= (l-a)(l-S+SAI +YA3) 
A2 
I-a 
SQ a - r/J= 0 







SUbstitute (10) and (11) into (9) gives: 
K* = [(PO-O(g-r»S] 
py¢J 
SUbstitute (10), (12) and (13) into (8) gives: 
1 





2'*, X* and K* are steady state values for Z, X and K respectively. In equations 
(4), (6) and (12) there are 3 equations with 3 unknowns, A"t A,z and A,3' (the 
shadow prices of capital, stock of the renewable natural resource and the stock of 
Pollution). 
SOlVing for the steady state of these equations gives (see appendix B): 
a 
aw(ya - a) - (0- r)(I- a)(1- S)[s¢J] I-a A,l·=-_______ -= __________________ ~~~ ________ ~ 
(r + ;)(1- a{(s -r{i] I~a p - [f30- ~;!- r)lS [i}~a (ra -a) 1 
A.2·:::: _ w(ya - a) - (0- f)(I - a)(l- S) 
[(s -r>[i]l~a p - [.80-~~-r)]S[:}~a (ya -a) J 
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a 
A.3"'::w+-L li{Ja-a)-(o-rXl-aXl-S) (flO-fi.g-r»sI.f]{l-a) 
(8-r) [a 1 J ryf3 S (8-r{~]l-a p [pO-:-r)]S[~J-a{Ja-a) 




Al* [PB - O(g - r)] ((6) I-a -w 0 (r - 0) 
ry S 
a 
A2 * = (r +(6) -a ((6) I-a 0 0 (1":" a) S 
a 
S -1 ((6) I-a y 
A3 * (1- a) S -(1- S) 








am UStng the same equation as above we can solve for the steady state value for 
output, Q, consumption, C and savings, S. 
Therefore: 
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y* = 1..[(Po-o(g-r»s] 
S Prt/J 
C* = (1- S)1..[<PO - o(g - r»s] 
S Prt/J 
(23) 
To make economic sense the steady state values of Y, C, U, X, K and Z cannot be 
negative. Therefore the foUowing restrictions on the parameters are assumed to 
hOld: 
g>r 
pO> o(g-r) > 0 
Rearranging the second equation gives: 
r g () 
->--->0 p p 8 
The first condition demands that the natural growth rate of the resource must be 
greater than the discount rate. The right hand side of the second condition 
demands that level of pollution which kills the natural growth process of the 
reSOurce must be greater than the level of po))ution that kiJJs the assimiJitive 
capacity of the environment. The difference between these capacity constraints 




It is now important to analyse the system to determine the stability of the steady 
state To d thO . . . h h . . ( . I) 
. 0 IS It IS necessary to determme t e c aractenstlc roots elgenva ues 
of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state. If the all the roots have 
POsitive real parts then the system is unstable. If the roots have negative real parts 
then th 
e system is stable. Determining the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated 
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at the steady state in this model becomes a very intractable problem to solve as 
there are 6 simultaneous non-linear differential equations. The Jacobian is: 
ok ok ok oK ok ok 
OK oX oz OAI OA2 OA3 
oX oX oX oX oX oX 
- - - - --OK oX OZ OAI OA2 OA3 
iJi iJi iJi iJi iJi iJi 
J= OK oX OZ OAI OA2 OA3 Oll Oll Oll 
. . 
OAI OAI OAI 
OK oX oz OAI OA2 OA3 
. . . 
OA2 OA2 OA2 OA2 OA2 OA2 
OK oX iJZ OAI OA2 OA3 
Ol3 OA3 Ol3 Ol3 Ol3 Ol3 
OK oX iJZ OAI OA2 OA3 
There is no simple closed-form expression for the eigenvalues of this matrix. 
Therefore a new method will be used to analyse the stability of the steady state. 
Using corollary 2c in Sorger (1989), (see methodology), it can be shown that the 
steady state is globally asymptotically stable for bounded solutions. 
The equilibrium point of this system possess the saddle point property if the 
'c urvature matrix ' , 
-H;. 
is negative definite, where H* is the maximised Hamiltonian and i = K, X, Z, and 
j:::: AI, ~, A3 and n = 3. Cass and Shell (1976) show that the Hamiltonian is 
convex in the costate and concave in the state for problems· with a concave 
object' fu . * * . d fi . lve nctlOn and so the matrices Hii and H jj are negatIve e mte. The 
Objective function in this model is concave (see appendix A), therefore in this 
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model the matrices Hi~ and H ff are negative definite. As the matrices 
H* * ii and H jj are negative definite with minimum eigenvalues below zero, the 
curvature matrix C is negative definite with a low rate of discount, (Brock and 
SCheinkman (1976». As the curvature matrix C is negative definite then the 
equilibrium point i.e. the steady state, is globally stable for bounded solutions, 
Sorger (I 989). This implies that with any initial levels of capital and resource 




A sensitivity analysis was carried out on the steady state solutions of the variables 
shown in the following table to determine their dependency on the parameters. 
The results are given below: 
r--
g P r 6 w r a ;, () S 
r--
1(." 




- + 0 + + - - + > > -




+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + 
-
r--
lJ· + + 
- + 
- -

















Regarding w~ it is interesting to see that the results show that if there is any 
change in the social preference towards the stock of pollution, w then there is no 
change in any of the steady state solutions, i.e. the steady state does not depend on 
tastes. 
Regarding g; if there was an increase in the natural growth rate, g, then we would 
expect that the steady state level of resource would rise along with the harvest 
rate. This would increase output, consumption and savings and therefore the 
level of pollution. Therefore we would expect that all the steady state solutions 
WOuld increase when there was an increase in g. As we can see, the comparative 
static results seem contradictory to a-priori expectations. However, a feasible 
explanation for some of the solutions is that if there is an increase in the natural 
growth rate then it would be possible to run down the level of resource stock to a 
lower level because of its capacity' for higher growth. Therefore the steady state 
level, X*, may be lower. During this time period, the level of harvest would 
increase, output would increase and due to this, the steady state level of pollution 
WOuld rise. At the steady state there is now less of the resource to harvest as it 
has been run down. Therefore output, consumption and the harvest rate will be 
low . 
er In the steady state; though they may, of course, have been higher along the 
tran .. 
sIhon path. Another reason why the steady state level of the resource stock 
may be lower is because as the stock of pollution builds up it will affect the 
growth rate of the resource. Therefore the steady state values of output, 
consum . Phon and resource extraction could be lower. 
Regarding o~ an increase in 0 ,the rate at which the rate of assimilated waste falls, 
(i.e. the capability of the environment to clean itself up is falling at a faster rate) 
WOuld be expected to result in an increase in the pollution stock. However the 
table above gives us contradictory results. If there was a rise in the level of 
POllution as would be expected, then there would be fall in the level of resource 
stock as a rise in the pollution stock would affect the growth of the resource. For 
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example, as a lake becomes more and more polluted because the capability to 
cleanse itself has fallen, the less the fish stock be able to regenerate. Eventually 
the pollution will start to destroy the growth process and the steady state stock of 
fish will reduce. The steady state level of harvest will also fall as there is less of 
the fish to harvest. With r constant, and the level of pollution rising, output 
Would have to fall to maintain a steady state stock of pollution. If output falls 
then there would be less output to consume therefore consumption and savings 
Would also fall. 
Regarding p, an increase in P, the rate at which the growth rate falls, means that 
the grOwth rate is now falling at a faster rate. If the growth of the resource is 
now more affected by the level of pollution we would expect that the steady state 
level of the resource stock to fall. This would imply lower output and 
consumption. Using the previous example, an increase in p would mean that the 
growth rate of fish stock in a lake is now more affected by the level of pollution 
and the fish are now regenerating at a slower rate. This would imply that there is 
less of the resource stock to harvest therefore less output, which in turn would 
redUce consumption and savings. 
The results show otherwise, but there is a possible explanation for this. With an 
increase in p, implying a lower growth rate at each pollution level, it is likely that 
the resource would still be growing. Therefore at the steady state there would be 
lllore to harvest, i.e. U* would be higher and hence Y* and C* would increase. 
Due to the increased output, the steady state level of the pollution stock would 
rise. 
Regarding f/>; if there was an increase in the rate of depreciation on capital we 
WOuld expect the level of capital to fall. If g = r then the results show that capital 
WOuld fall. To maintain output, i.e. no change in the steady state level of output, 
lllore of the resource would be needed in production (assuming that capital and 
. the resource are substitutable), therefore the rate of harvest would increase and 
the reSOurce stock would decrease. If output remains unchanged, consumption 
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and savings would also remain at their original steady state level. This is shown 
by the results above. The results imply that there is a maximum level for capital 
used in Production; this is feasible as there is only so much we can invest in new 
capital. Also there is a maximum level of the stock of the resource; this would 
also be feasible because, for example, a lake could only hold a certain amount of 
fish and after some maximum level there would be overcrowding and fish would 
start to die. However the results imply a minimum level on the extraction rate, 
this might seem unfeasible but it could be explained by the fact that if there is a 
maximum level on the use of capital, then to get a certain amount of output there 
Would be a minimum amount of the resource you need to use in the production 
process to achieve that output. In that case the level of output would not change, 
neither would consumption and savings. 
Regarding r. if there was an increase in the proportion of output that turns into 
emissions that flow into the environment we would expect the level of pollution 
stOck to . ' . h . h d 
nse. However the results show that there IS no c ange In t e stea y 
state level of pollution. If there was more pollution, the resource stock would 
fall. This would definitely be the case if g = r ( i.e. we are taking no more out of 
the e . 
nvtronment than can be produced). The resource stock would fall because 
there is n . . . W' h 
ow a hIgher level of pollution affecting the regeneratIon capacIty. It 
~~ hi OUrce stock there is less to harvest, therefore U* would fall. In tum t s 
WOuld mean output, consumption and savings would also fall. If the growth rate 
Was large then the level of resource stock could still rise even though the level of 
Pollution has risen. It seems all the results can be explained except the fact that 
an increa . . 
se In r doesn't affect the level of pollutIon stock. 
Regarding r; a counter-intuitive result is the effect of a change in the discount 
rate, r W'th . . . h b .. f 
. 1 a nse in r we would anticipate a nse 10 output at t e eglOOlng 0 
the plan. But as the economy depends so much on the natural resource for 
prOdUction, increased extraction of the resource would run down the stock and 
there 
Would be less left for future production. Therefore the steady state level of 
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output and consumption would be lower. This is the underlying argument for 
SUstainable development. If we use up our resources unsustainably then the 
future economy is put at risk. The table shows a different story. In the standard 
neoclassical optimal growth model, Cass (1965), a higher discount rate results in 
higher consumption at the start of the plan and lower steady state consumption. 
Here, the position is not so clear cut. An increase in consumption early in the 
plan results in lower output and less pollution. The lower pollution increases the 
grOwth rate of the resource and therefore it is possible to increase the extraction 
of the resource so that steady state output and consumption in this model can 
actually be higher. The steady state stock of the resource could still be higher 
eVen though it is possible to increase the extraction rate, as it is feasible that the 
resOurce is still growing along the transition path. Of course, at the steady state 
there is no change in the resource stock. 
Regarding 9, represents the natural assimilative capacity of the environment. If 
this in '" I 
creased then at each level of pollutIOn, the pollution stock wou d be cleaned 
up at a faster rate and we would expect the steady state stock of pollution to fall. 
With Ie I' k h S8 po luhon there would be a greater amount of the resource stoc as t ere 
is less p II ' . h 
o utlon to affect the growth rate of the resource. Wit a greater amount 
of resource stock there would be more to harvest therefore there would be a 
greater ' d' ld ' amOunt of output and thereby consumptIOn an savings wou Increase. 
The results show that there is an increase in all the steady state values as expected 
e"cept that there would in fact be no change in the steady state stock of pollution. 
Regarding S; an increase in S implies that there is an increase in the rate of saving. 
The comparative static results are as one would expect. They show that there 
Would be an increase in the steady state level of the capital stock and a fall in the 
leVel of consumption. With an increase in S and a fall in the steady state level of 
cOnsUIll t' P lon, then it is feasible that the steady state level of output would not 
chang 
e as the identity Y = C + I is assumed. If more is saved then more capital 
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can be used for future output and the level of the resource stock and the level of 
resource extraction can be lower in the steady state. 
Regarding a; an increase in a implies that the share of output accuring to capital 
has increased and that the marginal productivity of capital has increased. Output 
is given by: 
The marginal productivity of capital is thus given by: 
Or 
bY U 1- a y 
-=a--=a-:-iJK K I- a K 
This shows that an increase in a increases the marginal productivity of capital. In 
the comparitive statics the result shows that a does not affect the steady state 
level of the capital stock. In the standard neoclassical optimal growth model, 
Cass (1965), this is not the case and a does affect the steady state level of capital 
stock. Here a also does not affect the steady state level of the pollution stock, 
the level of consumption or the level of output. The only effect that ex. has is on 
the steady state level of the resource extraction and the steady state level of the 
resOurce stock. There is also no effect on them if the level of capital depreciation 
is equivalent to the savings rate. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter a new dynamic optimisation model has been developed in which 
there is an intertemporal trade off between producing output for consumption and 
the level of pollution. The model highlights the effect that pollution has on human 
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welfare and on the environment, i.e. the effect on the regeneration rate of a 
renewable resource and the effect on the assimilative capacity of the environment. 
It has been recognised that there is a weakness in the literature on environmental-
economic models in that they fail to take into account all aspects of their 
interaction. From various models presented in section I, it can be seen that this is 
the case and it can be said that models are over simplified to gain analytical 
simplicity. For instance, pollution is usually treated as a flow that doesn't build 
up into a stock in the environment, Keeler et al (1972), Gruver (1976), and 
Forster (1973a). Siebert (1982) and Barbier(1989) do include pollution stock in 
their models and natural resource use but not capital accumulation, therefore 
Pollution is genererated from consumption. Other models do include production 
but do not include natural resource use, van den Bergh and Nijkamp (1991) and 
BrOck (1977). Most of these models also treat the natural rate of assimilation as 
constant, others include, Plourde (1972) and D' Arge (1971). It has been argued 
in Forster (1975) and Smith (1977) and in this chapter that this is an unrealistic 
aSSUmption and also serves to allow analyitical simplicity. Here the natural decay 
rate does depend on the level of pollution stock in the environment and is a 
decreaSing function of that stock. 
It is argued here that the current environmental-economic models, do not take 
aCCOunt of all the necessary interactions that occur. The closest model is that of 
Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen, but here there are assumptions that are unrealistic. 
For instance, pollution emissions are treated as a factor of production and also the 
natural decay rate is constant. They also ignore capital depreciation. 
The model in this chapter combines characteristics of other models not previously 
brought . . 1'" f together Into one optimal control model. It IS a more rea IStlC versIon 0 
Tahvonen and Kuuluvainens' model in that takes into account the aspects that 
they have neglected. 
It is found that an optimal and sustainable consumption and resource harvesting 
policy does exist. Sustainable steady state solutions of the variables are derived 
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and sufficient conditions for the existence of the steady state are given. New 
theory on the stability of dynamical systems is used and it is shown that when the 
rate of discount is small enough all bounded solutions converge to a unique 
Optimal steady state. Therefore the same result as Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen is 
shown to exist under more realistic assumptions. The effect that changes in the 





Concavity of the objective function, W 
For this to be concave in K, U and Z, then the matrix of second derivatives must 
have non-positive eigenvalues. 
Therefore we need to find the eigenvalues of the matrix: 
Therefore the matrix is: 
(a-l)a(I_S)Ka - 2U I- a 
(1- a)a(1- S)Ka-1U-a 
o 
(1- a)a(1- S)Ka-1U-a 0 
-(1- a)a(l- S)KaU-a - 1 0 
Let B:::: (I - a )a(l- S), therefore: 








The characteristic equation is: 
where A represents the eigenvalues. 
Multiplying out gives: 
Cancelling out gives: 
The eigenvalues are: 
Theretore all eigenvalues are non-positive and the objective function is therefore 
concave. 
APPENDIX B 
Steady State Analysis 
Atth ... 
e steady state, AI = A2 = A3 = 0 
SUbstituting (12) into (4) gives: 
a 
41 - 2 'Y I-a aA. [A.J-
(r + iP)(I- a) S (24) 
Rearranging (12) we get: 
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a 
Al (S - as) + (1- a){I- S + rA3) = A2[~}-a (25) 
Substituting (24) into (25) gives: 
a 
aA.2 [t]l~a (S - as) + (1- a)(1- S + rA3) = A2[~}-a (r+;)(1-a) S 
Therefore rearranging: 
Let: 
[ ;]I~Q A [a(S - as) - {r + ;)(1- a)] + (1- a)(l- S) A _ ,=,:S~_-12 =------~(~r...:....+ ~;)~(I:..--....:.a~) _--=-___ _ 
3 - (ra - a) 
p= a(S- as)-(r+ ;)(l- a) 
(r+;){I- a) 
Therefore 1..3 becomes: 
From (6): 






A 2'" = w(ya - a) - (0 - r )(1- a )(1- S) 
[(8_r{~]I~a p-ft¥(ra-a)] 
A2'" = w(ya - a) - (0- r)(1- a)(l- S) (28) 
[(8 _r{~]I~a p -[PO- ;~- r)]S [~J'~a (ya -a)] 
Sub t' , 
s ltuttng (28) into (24) gives: 
[ fjJ]l~a aw(ya - a) - (0- r)(1- a)(1- S) -A "'_ S 
I - (r+;)(I-a{(8-r{~f p-ft¥(ra-a)] 
subsf ' ItUttng X* into the above gives: 
a 
aw(ya - a) - (0- rXl- a)(1- S)[fjJ] I-a 
A I'll == _ S (29) 
V+;XI -{8 -r{~]I~a p JP8- :-r)~[~]I~a (ya- a)] 




(8 -r{~J-a p-px(ya- a) 
(jJ()- 8(g-r»SI ¢] (1-a) 
rrP S 
Substituting X* into this gives: 
A simpler way of displaying these results is to use matrix formation: 




Therefore substituting (14) into (32) gives: 
a 
(0-r)).3 -A2[P8-~~-r)J;)(I-a) =w (33) 
Rearra . 
ngIng (33) gives: 
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Using {l2)gives: 
Rearranging we get: 
a 
(I - a)(1 - S + SA I) + r(J - a)A3 - A 2[i](I-a> = 0 
))' . lVJding through by (I-a): 
Therefore, rearranging: 
a 
SA.I + rA.3 - .12 [t](l-a> = -(1- S) (1- a) S 
(34) 
(35) 
Therefore using equations (31), (34) and (35) we can show the steady state 
SOlutl'O' , ns In matnx form: 
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a 
[PB - o(g - r)] ( <6) I-a Al* -w 0 (r - 0) 
ry S 
a 
(r+<6) -a (<6) I-a 0 A2 * = 0 (1- a) S 
a 




Al* [PB - o(g - r)] (<6) I-a -w 0 (r -0) 
ry S 
a 
A2 * = (r+<6) -a (<6) I-a 0 0 (1- a) S 
, a 
A3 * 
S -1 (<6) I-a (1- a) S y -(1- S) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE 
PRESERVATION OF NATURAL 
ENVIRONMENTS WITH A GROWING 
!OPULATION 
POpulation Pressures 
'the cause of the environmental problems that we face today can be attributed to 
hurnan activity - the more people, the more problems. A growing population puts 
pressure on both the economic and environmental systems. There is a need for 
more food, more water, more goods. The consequent rise in economic activity, 
as Well as the direct impact of a greater amount of people, places an increasing 
b ' 
urden on the eco-system. The question is, can the environmental and economic 
sYstems Cope? For a system to be sustainable it must have the capacity to 
generate enough wealth to provide for investment and the maintenance of the 
environment as well as for the material requirements of the population. 
Rapid Population has increased the demand on the environment and natural 
resOurce supplies causing increasing degradation to the environment. For 
e'Cample, the Brazilian rain forest is being cut down at an alarming rate to make 
Way for the increased need for agricultural production to support the ever 
increasin . .. . g number of people. Population growth IS putting increasing pressure on 
the depletion of our natural resources. The neo-Malthusian's view is that more 
People wiU lead to an increased use of resources and this will eventually lead to a 
Shortage. They argue that the loss of natural resources that are essential to life 
could come as a Holocaust (the bang), or could come slowly and painfully (the 
whj 
mper) as a result of the consequences of over popUlation. Whatever happens, 
they say We are doomed. Simon (1990), argues that the increased demand for 
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new supplies. He argues that eventually new sources will be found. But how 
Can a finite world supply us with an infinite amount of resources? 
It is true that as resources start to become more scarce their price will rise and this 
Will encourage the owners of the resource to conserve their supply. Shortages 
may arise because individual countries or regions will be unable to pay for the 
resOurces they need. But in the aftermath of the oil shocks in the mid-1970's 
when there was increasing prices for oil, there were new discoveries of fossil fuels. 
Rnown fossil fuel reserves have risen much faster than consumption in the past 
forty years. The world's reserves of oil and natural gas stood at 30 billion tons of 
oil equivalent in 1950, and today there are more than 250 billion tons, even though 
World oil consumption has totalled 100 billion tons in the intervening years, 
(WOrld Bank (1993». 
But even if the world as a whole has enough, individual countries and regions may 
be faced with serious shortages: For example, Asian countries do not have 
enOugh energy resources, particularly oil and gas, of their own to meet demands. 
Thomas MaIthus at first wrote about the dangers of population outstripping food 
SUPply due to the shortage of good farmland. He was writing at the start of the 
nineteenth century, when accelerating population and industrial growth were 
raising demands for food faster than English agriculture could respond, (Brinley 
(1985». However his predictions were confounded by the increase in 
intern t' 
a 10nal trade and technological change. 
Since Malthus first worried about the possibility of mass starvation, the world's 
OUtput offood has risen faster than its popUlation. For example, in India between 
1950 and 1990, food output increased by 2.7 per cent and its population increased 
on average by 2.1 per cent. However, although the global averages conceal some 
COuntries which are finding food resources increasingly scarce, some of the 
COuntries of sub-Saharan Africa, Nepal and Bangladesh are becoming increasingly 
hungry (World Bank (1984». 
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Neo-classical economists emphasise the ability of the market to adapt to resources 
Scarcities over time. If future scarcities are expected then businesses will hold the 
sUpplies of the resource off the market anticipating future prices to increase and 
they will invest in discovering and developing new supplies. Prices can guide 
rnarket adjustment processes but this presupposes that those resources have a 
Price, i.e. they can be bought and sold. This in tum implies that they are owned. 
However, many important resources are not privately owned. The sustainability 
of common property resources requires collective control, through legal and 
regulatory restraints and by decisions of the leaders in societies. If the amount of 
the resource is vast then users will assume that the impact of their actions will 
have little if any effect on it and that any sacrifice by them to preserve it will have 
an' , inSignificant effect. These resources are treated as free goods and are at risk. 
Some of these resources are renewable, such as the tropical forests, but some of 
the exhaustible resources may be more secure than some that are renewable. 
The ideas ofMalthus have resurfaced in the latter half of this century as concerns 
about the environment have grown. It has been argued that the world would 
Simply run out of the essential raw materials, such as coal and oi1, and so nature 
would limit growth. In 1972 the Club of Rome, a group of eminent people, 
prodUced the Limits To Growth (Meadows et al (1972)). The conclusion is 
extremely gloomy. They predicted that: 
"If the present growth trends in population, industrialisation, 
pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue 
unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached in 
some time within the next 100 years", (Meadows et al (1972)). 
However, after the publication of the Limits to Growth, the world's reserves of 
some know fossil fuels have risen faster than consumption, consumption has not 
Outstripped production, as pointed out earlier~ the world's reserves of oil and gas 
have ' , h' bl" , h ' , flsen. The lesson of the years since t IS pu IcatlOn IS t at It IS not 
necessarily the case that exhaustible resources will be exhausted. It is argued that 
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the market wi]) protect natural resources from over-use. But, as mentioned 
earlier, those environmental resources that are most at risk from over exploitation 
are not those that the Club of Rome were worried about, but the free 
environmental goods such as the tropical forests, the fish in the world's seas and 
the SUpply of fresh water. 
literature on Population models 
Stimulated by the Limits to Growth and environmental and energy concerns, a 
vigorous literature has evolved on natural resources and the environment. 
There is an extensive literature on economic growth with exhaustible resources as 
essential inputs in the production process where population is treated as stationary 
(I:>asgupta and Heal (1975), Solow (1974) and Dasgupta and Heal (1979)). 
SOlow (1974), starts his paper with the simplest of cases - modelling capital 
accUmulation with constant population, no technical progress and no scarce 
resources, i.e. the production function is: 
Q= F(K,L) 
Where K . h" . S' Q . IS t e capital stock and L IS the flow of labour services. mce IS net 
Output to be produced under constant returns to scale. 
Q=C+K 
Wherec' . . ' . IS consumption and K is investment. The dynamIC constramt IS: 
K = Q[F(K,L)]- C (1) 
a . 
e then intrOduces an exponentially growing population and assumes: 
i.e. L = nL (2) 
USing: 
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Q = F(K,L) = Lf(k) 




Where c=::CIL, the consumption per capita. 
Using equation (2) and the capital resource ratio we get: 
SUbstituting this into (3) gives: 
Therefore: 
kL +knL = f(k)-c 
L 
k = f (k) - nk - c 
(3) 
fie then extends his model to take into account exhaustible resources; the 
prodUction function becomes: 
Q=F(K,L)Rh O<h<l 
WhereF' h 
IS omogeneous of degree l_h1, R is the rate of flow of a natural resource 
and is an essential input in the productive process. He then argues that a model 
With eXponential population growth seems ridiculous. 
"We alJ know that population cannot grow forever if only for 
square footage reasons. The convention of exponential population 
growth makes excellent sense as an approximation so long as 
population is well below its limit. On a time-scale appropriate to 
finite resources however, exponential growth of population is an 
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inappropriate idealisation. But then we might as well treat the 
population as constant." (See Solow (1974), p 36). 
He then treats population growth as zero, i.e. n = O. 
Empirical evidence of population growth indicates that the population is not 
stationary. Given our empirical experience of population growth it is worthwhile 
to explore the consequences of a growing population in models involving a non-
renewable resource (Stiglitz (1974a), Ingham and Simmons (1975), Cigno (1981) 
and Stiglitz (l974b». 
Ingham and Simmons (1975), examine optimal growth paths for an economy 
Which does possess an exponentially growing labour force and a scarce non-
renewable resource but with the particular criterion of intergenerational equity. 
In their model there is a single non-renewable natural resource that is extracted 
&001 the environment. A single composite commodity is produced from capital, 
labour and natural resource inputs with the assumption of constant returns to 




k(t) = f(k(t),x(t»-nk(t)-c(t) 
Where U(c(t»is the welfare ascribed to a particular individual of generation t, L is 
the labour force, k = KIL the capital:labour ratio and x = XIL the resource:labour 
ratio. Also the stock of the resource X must be allocated to production over time 
So that: 
f:L(t)x(t)dt = X 
Labou r grows at a rate n, i.e. L(t) = e nl 
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Production does include the natural resource but they do not take into account the 
am . 
entty value of the environment. The utility function only contains 
consumption as its argument. The purpose of their paper is to determine 
Whether there are feasible and optimal growth paths under a variety of 
teChnological constraints. They show that the nature of the optimal paths will 
depend on the properties of the functionsj{k,x) and U(c). They found that if the 
elasticity of substitution is constant i.e. using a CES production function: 
and is greater than unity and if population does not grow too rapidly in relation to 
the parameters of the production function, then it is not certain that an infinite 
hOrizon optimum exists. They show that if the time horizon is finite then an 
OPtimal solution exists. 
Sti r g ItZ (I 974b), examines the implications of introducing exhaustible natural 
resOurces as an essential factor of production in the standard neo-classical growth 
model and he treats the rate of population growth as constant. In his model 
OUtput is a function of labour, capital and natural resource inputs and it can be 
either consumed or invested. 
Q = F(K,L,R,t) = KQ'LQ1RQ'eA.1 = C+K 
where a I + a 2 + a 3 = 1 , ,t is the rate of technical progress and C is the level of 
consUmption. Labour gross at a constant exponential rate, n, such that: 
Also: 
R=-S 
Where S is the stock of the resource. He shows that if there is a steady state 
SOlution, it is a saddle point. Hence introducing exhaustible resources into the 
mOdel has the effect of making the system highly unstable. Stiglitz (1974a), 
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shows that steadily growing per capita consumption may be feasible forever if a 
wasting and non-replenishable resource is indispensable to production and if 
population is growing at a constant exponential rate. He argues that even with a 
limited amount of resources, the economy need not decline. Technical change 
and capital accumulation will offset the effects of falling natural resource inputs. 
Capital accumulation alone could do this if the share of capital in production is 
greater than that of the natural resource. He argues that we can just use up our 
reSOurces and that the technical change can offset the effects on output of a slowly 
declining natural resource input. Stiglitz then shows the optimal growth paths for 
. an economy with exhaustible natural resources with the criterion of maximising 
per capita consumption. Stiglitz, along with others such as Dasgupta and Heal 
(1974), Solow (1974) and Kamien and Schwartz (1978), show that it may be 
OPtimal to completely exhaust a non-renewable resource if the availability of 
future technologies and perfect substitutes mean that depletion of the resource is 
no longer essential for future production. 
Mitra (1983) is concerned with what patterns of population growth are consistent 
With the attainment of some social objectives in the presence of exhaustible 
resOurce constraints. He is not concerned with finding an optimal population 
policy Where population or it's growth rate is treated as a control variable, but 
POpulation is exogenously given and satisfies Lo = L, L
'
+1 ~ Lt for 1 ~ O. The 
problem he states is to determine precisely what population profiles are consistent 
(or inconsistent) with economic welfare objectives, first the attainment of a non-
trivial "maximum" program, i.e. it is a maximum programme and can maintain a 
POsitive per capita consumption level, and secondly the attainment of an "optimal 
programme". Mitra examines the precise limitations that must be imposed on 
POpulation growth, in order to attain these welfare objective. 
lie states that population growth should not be too fast and shows that population 
grOwth consistent with the welfare objectives is a "quasi-arithmetic progression", 
. 
I.e. it ::: (1+ J)J. for t ~ 0 and ..t > 0, rather than a geometric progression. 
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Papers such as, Koopmans (1974), Lane (1977) and Dasgupta and Mitra (1979), 
deal with the problem of optimal population policies with exhaustible resource 
constraints where the population is treated as a control variable. 
eigno (1981) argues that in an economy constrained by exhaustible resources, the 
assUmption of a constant rate of population growth is implausible. He examines 
the implications of making the population growth rate a function of consumption 
and capital per capita, therefore the growth rate is endogenously determined. He 
argues that both natality and mortality rates, the difference of which is the 
Population growth rate, are bound up with a country's standard of living and 
degree of industrialisation. He postulates that the rate of population growth is 
POsitively related to per capita consumption and inversely related to the degree of 
industrialisation. He argues that this is consistent with empirical observations that 
at low levels of industrialisation, the rate of population growth tends to move in 
the same direction as per capita consumption, while at high levels of 
industrialisation, it tends to mov~ in the opposite direction. Cigno uses Stiglitz's 
model but makes the minor alteration that in the dynamic equation, L = nL J n is 
not constant and he assumes that the rate of growth is: 
Where {l- s >( i) represents the standard of living with s as the savings rate 
aSsumed constant, and 1 represents the degree of industrialisation. He finds 
that an economy with exhaustible resources and an endogenously determined 
Population is capable of stable growth. He shows that the stability of the system 
depends on the choice of savings/income ratio. An economy may be put on a 
stable path if a policy maker is able to control the choice of savings/income ratio. 
liowever. Cigno considers the dynamic model of an economy with a non-
renewable resource as an essential factor of production but not in an optimising 
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framework. The model presented in the following sections will be an extension of 
this model. 
In the above articles, natural resources are treated as those environmental 
resOurces that provide us with valuable productive services; thus only one 
function of the natural environment is considered relevant to the aspect of natural 
resource scarcity and that is as a supplier of the raw material and energy inputs to 
the economic process. 
The literature concerning natural resource depletion, population growth and the 
amenity values associated with the environment is much sparser. 
I<rautkraemer (1985), broadens the conventional approach to optimal resource 
depletion by taking into account the amenity value of preserved environments. 
The extraction of a non-renewable resource, which is an essential input into the 
productive process, irreversibly disrupts the natural environment where the 
reSOurce is found. In his model the economy produces a composite commodity 
With inputs capital and the natural resource. Utility is a function of the flow of 
consUmption and the amenity services from the resource stock. The commodity 
can be Consumed or invested to increase future production. The problem is to 
choose the optimal path of extraction and investment so as to maximise the 
Present value of utility. 
SUbject to: 
8(t) = -R(t) 
K(t) = F[K(t),R(t)] - C(t) 
C(t),K(t),R(t),S(t) non - negative 
K(O) = Ko; S(O) = So 
Where C· k R 
• IS consumption, S is the non-renewable resource stoc , 
InpUt to prod ' K ' . I' , d t' uctlon, IS capita mput m pro uc Ion. 
is the resource 
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He finds that the optimal level of preservation will depend upon the initial capital 
stock. 
"If the elasticity of capital-resource substitution is greater than the 
inverse of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, then 
an increase in the initial capital stock will increase the optimal level 
of preservation.", (p 165). 
However, within his model there is the assumption that the population is constant, 
i.e. there is a stationary population. 
Burt and Cummings' paper (1970), is concerned with developing a comprehensive 
model for simultaneously optimising the rate of resource extraction and 
investment in natural resource industries in general. They postulate that the model 
is sUfficiently general to be applicable to any specific resource, i.e. non-renewable 
Or renewable. They state that optimisation is viewed from the stand point of 
society and the level of population is treated as stationary. The social benefit 
function contains in it's arguments the level of resource stock, and the rate of 
resource use, at time t: 
B, (u" v, ,x, ,Y,) 
Whereu ' I' 
t, vt, Xt, Yt represent the rate of use of the resource, capIta Investment, 
resOurce stocks and amount of investment in the natural resource industry. This 
can be viewed as a welfare function that is taking into consideration the benefits of 
resOurce amenities and so the objective then would be to maximise these benefits 
to societ H ' , , I ' h' y. Owever there IS no mentIon of envlronmenta concerns 10 t IS paper. 
Their rationale for incJuding the level of resource stocks in the social benefit 
function is that Xt, the resource stock at time t, reflects the accessibility of the 
resou 
ree. For example; 
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" large stocks of fish permit capture of a given quantity at a lower 
cost, and large stocks of a mineral are associated with relatively 
accessible and rich ores." (Burt and Cummings 1970, p 578). 
u' . 
t IS Included because the rate of use of the resource is assumed to have value in 
economic production or as a direct consumption good. The level of capital 
invested in the natural resource industry, Yt. is included for the reason that higher 
stocks of capital imply lower costs of production in each period. 
The social benefit function is viewed as a profit function and results applying to 
the behaviour of the firm. 
Clark (1976) considers problems of maximising discounted net revenue derived 
from the exploitation of renewable resources. He extends the theory of optimal 
exploitation of renewable resources to more complex biological models that 
involve age structure. However he does not take into account the amenity 
services provided by natural envi~onments and there is no treatment of population, 
indicating that he assumes that population is stationary. 
Beddington, Watts and Wright (1975) derive optimal time paths for the cropping 
of self .. reproducible natural resources. In their paper they present four models of 
renewable resources that are inputs in the production process. Population is 
treated as constant and so doesn't enter into the analysis. In all the models the 
economic objective is to maximise the present value of profit obtained from the 
selJing of the crop. However they do examine the conditions under which the 
resOurce becomes exterminated, but under the strategy of maximising discounted 
cash flow. 
Tbi 
s chapter deals with the scenario of an economy that possess a single 
renewable resource that is extracted from a pre-existing pool. The resource is 
self .. replenishable. This situation could apply to the cutting down of trees where 
the forest re-seeds itself. There are no controls on regeneration - no additional 
inputs, e.g. fertiliser. It is only managed only by cropping. The resource is used 
193 
in the production of a single composite commodity which is either consumed or 
invested. The objective is to find the optimal extraction rate so as to maximise 
per capita consumption. However, here there is the additional constraint to the 
USUal analysis - the population (which is assumed equivalent to the labour force) is 
growing at an endogenous rate. This chapter is an extension to the work of 
Cigno (1981) in that the full optimal solution to the problem will be derived. 
Also, renewable resources will be the essential factor of production rather than an 
t'Chaustible resource as in most of the previous literature. 
In Section I, the model will be developed and the dynamical system explained. In 
Section II the formal optimal control problem will be presented and solved for the 
OPtimal sustainable steady state solution. In Section III it is shown that for the 
steady state to exist, there are restrictions on the range which the discount rate can 
take. In Section IV the stability of the system will be analysed and Section V 
Co 'd 
nSI ers the effects that changes in the paramenters of the model have on the 
steady state solutions. Section VI will offer some conclusions. 
SECTION I 
The Model 
Consider an economy that possesses a single renewable natural resource that is 
extracted from a pre-existing pool. This resource is used in the production of a 
Single composite commodity which is either consumed or invested. Efficient 
OUtput Possibilities for the commodity are given by the production function: 
(1) 
Where K is the capital input, L is the labour input and R is the resource input, all at 
tillle t, The production function has the property that if there is no amount of the 
resOurce used in porduction then there will be no output, ie. if R = 0 then Y = 0, 
l'his is described by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) as an essential resource. 
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" .. one regards a resource as being essential if output of final 
consumption goods is nil in the absense of the resource. 
Otherwise caU the resource inessential." (Dasgupta and Heal 
(1974) p. 4). 
The Production function is twice differentiable and strictly concave, i.e. ; 
Fu<O 
We also assume the usual neoclassical assumption of constant returns to scale 
(linear homogeniety), i.e. at + a2 + a3 = 1 
The development over time of. the capital stock (k) can be described by the 
dYnamic equation: 
(2) 
~here C is the consumption of the composite commodity. Output that is not 
InVested . . II' '11 I IS consumed; therefore output minus consumptIon, a at tIme t, WI equa 
the cha . 
nge 10 the stock of capital at time t. 
Iiere We are assuming that the costs of extracting the resource are zero and that 
extraction of the resource causes irreversible degradation to the environment. 
The chan . . . ge 10 the resource stock IS gIVen by: 
S=gS-R (3) 
WhereSd .. k . t . h h enotes the level of remammg resource stoc at time ,g IS t e growt 
rate of the renewable resource at time t and R is the level of resource extraction at 
f 
Illle I, all of which is used up in production. 
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The available labour force is considered to be identical to the population and 
grows at a rate n. Therefore the change in the labour supply ( L ) is given by: 
L=nL (4) 
The growth rate of the population is not assumed to be constant as it is in most of 
the literature on natural resources. Here it is assumed that the growth rate, n(t), 
of the population is a function of the country's standard of living and the degree to 
which the country is industrialised. This is an extension of an idea of Cigno 
(I 981), where he argued that the variables sometime treated as constants in other 
Illodels are infact actual economic variables themselves. He then let the rate of 
Population growth be positively related to the country's standard of living, which 
he takes to be the level of per capita consumption, and inversely related to the 
degree of industrialisation. He argues that this is consistent with empirical 
observations that: 
"at low levels of industrialisation the rate of population growth 
tends to move in the same direction as per capita consumption, 
while at higher levels of industrialisation it tends to move in the 
opposite direction", (Cigno (I 980), P 287). 
lie the I ' , 
nets the rate of population growth be given by: 
where VI and V2 are positive constants representing the share of population growth 
that is att 'b f' d 'I" d n uted to per capita consumption and the degree 0 m ustrla Isatlon, an 
W is th ' 
e savtngs rate, assumed constant. 
Per ca ' Pita consumtion is : 
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Therefore the growth function can be written: 
(L)V2 n=cV, K (5) 
Now, writing the stock of capital, stock of resource, output and consumption in 
per capita terms: 
k=KlL c=CIL r=RlL y=YIL 
i.e. 
K=kL C=cL R=rL Y=yL 
Where k = capital to lab~ur ratio I the amount of capital per unit of labour. 
c = amount of consumption per unit of labour I consumption per 
capita. 
r = amount of resource flow used per unit oflabour 
y = total output per unit oflabour, i.e. average product of labour. 
k = (kL)a, La 2 (rL)a] - cL 
MUltiply' . 109 out gtves: 
:SUt since 
, ctl + ct2 + ct3 = 1 this can be simplified to: 
(6) 
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Looking at the resource stock equation: 
S=gsL-rL (7) 
SUbstituting K = kL into the population growth function gives: 
v (L)Vl v-v 
n=cI kL =clk 1 (8) 
Therefore the change in the stock of labour/population is: 
(9) 
We now write the change in the capital stock and resource stock in per capita 
qUantities: 
FrOlll the above definitions, K = kL. Differentiating, we get: 
and . 
, Usmg equation (9): 
k == kL + kc VI k -vz L 
Equating this with equation (6): 
Rearr . 
angtng gives: 
lJ' SIng S - ,r d d'ffi .. , 
- SL. an I erentlatmg gives: 
(10) 
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Substituting equation (9) into this gives: 
S ::SCV • k-V 2 L + sL 
Equating this with equation (7) gives: 




the formal problem 
Utility is' 'fu' f ' c. bl b' t' an increasing nctJon 0 consumptIon. Therelore a reasona e 0 ~ec Ive 
for a social planner is to maximise per capita utility over time given the constraints 
on capital accumulation and the renewable resource stock described in equations 
(10) and (II) above. 
'therefore the problem is to: 
SUbject to' 
s:::: gs-r -scV.k-V2 
and th ' , , 
e initial conditions: 
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k(O) = ko > 0 
S(O) = So> 0 
where 'If is the social rate of discount and where we assume for simplicity that 
U(e) == In(c). Note that this utility function is strictly concave (i.e. exhibits 
diminishing marginal utility): 
Uc>O Ucc<O 
The current value Hamiltonian is: 
Where Al(t) and A2(t) are the current value shadow prices associated with capital 
and resOurce stocks respectively. 
P' 
Irst order necessary conditions for an interior solution are: 
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Note that these conditions are also sufficient because of the concavity of the 
objective functional, see Mangasarian (1966). 
In the long run, the optimal solution may "settle down" to an equilibrium point. 
This particular solution of a system of differential equations is known as the steady 
state. If the steady state exists, then the system, given the initial state values, is 
SUstainable and there is an optimal extraction and consumption plan that will lead 
to this Sustainable eqUilibrium state. The analysis continues by deriving the steady 
state. 
The steady state solutions are characterised by: 
ll=A2=k=s=0 
Therefore, from equations (lO) and (11): 
v k-v 0 gs-r-sc. 1 = 




;-A-I-J.}A,lkl-v2cV.-l_VlA,2Sk-v2cv.-1 = 0 (3) 
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There are 6 equations in 6 unknowns. These can then be solved for the steady 
state values of the variables s, k, r, c, AI, A2, denoted by s*, k*, r*, c*, AI*, A2*' all 
in terms of k* . 
From (6); 
Solving this for c*, assuming A2 '* 0; 
.-!. 1'2 
c* = (g - III) VI k * vI (7) 
Solving for r*; 
SUbstituing (7) into (1) and solving for r* gives: 
I 
r* = (g- ",)k *)-a) +(g_ "') VI k *V2 [ 
..!.. ...!.. -a I ]a3 (8) 








SOlving for A.l * (see appendix A), gives: 
A.}*:: rp =0(11) 
I "2 "I-I ("I-l2) 
(g-rp)"I k*-;J rp+ry(g- rp)--;f k.-VJ-r rp+a3(g-rp)]+l1a3(g-rp) 
SOlving for k* (See appendix A), gives: 
2 2 lI/ - QJIII(g - \1/) + \I/(g - \I/)(l-l'2) -l'2Q3(g - \1/) 
I 2..+1 
(12) 
QI (g - \1/) "I + V2Q 3(g - \1/) "I 
Equations (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) are the steady state solutions of c, r, $, A.J 
and 1 ., 'w 
42. Equation (12) shows the steady state solution of the per capita captt 
stock, k. 
loo1d 




g> If! must hold if the solution is to be economically sensible. This condition also 
enSures that the level of resource extraction, r, the level of resource stock, S, the 
shadow price of capital, A.I, the shadow price of resource stock, A.2, and the level 
of capital stock are positive. Equation (12) gives an interesting result. The 
exponent on the inverse of the degree of industrialisation, V2, and the exponent on 
per capita consumption, VI, must not be equal to each other. If this were the case 
then the whole system would collapse. This implies that the share of per capita 
consumption to population growth cannot be equal to the share of industrialisation 
to Population growth. 
SECTION III 
Conditions for the Existence of the Steady State 
We know from above t~at the condition g > If/ must hold. Therefore the 
denomi' b .. 
nator of k* is positive and so for k* > 0, the numerator must e positive. 
Now let us find the range of values of If/for which k* is positive: 
Let th 
e numerator of k* be denoted by Y: 
M:ulitPIYing out and collecting terms gives: 
The 
roots of Y = 0 satisfy: 
[lit +V2 - V2a3]lf/2 +[g(I-al-v2 +2V2a3)]lf/-V2a)g2 = 0 
r 
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Then the roots are: 
There is one positive root, ,,/, and one negative root, If-, since ~ B2 + 4AC > B 
Now consider the parabola Y = Y( If): 
The turning point satisfies dY = 2A If + B = O. Therefore: 
d'l' 
and since the second derivative is positive, 
then the tu' .. .. 
rrung pomt IS a minImum. 





The shaded regions show the values for 'I' for which Y> O. 1// cannot be negative, 
therefore 
'I' must be greater than or equal to the positive root ; 
~+ '2:!!+.JB2 +4AC 
2A However we know that g > \1' from (7), and so we 
also require that: 
g>lp+ =:J.6{I-al-"2 +2l2a3)1+J[6{I-al-l2 +21'2a3)12 +1a l +1'2-1'2a3Jl2a~ 
~al +1'2 -1'2a3J 
Multiply' b . + 
mg y the denommator of \1' : 
Rearra 
nge and cancel: 
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Squaring both sides: 
Rearranging gives: 
eXpanding the right hand side: 
Cancelling out and collecting te~s gives: 
1- 2al - 2v2 +a12 +4v2a3 +2alv2 - 4v2a la 3 +V22 -4v22a3+4v22a32 
SUbstituting this into equation (1): 
Cancelling terms we get: 
Rearranging: 
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It is clear that this condition holds, thus it has been proved that g is greater than 
the p " + + 
oSltlve root, '1/ • therefore there is a non-empty set for '1/ where the value of 
k* > 0 Therefore the discount rate must lie in the range: 
-B+.JB2 +4AC 
-------< \j/ < g 2A -




It then fOllows that the steady states c*, r*, s*, A.I * and A.2 * are all positive. 
SECTION IV 
Stability 
In this section the system is analysed to determing the stability of the steady state. 
It is 
necessary therefore to determine the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix 
evaluat d 
e at the steady state. The Jacobian is: 
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t3k de t3k t3k t3k de 
-~ « & OAI OA2 a: 
Cf Cf Cf Cf Cf Cf 
~ « & OAt OA2 a: 
is is is is a a 
- -
J= ~ « & OAI OA2 a: 01 1 01 1 01 1 01 1 01 1 011 
~ « & OAt OA2 a: 
012 012 012 0..i2 0..i2 OA2 
~ « & OAt OA2 a: 
~ ~ ~ ~ a a 
~ « & OAl OA2 a: 
There is no simple closed-form expression for the eigenvalues of this matrix. 
Therefore a new method was used to analyse the stability of the steady state. 
Using corollary 2c in Sorger (1989), (see methodology), it can be shown that the 
steady state is globally asymptotically stable for bounded solutions. 
The equilibrium point of this system possess the saddle point property if the 
, 
curvature matrix ' , 
'" HU
'" H .. JJ 
is negative definite, where H'" is the maximised Hamiltonian and i = k, sand} = At, 
~,~ and .) .. . 
n = 2. Cass and Shell (I976) show that the Haml toman IS convex In 
~~ . . 
ate and concave in the state for optimal control problems wIth a concave 
ob' gective fu . ... '" . d fi . Th nctlon and so the matrices HU and H jj are negative e Imte. e 
Objecti '. . ."'''' Ve functIon here IS strictly concave and as the matnces HU and H jj are 
negative defi' . h .. , b I h t' C' lmte WIt mlmmum eIgenvalues e ow zero t e curvature rna nx IS 
neg f 
a IVe definite with a low rate of discount, (Brock and Scheinkman (1976). 
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As the curvature matrix C is negative definite then the equilibrium point i.e. the 
steady state, is globalJy stable for bounded solutions, Sorger (1989). This implies 
that with any initial levels of capital and resource stocks in the environment the 
opt' lmal path converges toward a unique steady state. 
SECTION V 
Cornparitive Statics 
the next step is to cany out a sensitivity analysis on the steady state solutions of 
the v 'bl . 
ana es to determine their dependency on the parameters. The complex 
nature of the steady state values makes it difficult to obtain the partial derivatives 
With respect to each parameter. To simplify matters the assumption that V2 = 1 is 
assumed throughout this section. Looking back at Section III if V2 = 1, then 
equation (1) is still positive and so the condition that there is a non-empty set for 
'Ii ' 
where the value of k* > 0 still holds. So k*, c*, r*, s*, A,I* and A,2* are 
POsitive. 
We know from the steady state expression for k (equation (12», that VI cannot be 
equal to V2, so VI can take values below or above 1, however VI *' 1. 
the results of the sensitivity analysis on the steady state solutions of the variables 
are . 
gIven below (see appendix B). The following table summarises the results for 
VI ~ 1 
the Co . . f 
mpantive statics are very complicated and not all the parameters are 0 
Sreat j 
nterest. It was chosen to analyse the effects that the parameters g and VI 
have On th . . h h f 
e steady state values of k, c, rand s. An Increase In t e growt rate a 
the resou . . . . h 
rce, g, gIves a counter-intuitive result and an Increase In VI gtves t e same 
reSult a 
s a standard neoclassical growth model. 
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r* 1-2v} 'f 1-2v} + if ell < 
VI (1- vI> - I al < vI (1- vI) 
I----
$* I-2v} + if al < 'f 1- 2vl 
V}(l-vl) - 1 al < VI (1- vI) 
----
Regarding g: We have already assumed that VI > 1, i.e, VI> V2, which implies 
that the ' , ffi I ' h' positive e ect that consumption has on the popu atlOn growt rate IS 
greater that the negative effect of industrialisation. The table shows that if there 
Was a ' n Increase in the growth rate of the resource, then the steady state level of 
Per capita consumption rises. As population growth rate is increasing, one may 
eXpect that per capita consumption would fall. However, the result shows 
Otherwise. A feasible explanation for this is that per capita consumption would 
rise eVen though population growth rate is rising, if total consumption was rising 
faster than population, 
'Vith an , , h f " Increase In the growth of the resource, t e rate 0 extraction nses as 




We know that al must be less than this for the steady state level of resource 





Olr-+-+---__ ~ __ ~ ______ ~------~----~ 
2 V 6 8 10 
-1 
It is ea ' 
sy to show that Q = 1 when VI = 2.6 (Idp). 
Wekn 
Ow that at < l. For values of 2.6> VI > 1, Q is greater than 1, thus the 
Conditi 
on on at holds automatically as al is assumed to be less than 1 throughout. 
lIence th ' , 
e CondJtlOn must hold for values ofVt greater than 2.6 (ldp). 
It follows th t 'f ' 'I' wth a I VI IS large, i.e. the effect of consumptIon on popu atlon gro 
rate is large, there is some positive declining number that is less than 1 that must 
be great h 
er t an al for the results to hold. 
With a . 
n Increase in the amount of the resource that is extracted at the steady state, 
then 111 • • 
. ore Can be consumed per capita, even though the populatIOn growth rate IS 
utcreasin , 
g. The rise in the growth of the resource may stIlI allow the steady state 
level of h . . 
t e resource to increase even though the amount extracted has nsen, If the 
growth rat . . . Tbi . b e Increases at a faster rate than the extractlon rate Increases. S IS 
orne Out by the results. 
212 
Regarding Yo The results show that a rise in the discount rate, '1', implying an 
increased preference for consumption in the present, would cause a rise in 
Consumption at the beginning of the plan and lower steady state consumption. 
Tbi ' 
s IS the same result as in the standard neoclassical growth model (Cass 1965). 
As the economy depends so much on the natural resource for production, 
. 
ltlcreased extraction of the resource would run down stocks and there would be 
less left for future production. As the steady state stock is now lower, there is 
less left to extract and so the steady state extraction rate falls. This is the 
underlying argument for sustainable development, it we extract too much now and 
Pay less regard for future generations then they will have less resources to use and 
So their output prospects will be diminished. 
These results are even more unfavourable for future generations if the population 
growth rate is rising. There will be more pressure on the per capita quantities of 




s chapter a model has been formulated of a simple closed economy wIth a 
renewable natural resource that is an essential factor of production. This 
economy also has an endogenously determined rate of population growth. The 
lllodel Was presented in Section I. In Section II the necessary and sufficient 
conditi t'. h d Ons lor an optimal solution were presented and solved for t e stea y state. 
l'he model highlights the importance of including population growth in dynamic 
°Ptilllis t' , 'I ' b a Ion models. From the various models presented 10 sectIon ,It can e 
Seen th ' '( 74) at populatIon is usually treated as constant. For 1Ostance, Solow 19 , 
l<rautkraemer (1985) and Dasgupta and Heal (1974 and 1979), formulate models 
Where an xh ' d' b I" e austible resource is an essential input 10 pro uctlOn ut popu atlon IS 
constant,· h ' ' 1 t' In other ence they assume that there IS a statlonary popu a Ion. 
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tnodels, the theory has been extended to renewable resource extraction, 
lleddington et al (1975) and Clark (1976). 
Other research has explored the consequences of a growing popUlation in models 
inVOlving a non-renewable resource, Stiglitz(1974a), Ingham and Simmons (1975) 
and St' I' IgitZ (I 974b). In these models the labour force (equivalent to the 
POPUlation) grows at a constant exponential rate. The growth rate in these 
tnod I ' 
e s IS treated as an exogenously given constant. 
This chapter is an extension to an earlier paper by Cigno (1980), where the 
itnpli ' 
cattons of making the population growth rate endogenous were explored. 
The growth rate is a function of consumption and capital per capita. His model is 
an extension to Stiglitz's model (1974b). Stiglitz found that introducing 
exhau 'bI Stl e resources has the effect of making the standard neo-classical growth 
tnodel unstable. Cigno argues that putting endogenous population growth and 
exhaustible resources together may result in a stable solution. However Cigno 
Co ' 
nSlders the dynamic model of an economy with a non-renewable resource as an 
essential factor of production but not in an optimising framework. Stiglitz also 
Presents his work in this way. Also Cigno does not include in his model the 
dYna ' Illics of the non-renewable resource, it simply appears in the production 
fhnction. 
In tbi 
s chapter a version of Cigno's model was presented and solved for the 
OPtimal ' , gI Sustamable steady state. In this model the economy possesses a sm e 
reneWabl ' , d' I' I:'. d e natural resource which is used as an Input In pro uctlon. t IS ,oun 
that an 0 ' , I' d pttma) and sustainable consumption and resource harvestIng po ICY oes 
~ AI ' 
. so the conditions that are necessary for the steady state to eXlst are 
shoWn N " d d" h 
. ew theory on the stability of dynamIcal systems IS use an It IS S own 
that Wh ' , 
en the rate of discount is small enough all bounded solutIOns converge to a 
Uni qUe steady state. This is in contrast to Stiglitz's work and agrees with Cigno's 
resUlts. However our problem is solved in an optimising framework and for a 
reneWabl 
e natural resource and is thus more general. 
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SOtne of the past work has shown that it is optimal to completely exhaust a non-
renewable resource stock if the availability of future technologies and perfect 
SUbstitutes mean that depletion of the resource is no longer essential for future 
production. Stiglitz (1974a), argues that even with a limited amount of the 
reSOurce, the economy need not decline. This is because he assumes that 
technical change and capital accumulation will offset the effects of falling natural 
resOurc ' 
e Inputs and so we should just use up our resources. Other work has also 
argued this point, Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974) and Kamien and 
SChwartz (1978). 
the tnodel in this chapter concerns a renewable resource. Renewable resources 
tend not to get as much attention as non-renewable resources in the literature as 
they are not seen as limiting factors for economic growth. But as we are aware, 
the over-exploitation of these resources can render them extinct and harm the 
environment and biosphere. We need to pay as much attention to renewable 
resources ' h h" as non-renewable. This analysis presented here sows t at It IS not 
o t' p Itnal to completely exhaust the resource, this is in direct contrast to some of the 
pre ' 
VIOUS literature (See Clark (1976». 
the comparative statics also shows that if there is a greater preference to deplete 
~~ , 
urce earlier on i.e. there is a greater preference for current consumptIOn, 
then futur ' 'b'l' , S t' bl e generations will be deprived of some output POSSI I Itles. us ama e 
developme t ' 'd' , , h d If n requires that the options offuture generatIons are not ImmlS e . 
We Use u ' '~ p natural resources at too fast a rate then we are removmg an option lor 
fUture ' generatIons. 
~w ' 
orld Commission on Environment and Development was estabhshed by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1983. They define Sustainable 
nevel 
°pment as: 
"Development is sustainable if it satisfies present needs without 
compromising the ability offuture generations to meet their own 
needs. " (WCED, 1987). 
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Current Over-exploitation of the worlds natural resources and destruction of 
natural environments jeopardises the future possibiHties of obtaining 
en . C 
VlrOntnental services from these areas and so threatens the future world 
economy. The goal of SD therefore is to achieve the maximum level of economic 
Welfare that can be perpetuated for many generations in the future and to establish 





SOlving for A. * 
SUbstituting (7) into (3) gives: 
___ 1 vI-l v2(vl-l) 
1. V2 - 2} • -21 • k .1-v2 VI (g- VI) VI k. vI 
(g-W)VJk·~ 
"1-1 V;Z(v}-I) 
..4.2 * s * k *-"2 VI (g - IJI) VI k * VI = 0 
substitut' Ing (9) into (3) gives: 
4. 1 [ I "'l J~3 VI-I "'l(VI-I) 
2 *; (g_V/)k*I-al +(g-IJI)VI k*;j-al k*-V]. Vt(g-IJI) VI k* VI =0 
SUbstitu' Ing (I 0) into (3) gives: 
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1 [ 1 "2 ]:3 VI-I v2(VI-I) 
V; (g-If!)k .t-at +(g -If!) VI k. ;;;--at k .-"2 VI (g -If!) VI k· VI = 0 
Collecting terms together: 
1 vI-I (vI- v2) 
- .! V2 -AI *-...1.1 *Vl(g-V/) VI k* vI 
(g -Iff) vI k * -;.-
Mr U Itplying out the last term and simplifying: 
Collect' Ing "-1 110 'S together: 
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collecting terms together: 
MUltiplying through by 'V gives: 
SOlVing for "'1 * 
SOI"ing for k* 
SUbstituting (7) into (5): 
~..tI *-aI.1I *k*al-l r*a3 +.1} *(g-V/)(}-v2)-v2A2 *s*(g_V/)k*-1 =0 
SUbstitutin (8)' h . d II . h k*' . g lOto t e above equation an co ectmg t e s. 
SUbstit f U 109 (9) into the above equation gives: 
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Substituting (10) into the above equation gives: 
Dividing through by AI, times by \jI and simplifying: 
MUltipl . Ylng out gives: 
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"2 ColI' --1 
ectlOg k '" "1 terms together: 





First it . 
IS necessary to simplifY the expression for the steady state values of k, c, r 
ands. S· '. 
unphfylOg equation (12) gives: 
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By substituting k* into equation (7) gives c*: 
l 
2 I-V} 
'II _ aI'll - a3(g - 'II) 
c* - [( - )] ~(g--'II~)-----.--
- g 'II [at + a3(g - 'II)] 
Substituting k* into equation (8) gives: 
r* = + 





The simplified expressions for each variable followed by the derivative with 
respect to g and 1f/ are given below. The derivatives have been calculated using 
Maple V 2.0. Each Greek symbol is assigned a conventional letter as Maple is 
unable to write Greek symbols. 





(1-.1)( U -A U-F(g- u)] X g-U 
k:= (g- U) A +F(g- U) 
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C 
._ ( (U2 -A U J( 1 ~ X)-




2X -1-AX2 +AXJ( 2 (XC~-A )J (;) 
(g _ U) x2 ..JL J 1 - X g _ U - A U - F (g - U) 
A+F(g- U) (;) 
( 
(X-I)(l-A)+X)( U2 (X(I-A)) 
+ (g _ U) x - J 1-X g_ U-A U-F(g- U) 





+AX)( U2 J I-X 2 ---A U-F(g- U) X' g-U 
8:= (g - U) ..Q---=-A":'""+--:P=-=(:--g --U=)--
( XO-A») 
( eX-IHI-A)+X)(L_ AU_ P(g_u)] 1-X X g-U 
+ (g - U) -'I.-~A-:-+--:P=-=(:--g --=U):---- I 
U 
The derivatives with respect to g of k*, c*, r * and s* respectively are given by: 
_ ( 1 - ~) ( 1 ) ( % 1 )( 1 ~ X) ( _.1) 
(g U) 1 - X A + F (g _ U) 1 X 
U -- - + (g- U) 
( 
%1 ) (l-:X) X(- (,~~2 -F _ %1 P J 
A+F(g- U) A+F(g- U) (A+F(g- U»2 
(A + F (g- U»/«1-X) % 1) 




( %1 )L:x) (%1 )L:x) A+(F.(;g-~~)2 -F +(g~~F A+FJ(g- U) x 
A+P(g- U) - (A+F(g- U))2 (A+F(g- U))/«l-X)%l) 
U2 % 1 := g _ U - A U - F (g - U) 
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(~) ( ___ %5) 
(g - U) %5 %4 + (g _ U) X2 %4 X 
X2 (g- U) 
(.l-A)[- Cg~U)2-F _ %IF ](A+F(g-U)/«l-X)%l) x A + F (g - U) (A + F (g _ U» 2 
+ %3 «X-1) (l-A)+X)%2 
+ g (A +F(g- U» 
(1-X)%1 
ACg- UJ~)o/04+%3%J 
U2 % 1 := g _ U - A U - F (g - U) 
( X(l-A») 
o ( %1 ) 1-X 
Vo2:= A +F (g- U) 
( (X-1)(1-A)+X) 
%3:= (g- U) X 
(~J 





(1-1)( 1)( ~1 )(l~X) (1) 
(g - U) X 1 - X A + F (£ - Ul + (g _ U) 1 - X 
( g; U) [2--L+ U2 -A+F J 
( % 1 ) 1 - X g - U (g _ U) 
2 + % 1 F 
A+F(g- U) X A+F(g- U) (.A+F(g- U)2 
(A+F(g- U»/«l-X)%l) 
U2 % 1 := g _ U - A U - F (g - U) 
&* 
-;jj:= 
(....L) (6) ( %1 ) I-X (%1) X 
• A+(F(g- U) 2 +(g- U) A+F(g- U) J 
2-1L+ U -A+F 
g-U (g_U)2 + %IF (A+F(g-U»/«l-X)%l) 
A+F(g- U) (A+F(g- U»2 
U2 %1 :=--A U-F(g- U) g-U 
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( ( 
%5 J )( ~ ) [ ( %5 J ( %5 J 
(g_ U) X2 %4+%3%2 _ (8- U) X2 %5%4 +(g_ U) X2 %4X 
XI- (g- U) 
[ 2] 2~+ U -.A+F ( l.-A) g-U (8-U)2 + %1F (A+F(g-U)/( X A +F (g- U) (A +F (g_ U»2 
(1-X)%1)- %3 «X-ilil_-~)+x)%2 +%3%2X(1-A) 
[ 2] 2~+ U -A+F g- ~+~( ~)~) + %1 F 2 (A+F(g- U»/«1-X)%1) 
g (A + F (g - U» 
] / (,(g -U) (~J %4 +%3 %JJ 
U2 % 1 := g _ U -.A U - F (g - U) 
( X(1-A») 
o ._( %1 ) 1-X 
Vo2.- A +F(g- U) 
( X-1H1-A)+X) 
%3 :=(g- U) X 






( %5) F ( (%5) ) F ( 
- U xi. %4+%3%2 + (g_ U) X2 %4+%3%2 
U2 
(%5) (%5) 
_ (g- U) x2 %5%4 +(g_ U) x2 %4XG-A) 
r(g- U) J 2 
2-L+ U -A+F 
( g- U (g- U)2 + %1 F 2 (A +F(g- U»/«(1-X)%1) 
A+F(g- U) (A+F(g- U» 
%3 ((X-I) (l-A)+X)%2 +%3%2X(1-A) 
- X(g- U) J 2 2~+ U -A+F ., 
[ g-U (g_U)2 + %1F 2 (A+F(g-U»/«(1-X)%l) A + F (g - U) (A + F (g - U) 
};(UF((g- u)(~)%4+%3%2)J 
%1 :=L_A U-F(g- U) g-U 
%2 :=(A+~~- U») (
XO-A)) 
I-X 
( (X - 1) ~ - A) + X) 
%3 :=(g- U) 
. (X\~:)) 
%4:=(A+F~~_ uJ 
%5 := 2 X-I - A X2 + A X 
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The sign of each differential is given in the table in Section V for X > 1. 
H fh I · iriJs owever, on some 0 t e resu ts, I.e. t%" t%" are only positive if 
1- 2vI ir a; 
a 1 < . Similarly, ~ T and NT are only negative if this condition 
vI (1- VI) C/l.J C/l.J 
holds as well. 
I-2vI Let Q = , then, we need to find out what values of VI does Q = 1. 
vI (1- vI) 
S 1 - 2vI . I . d I' et = 1, then multtp ymg out an so vmg we get: 
vI (1- vI) 
VI = 2.61 and 0.38 (2dp). We also know that VI > 1, therefore VI = 2.61 when 
Q = 1. Thus for values of I < VI .~ 2.6 the condition a 1 < 1 - 2vl 
vI (1- vI) 
automatically holds as at < 1, assumed throughout. It follows that for values of 
VI> 2.6 the condition must hold. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE OPTIMAL TIME PATH OF A CARBON 
TAX 
Pollution and the taxation of carbon emissions 
One important by-product of the combustion of fossil fuels is the emission of 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. CO2 is not generally thought of as a 
pollutant but rather as something that plays an important role in the determination 
of the global climate. The presence of C02 in the atmosphere produces a 
"greenhouse effect", CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHG) are mostly 
transparent to sunlight. The sunlight passes through them and warms the earth. 
,-
The earth radiates heat out into space and it is this infrared radiation that is 
absorbed by the gases. There is evidence that greenhouse gases are changing the 
climate but the seriousness of global warming is not known. 
The need for public intervention to control environmental pollution arises because 
of the externalities that are incurred by other members of society, i.e. there are 
costs involved with poUution. The polluter may have no reason to· take these 
external costs associated with the emission of carbon dioxide into account. 
Therefore the objective of environmental policy should be to fully internalise these 
costs. A tax on carbon emissions would have two effects on fuel use. Firstly, it 
would create an incentive to switch away from the most CO2-intensive fuels to 
less carbon intensive fuels. Secondly, consumers would be motivated to utiltize 
energy more efficiently and to reduce energy consumption where possible. It 
would also encourage investment in energy saving technology development of 
new, Jess carbon intensive technologies, products and processes. 
Carbon taxes have some drawbacks: a sizeable tax may imply major problems of 
institutional control and political acceptability. Also a very important concern is 
232 
for the resulting distributional effects. Energy intensive sectors of the economy, 
such as the steel and cement industries, may experience detrimental effects from 
the impostion of a carbon tax, especially with regards to their international 
competitiveness, output and employment. Also there is the concern that lower 
income households would not be able to afford at least a minimum level of 
domestic heating. The advantage of a carbon tax is that revenue would be 
created and this could be recycled back into the economy to offset these negative 
effects. For example, if the revenue was used to reduce the level of other more 
distortionary indirect taxes in the economy. This could also broadly offset the 
effect that the tax might have on the price level. 
Nordhaus {1993a), for instance, estimated that if a US$S6 per ton carbon tax was 
implemented, CO2 emissions in 1995 would be reduced by 20% below 1990 
levels, but would result in an annual global loss in GOP of US$762 billion. 
When burdensome taxes were reduced, however, a tax of US$S9 per ton of 
carbon would be optimal and this would reduce emissions by 20% below the 1990 
level resulting in a gain in GOP ofUS$206 billion .. 
Similarly, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) argue that a policy of recycling the 
revenue as lump sum payments to households is: 
"not the most likely use of the revenue ... Using the revenue to 
reduce distortionary taxes would lower the net cost of a carbon tax 
by removing inefficiency elsewhere in the economy" (Jorgenson 
and Wilcoxen (1993)) 
Indeed they found that a 1.7% GDP loss under a policy lump sum redistribution is 
converted to a 0.69% loss if labour taxes are reduced and a 1.1% gain if capital 
taxes are reduced. 
It is not, however, the purpose of this chapter to discuss these aspects For a 
more in depth discussion of the distributional effects see Johnson et al (1990) and 
Smith (1992). 
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In 1992 the British Government, along with around 150 other countries, signed 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change in Rio de Janeiro. The target s~t 
was to return emissions of CO2 and other GHGs to their 1990 levels by the year 
2000. In response to this, a few countries have introduced a carbon tax. For 
example, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The European Community proposed to 
introduce a carbon tax in 1993 at $3 a barrel of oil and this was to increase by $1 
annually until it reached $10 in the year 2000. It has been calculated by Barker et 
al (1993), that in the year 2000 the proposed tax of US$10 would yield 
approximately £11.5 billion in the UK and would reduce CO2 emissions by 8% 
compared to the 1990 level. For a detailed report on the European Community's 
proposals see Pearson and Smith (1991). But since the Rio Earth Summit in 
1992 policies to reduce emissions have been pigeonholed. 
The literature on carbon tax models 
There has been a substantial literature on pollution externalities, (see chapter 5). 
Recently the literature has focused on the issue of a carbon tax, but has tended to 
. look at the level of tax that is required to reduce CO2 emissions to some target 
level by some specified date. 
Manne and Richels {l991} analysis is concerned with the level of carbon tax that 
will achieve a particular target of emission levels by 2020. The analysis is based 
on the Global 2100 Model which is an analytic framework for estimating the 
economy wide impacts of rising energy costs. They estimate how emissions are 
likely to evolve over time when there are no carbon limits and indicate the size of 
the carbon tax that would be needed to encourage lower dependency on carbon 
intensive fuels. They explore the impacts of carbon emission limits on five 
regions - I}. USA 2}.other OECD countries (Western Europe, Canada, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand 3). USSR 4}.China and 5}. ROW (Rest Of the 
World). The reason for this regional categorising is that the solution to the 
climate problem is likely to require different responses by industrialised countries 
than by developing countries. Also, CO2 emissions largely result from coal 
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burning and 97% of the world's coal resources are found in the DECO, USSR, 
Eastern Europe and China (see Cline (1982)). The ROW category is needed t~ 
keep a consistent global balance of energy and flows from carbon. They establish 
a region-by-region time path for carbon taxation, that is required to achieve 
specific limits on carbon emissions. The time path varies between regions. A 
high tax is required in the industrialised countries because there is an assumed 
agreement to reduce emissions by 20% by the year 2020 and China and the ROW 
are allowed to increase emissions beyond their current levels. Those that find it 
easier to remove the link between energy consumption and GOP growth will find 
that the tax rises but are at a lower rate than those who find it harder to adjust to 
the emission limits 
The USSR and Eastern Europe will find it more difficult to adjust to emission 
limits as they lack the supply of, and the demand for, alternative energy. They 
wi]] have to maintain their taxes at a higher level to encourage consumers to 
substitute high carbon-intensive fuels for lower carbon-intensive fuels. Their tax 
rate will not start to fall significantly until 2070. Other OECD countries are 
better off in terms of supply and demand for energy alternatives. Therefore they 
require a reduced tax level, but the tax will still rise due to the 20% reduction 
commitment by 2020. However, after the year 2020, US and OECD taxation 
level will fall. China and the ROWs' tax level will rise contiually until 2040 and 
then stabilise. 
From their paper, Manne and RicheJs give an insight into the fact that the costs of 
limiting carbon emissions is likely to vary among regions. However, the long run 
carbon tax for each region that is required to reduce consumers dependency on 
carbon based fuels converges in 2100 and the long run carbon tax is calculated to 
be $250 per ton of carbon emissions. 
Although this is an interesting and significant piece of work they do not take any 
account of the damage costs of global warming. In a similar paper, Whalley and 
Wigle develop a CGE (Computer Generalised Equilibrium) Model and use this to 
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identify the effects of cutting CO2 emissions by 50% by 2005 and the international 
effects that could result. Again they abstract from the issue of damage from 
global warming. 
There are a few attempts to estimate the monetary quantification of global 
warming damage. Fankhauser (1994) provides estimates of the marginal social 
cost of GHG emissions. He estimates the social cost to be $20 per ton of carbon 
emission between 1991 - 2000. This then rises over time to about $28 per ton of 
carbon between 2021 - 2030. This shows that as emissions are rising, the 
marginal damage costs are rising. Therefore the damage function is non-linear, 
implying that a ton of CO2 added to an existing large stock is likely to cause a 
higher damage than a ton emitted when there is a low concentration level. 
Neither of these two papers, or the proposed European carbon tax policy deal 
with the task of designing an optimal policy response to global warming and the 
, 
figures with which they provide us with give little indication of the socially optimal 
carbon tax, let alone the optimal emission and carbon tax trajectories. This 
requires optimal control modelling. 
The pioneering paper paper in this area is N ordhaus (1991), where costs are 
estimated that could be caused by global warming. Nordhaus investigates the 
impact of doubling CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, which he takes as a 3 % 
rise in mean surface temperature. He estimates the flow damages from this 
climate change to be 114% of GNP for the US and claims that this would hold for 
the rest of the world. His damage function would incorporate for example, land 
lost due to the sea level rising and crop yields changing due to climatic variations. 
To allow for non market impacts, such as damage to natural systems, he raises this 
value to 1% and estimates that the cost per ton of carbon emission to be $7.33. 
Others also agree with Nordhaus and predict damage costs in the order of 1-2% of 
world GNP (Cline (1992), Titus (1992) and Fankhauser (1992, 1993». Nordhaus, 
however, makes a particularly questionable assumption. He assumes that the 
economy is already in a resource steady state, implying that all physical flows and 
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concentrations of GHGs are also constant, and that the impact of climate has been 
stabilised. This does not take into account that higher emissions will increase 
damage costs. For instance, the IPCC (1992), (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (1990», forecasts an increase in annual CO2 emissions of 9-14 
gigatonnes by the year 2025. Nordhaus does not consider the optimal carbon tax 
that would result from his model. 
It can be argued it is the time path that a carbon tax should take is what matters. 
The major source of CO2 in the atmosphere is the burning of fossil fuels, so to 
encourage delayed depletion of the resource a falling tax would be the correct 
policy. Another possible reason for a falling carbon tax is that technology that 
will reduce emissions is already in existence and it is very possible that technology 
may be invented that might eliminate GHG emissions and reduce global warming. 
This is another argument in favour of delaying some fossil fuel burning and a 
falling carbon tax, would encourage this. However as the damage arising from 
global warming is an increasing function of the level of CO2 emissions then maybe 
the correct policy would be a rising tax rate. It seems then, that the issue that we 
should be concerned with is the optimal time path that the carbon tax should take. 
As mentioned above this requires the application of optimal control theory. 
The CET A (Carbon Emission Trajectory Assessment) Model used by Peck and 
Teisberg (1991) provides an assessment of what the optimal trajectory might be 
and, consequently, what is the optimal time path that a carbon tax should follow. 
They experiment with a linear and a non-linear damage function. They show that 
the carbon tax in either case is likely to be non-decreasing over time. In the case 
of the linear function the tax rises steadily and in the case of the non-linear 
function the tax rises sharply over time because they argue that an increase in the 
stock of the pollution increases the marginal damage caused, thus requiring a 
higher emission charge. They do not, however, include the damage function as an 
argument in the utility function or take into account the optimal allocation of 
natural resources over time. There are energy inputs in the production function 
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but there is no explicit treatment of the dynamics of the stock of the natural 
resource. 
The DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy) model, Nordhaus (1993b), is 
also an optimal control model. A dynamic optimisation model is constructed for 
estimating the optimal path of reductions of C02. The optimal growth model is 
extended to include a climate module and a damage sector. These feed back into 
the economy. He assumes a non-linear damage function and shows that the 
carbon tax that is required to raise fossil fuel prices sufficiently to induce 
substitution from carbon intensive goods and services to less carbon intensive 
uses, increases gradually over time. The model however does not include 
extraction of non-renewable resources, the very fossil fuels that he is raising the 
prices of. This work is an extension to the earlier resource steady state work by 
Nordhaus (1991). In this later model he develops the dynamics of the economy 
and the climate, and argues that the resource steady state approach is 
unsatisfactory because of the time lags involved in the reaction of the climate and 
the economy to C02 emissions. He states that scientific estimates indicate that 
the GHGs stay in the atmosphere for over 100 years. Also the climate has a lag 
of several decades behind the changes in GHG stocks because the oceans contain 
a lot of the heat. For a full analysis of the DICE model see Nordhaus (1992). 
In the DICE model the objective is to maximise the discounted sum of the utilities 
of consumption, summed over the relevant time horizon. 
max L u[c(t),P(t)(1 + p)-t ] 
{c(t)} t 
Where U is the flow of utility or social weIl-being, c(t) is the flow of consumption 
at time t, P(t) is the level of population at time t and p is the pure rate of social 
time preference. The maximisation is subject to a number of constraints, the first 
set are the economic constraints while the second is the set of climate-emissions 
constraints. 
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The Economic Constraints 
First, he takes the definition of total utility to be the product of population [P(t)] 
and utility of per capita consumption u[(t)]. He takes a power function to 
represent the form of the utility function: 
P(t){[C(t)]I-a -I} 
U[c(t)] = ( ) I-a (1) 
a is the parameter that measures the social valuation of different levels of 
consumption, which he calls the "rate of inequality aversion". When a is zero, 
then there is no social aversion to inequality, as a increases then society becomes 
more egalitarian, i.e. society holds the principle of equal rights for everyone. In 
his model, Nordhaus takes a = 1, which is the logarithmic or Bernoullian utility 
function. 
The definition of per capita consumption is c(t): 
c(t) = C(t) 
P(t) 
where C(t) is total consumption and P(t) is total population. 
The production function used is the Cobb Douglas function in capital [K(t)], 
Labour [P(t)] , (which is assumed proportional to population), and technology 
[A (t)]. 
Q(t) = n(t)A(t)K(t)r p(t)l-r (2) 
where r is the elasticity of output with respect to capital. There are constant 
returns to scale in capital and labour. The term fX...t) relates to climate impacts 
which are described in equation (9). 
Output is either consumed or invested, i.e. 
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C(/) = Q(/) - 1(/) (3) 
The capital accumulation equation is: 
K(/) = (1- 0 x)K(1 - 1) + 1(/) (4) 
where 6K is the rate of capital depreciation. Therefore the stock of capital at time t 
is equal to the stock of capital in the previous period less the depreciated capital in 
that time plus new investment at time t. 
The climate, emission and damage equations 
The first constant links economic activity with GHG emissions: 
E(/) = [1- ,u(t)]a(/)Q(t) (5) 
E(/) represents emissions at time I, o(t) is the ratio of uncontrolled GHG emissions 
to gross output, ,u(/) is the fractional reduction of emissions relative to an 
uncontrolled level. 
The next constant represents the build up of GHG in the atmosphere. 
M(t) = flEet) + (1- 8 M)M(t -1) (6) 
M(/) is the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere, fl is the rate at which the atmosphere 
retains COl, Ou is the rate of removal of COl from the atmosphere. This shows 
that the stock of CO2 at time t is equal to CO2 retained in the atmosphere from 
emissions at time t plus the net stock of C02 in the previous time period. 
The impact of climate change on human and natural systems is taken to be a non-
linear function of temperature increase: 
D(t) = 0.0 J33[ T~I) r Q(t) (7) 
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where D(/) is the loss of global output from greenhouse warming and T(/) is the 
temperature in period I. The cost of greenhouse warming of 3% is estimated in 'a 
previous paper by Nordhaus (1991) to be 114% (0.0025)% of national income. 
He has adjusted this here to take into account that there are areas that are 
unquantifiable by increasing the value to 0.0133%. 
Total cost of reducing emissions is: 
TC(/) ::: b (/)b2 
GDP(t) III (8) 
expressed as a fraction of world output. p(/) is the reduction in GHG emissions. 
This equation shows that the cost curve rises as more costly measures are 
required. 
The damage and cost functions are then combined to form the relationship n in 
the production function: 
0(/) ::: [1- blp(/)b2] / [1 + d(/)] (9) 
Nordhaus uses cost and damage for global warming as components of the 
production function. He does not however, include the damage function as an 
argument in the utility function. He talks about market impacts from the global 
warming damage and that one must also take into consideration that there are 
unquantifiable costs such as damage done to natural systems and everyday life. It 
would be more appropriate to include this damage cost as a negative argument in 
the utility function. The model also does not include extraction of non-renewable 
resources - there is no treatment of the dynamics of natural resource stocks. 
There is no use of fossil fuels, pollution emissions simply come from production. 
Various parameters are given estimates and then the model is simulated using the 
GAMS (Generalised Algorithm Modelling System) computer package and run 
under several scenarios. He shows the optimal carbon tax should rise gradually 
Overtime. 
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Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991) show that if the stock of CO2 is below its 
steady state level then the carbon tax should rise over time. 
The problem in their model is to: 
subject to: 
max f;[B(Y - A) - Dp(aY) - Ds(S)]e -8t dt 
S = aY - u(A)S 
S(O»So 
where S is the stock of pollutant, a. is the emission output ratio, a(A) denotes the 
rate at which the pollutants are assimilated by the environment. Y is the 
production of goods and an amount of output is used to clean up the environment, 
(A). Consumption is thus Y-A. Net social benefits of consumption are B(C), 
where B'(C) > 0 and B"(C) <0. DF(a.Y) and Ds(S) denote the social damage 
caused by the flow and the stock of pollution respectively. e > 0 is the social rate 
of discount. The stock of pollution and the optimal emission charge evolve over 
time according to: 
S = aY( r, S) - yA( r, S»S 
i'=[O+o(A(r,S»]r-D s(S) 
Where T denotes the optimal emission charge per unit of pollution, a.Y. 
They show that the optimal emissions charge should rise over time if the stock of 
pollution is below its optimal steady state. This is because the optimal pollution 
stock is rising and if this is the case then an increase in the stock of pollution 
increases the marginal damage done to the environment and therefore requires a 
rising tax. 
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They also allow for pollution stock in the classical Ramsey problem. The 
problem then is to maximise a social welfare function, W subject to constraints on 
capital accumulation and pollution stock accumulation, i.e. maximise: 
subject to: 
K=!(K)-OK-C 
S = cif(K)- uS 
K(O) = Ko 
~O)= So 
where B( C) is the net benefits from per capita consumption, C. K is the per 
capita capital stock, u is the depreciation of the stock of pollutants. 
An interior solution must satisfy: 
c= {r(K{l-(B'~C»)r] -6- O}1J(C) 
f = (0 + u)r - D'S (S) 
Again, the optimal time path for the emission charge, r, is increasing if the stock 
of pollution is below the steady state level. 
Neither of their models include any treatment of natural resource stock extraction. 
They do provide a brief illustrative example of how to include renewable or non-
renewable resources into such models thereby stressing the interrelationship 
between the economy, the environment and renewable or non-renewable 
resources, however they do not extend their analysis to include emission charges. 
There are many other models that relate stock externalities to the use of natural 
resources that do not examine the implications of their models for the time path of 
a carbon tax, (see chapter 5). However more recently there have been a few 
authors that have looked into this issue. 
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Ulph and U1ph (1994) argue that a carbon tax should first rise sharply and then 
fall. This is because after some time the exhaustion constraint will start to bite, 
i.e. the resource stock is getting lower and the producer price of the non-
renewable resource increases and so chokes off demand. The carbon tax is then 
steadily eliminated and so both the specific and ad valorem tax will fall over time. 
In their model they assume one very important feature - constant marginal costs of 
extraction. This therefore implies that each unit costs the same to extract. As 
mining goes deeper, then a unit of coal extracted costs the same to extract as the 
previous unit. The work in this chapter does not entirely hold with this view. 
Costs in coal mining have been kept down to some extent because 'uneconomic' 
deposits have not been extracted. As each additional unit is extracted the 
resource stock goes down. Extracting further deposits become more difficult and 
therefore the cost of extracting more rises. Therefore there are increasing 
marginal costs of extraction. To argue that each unit costs the same to extract is 
an unrealistic assumption to make. 
In U1ph and Ulph the problem is to: 
subject to: 
where 
max S;[B(x) - c(x) _D(M)]e-rt .dt 
P 2 B(x) - c(x) = ax --x 
2 
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where S is the stock of the resource, M is the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere, x is 
the extraction rate, B(x) is benefits of resource extraction, c(x) is cost of resource 
extraction, D(M) is the damage function, 0 is the rate that the CO2 decays in the 
atmosphere, each unit of the resource extracted adds to the stock of CO2 by and 
amount y, a, p and e are positive constants. 
The costs of extraction are constant and the damage cost function from global 
warming is monotonically increasing in M, implying that as the stock of the 
resource increases, the cost of the damage increases at an increasing rate. 
In this paper they assume that the resource is exhausted in finite time although 
they do not prove this to be the case. They look at the problem in 2 phases - one 
where there is production, i.e. there is positive extraction of the resource and one 
where there is no extraction, the terminal phase. Their model is not solved in the 
general case and they use numerical calibration of the model to determine the 
optimal time path of the carbon tax. 
A falling carbon tax over time is argued by Sinclair (1992). He offers a model 
where there are two sectors, oil extraction and other production. Oil is extracted 
from the ground at no cost and used as an input in the production process. 
However their is no explicit treatment of the dynamics of the stock of carbon in 
the atmosphere. He assumes that the non-oil production sector is affected by the 
emissions and incorporates this into the model by introducing a negative link 
between the rate of technical progress and the level of oil depletion. 
UIph and Ulph in their paper described previously, develop Sinclair's model into an 
optimal control problem to show that Sinclair's intuition that there should be a 
falling carbon tax is perfectly correct from his analysis, but that it is the 
implausible assumption that he makes that drives him to his conclusion. 
He assumes that the damage caused by C02 in the atmosphere affects the 
productive capacity of the economy, where: 
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K(M) = M- r 1"> 0 (1) 
K(M) is the technological capabilities of the economy as affected by the stock of 
C02. This equation shows that as the stock of C02 increases the technological 
capabilities of the economy reduce at an increasing rate. 
He then shows that Sinclair assumes that the burning of fossil fuels effects the 
percentage rate of growth of C02, rather than the absolute rate that Ulph and 
Ulph assume. Their constraint on the stock of pollution growth above now 
changes to: 
M=M(yx-8) (2) 
They then show that it is the percentage reduction ill the stock of fossil fuel rather 
than the absolute, which affects the percentage rate of increase in C02. 








This means that if a new source of an exhaustible resource were to be discovered, 
i.e. S increases, then the rate of accumulation of C02 in the atmosphere would 
reduce. But as there is more of the resource available to extract, then more 
would be extracted and the stock of C02 would increase. 
Differentiating (1) with respect to time gives: 
Substituting (1) and (4) into this gives and rearranging gives: 
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K=(q-X;)K (5) 
where q = ro and X = yr. This is the crucial equation that Sinclair gives showing 
that it is the burning of the resources that reduces the rate of growth of the 
technological capabilities of the economy. 
Ulph and Ulph then go on to develop Sinclair's model into a full optimal control 
problem. The change in the resource stock can now be given by substituting 
equation (3) into the original resource stock constraint: 
(6) 
The optimal extraction problem is then to: 
subject to equations (5) and (6). 
They show that the social exhaustion price of the fossil fuel (the shadow price of S 
or the social value of the stock), is falling over time, and that given Sinclair's 
assumption - it is the percentage reduction in the stock of fossil fuels which 
determines the rate of growth of C02 -this implies the following. As the stock of 
the fossil fuels is reduced then the percentage reduction in the stock that will arise 
from future extraction will increase. Therefore the amount of damage done by 
C02 will increase. They prove using Sinclair's analysis, that the ad valorem tax 
must be falling in the steady state. 
In another paper, Sinclair (1994) proves that the carbon tax should still indeed be 
falling over time, without making these assumptions. In his paper he formulates a 
model of endogeneous growth, oil extraction and global warming. First he looks 
at the decentralised case and introduces a tax on oil. Here the Lagrangian 
multiplier method is used and the problem is to: 
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where: 
B(t) = -P(t)D(t)[I + Z(t)] + $(t) + y(t)N(t) 
C(t) = c(t)N(t) + jK(t) + K(t) 
subject to the initial conditions: 
K(O)=Ko > 0 
S(O) =Ko >0 
In the model: 
e-itc(t)l-v 
A(t) = [ ] 1- v 
c(t) is per capita consumption, i is the discount rate and v is a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion. h is an exogeneous rate of technical progress, K, Nand D 
are the inputs of capital, labour and oil respectively. S(t) is the stock of oil 
underground and so -8(t) is the rate of extraction, P is the price of oil, y is the 
per capita return on oil excise receipts, j is the rate of capital depreciation Z is the 
ad valorem tax on oil, m is the green house effect parameter representing the 
elasticity of technology to resource stock, al and a2 are positive constants and 
al+a2 < 1. 
He then goes on to formulate a social planners problem and looks at the time path 
of the tax that will make these two situations equivalent. 
The planner's problem is to: 
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max 'I' ~ J; [ A(I) - p(l\ ,hi s(1)m K(I) a N (I) a, [-$(1) jl-a, -a, - C(I») ~ 
subject to K(D), and S(D) given. The variables are as before but here there is a 
greenhouse effect parameter, m. The difference between the two maximisation 
problems is that the planner recognises that there is benefit from the stock of 
unbumt oil, whereas individuals ignore it. 
He shows that the tax is falling over time as the greenhouse parameter is positive. 
Although Sinclair includes in the social planner's problem the favourable affect of 
an unbumt oil stock, (i.e. there is less pollution in the atmosphere), he does not 
include any treatment of the dynamics of the flow or stock of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. 
In this chapter it is shown that a version of the Ulph and Ulph model can be solved 
in general for the time path of the carbon tax without having to make assumptions 
about some of the parameters. Their model is developed further to incorporate 
increasing marginal costs of extraction and it is shown that the specific tax on 
carbon emissions should be held constant over time and the ad valorem tax should 
fall. This agrees with the conclusion of Sinclair (1992), but here it is the absolute 
reduction in the fossil fuel stock that determines the rate of growth of CO2, not the 
percentage. This also agrees with the conclusion of Sinclair (1994), but here the 
dynamics of the CO2 stock is a constraint on the maximisation problem. 
It is also shown that the steady state level of the resource stock is positive, and 
that extraction of the resource is terminated before the resource is totally 
exhausted; this is in contrast to Ulph and Ulph where the resource stock is 
completely exhausted. It is also shown that the level of steady state resource 
stock is greater than that which occurs when environmental considerations are not 
taken into account. 
In Section I the model is formulated. In Section II Pontryagin's Maximum 
Principle (pontryagin et al (1962» is used to derive the first order conditions and 
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the optimal steady state. In section III the optimal time paths of the relevant 
variables are derived, including the optimal time path of the carbon tax. 
SECTION I 
The Model 
In this section a model of the extraction of a non-renewable resource and its 
consumption over time is constructed. Consumption of the resource generates a 
flow of pollution which builds up into a stock in the atmosphere. However it has 
been observed that the increase in the stock of CO2 is about half of what it should 
be if all the anthropogenic (manmade) emissions that have occurred since the 
industrial revolution had been added to the pre-industrial stock of CO2. This 
implies that carbon is being removed from the atmosphere, into the oceans and the 
biosphere. In this model there is assumed to be a constant depreciation/decay 
rate for the stock' of C02. 
The problem then is to identifY a time path of a tax on carbon emissions that will 
make the decentralised optimum by individual agents equivalent to the socially 
optimal solution. 
A stock S of non-renewable resource is extracted from the ground at a rate x. 
The behaviour of the stock of the resource over time is given by: 
Consumption of the resource generates a flow of pollution which evolves over 
time according to: 
where M is the stock of C02 in the atmosphere at time t. Each unit of the 
resource extracted adds to the stock of C02 by an amount r> O. The stock of 
the resource decays at rate 0. 
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The stock of C02 causes damage to the environment. Costs associated with 
global warming can be put into two categories (Nordhaus (1991». The first is tile 
market effects of global warming; for example the reduced productivity from land 
loss and the reduced productivity in the climate dependent commercial activities, 
such as agriculture, forestry and fishing. Also, there are shore protection costs 
due to rising sea levels. The second category contains the damage to unmanaged 
natural systems and changes in the amenity value of everyday life. The damage 
function in this model and in Ulph and Ulph is given by a monotonically increasing 
damage function, D(M) where D '(M) > 0 and D' '(M) ~ O. This implies that as 
the level of pollution rises the damage done by the CO2 increases either at an 
increasing or constant rate. 
The cost of extracting the resource increases as the level of the resource stock 
goes down. This implies that there is increasing marginal costa of extraction. 
Therefore the cost function is given by C(x,S) where Cs(x,S) > 0 and Css(x,S) ~ O. 
The flow of the resource generates benefits from consumption. This is given by a 
concave benefit function B(x) where BxCx) > 0 and Bxx(x) < O. This implies that as 
the amount of resouce consumed increases then the benefit increases but at a 
falling rate, i.e. diminishing m'arginal utility. 
Social welfare, W, is given by: 
W = B(x) - C(x,S) -D(M) 
SECTION II 
The formal problem 
The task of a social planner then is to maximise discounted social welfare from 
fossil fuel extraction, subject to the constraints on resource stock and pollution 
stock accumulation. 
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Formally the problem is to : 
subject to: 
with initial conditions: 
M(O)=MO >0 
S(O) = SO> 0 
where r is the social rate of time preference. 
The current value Hamiltonian is: 
H = B(x) - c(x,S) - D(M) - p(x) - A(]X - 8M) 
{l) 
(2) 
where the shadow price associated with the stock of pollutants corresponds to _)., 
because this is a stock with a negative social value. The shadow price associated 
with the stock of the resource corresponds to JI, which has positive social value, 
i.e. Jl and A are costate variables. 
Assuming an interior solution, the first order necessary conditions are: 
d (-rl) /JH . ( S) dl pe =- OS ~ p= rp-cs x, 
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The transversality conditions are: 
lim e -rl p(t)S(t) = 0 
I~oo 
lim e -rl ).,(/)M(/) = 0 
I~oo 
Rearranging the first equation gives: 
Bx(x) = cs(x,S) + p + y)., 
This equation demands that the marginal benefits from consuming the resource 
equal the marginal costs (i.e. marginal private costs) plus social value placed on 
the reduction of an extra unit of the resource and the social value of additional unit 
of CO2 placed in the atmosphere(i.e. marginal social costs). 
Therefore the social optimum can be decentralised by a producer price, 
, 
q(t) = cx(x,S) + f.I and a consumer price p(t) = q(t) + y)., . ).,(/) is the positive 
specific tax placed on each unit of C02 emissions. The behaviour of the specific 
tax over time can be seen by the differential equation: 
1 = (r + b'»)" - D'(M) 
The ad valorem tax, V(t), which is a tax set as a percentage of the value of the 
commodity is given by: 
v (I) = ).,(t) 
q(/) 
Therefore to specialise further and solve for the time path of the specific and the 
ad valorem taxes, functional forms for the functions above need to be specified. 
Let: 
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R(x)=ax- P x2 2 
c(x,S) = (c - 8S')x 
D(M)=&M 
From this we see that R(x) is strictly concave in x. Also c(x,S) is (weekly) 
convcex in x, and D(M) is linear and increasing in M. 
A linear damage function is used here to permit the derivation of the general 
solution. Peck and Teisberg (1991) show that the carbon tax would rise over 
time whether it is a linear or non-linear function. It is only the magnitude that is 
different. Since the aim of this chapter is to gain insight into the optimal time 
profile of the tax rather than its magnitude, the damage function used will be a 
linear function of the increase in the stock of pollution. 
The current value Hamiltonian is: 
H = ax - /!... x2 - (c - 8S')x - e/'vf - J1X - A(;X - 0A1) 
2 
The first order necessary conditions are: 
ill 
- = a- px-c+OS- P-YA = 0 
a 




These conditions are also sufficient because of the concavity of the objective 
function in x and M. (See Mangarsarian (1966». 
From (3): 
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a - c + OS - P - rA 
x = ----=--...:...-p (6) 
Substituting this into the state equations, (1) and (2) and costate equations, (4) 
and (5) we get: 
1 S = --[a-c+ OS - p- rAJ p 
. r M =-[a - c + ()S- jl- rA]- OM p 







In the long run the optimal solution may "settle down" or converge to a steady 
state. If the steady state exists and is optimal, then there is an optimal extraction 
plan that will lead to this steady state. At the steady state S = M = 1 = jJ = 0 
therefore: 
S=-x*=o 
M = ]'X * -OM* = 0 
jJ. = r jl * -8x* = 0 
l = (r + 0) - e = 0 
Thus 
x* =0 
and substituting this into the other equations gives: 
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M*=O 
J.l* = 0 
A*= & (r+o) 
Rearranging (6) and substituting in x* = 0 gives: 
c - a + J.l * +YA * S* = --~--'----
o 
Therefore substituting A * and J.l* into S* gives: 
S* = _c _-_a + _..;..Y& __ 
o O(r + 0) 
Rearranging gives: 
S*= (c-a)(r+o)+y& 
O(r + 0) (11) 
This steady state level of resource stock is greater than in the decentralised case 
When no environmental considerations are taken into account, this is shown in 
Chappell and Dury (1994), where the optimisation problem is to: 
max fa {ax - px2 - (c - OS)x}e -rt .dt 
subject to: 





(c- a) (c- a)(r +0) + r& 
-'--~ < -'---'-'----'---'--
o O(r +0) 
Therefore less is extracted in the socially optimum case. 
SECTION III 
The optimum time path 
The problem here is to identify a time path for a tax on emissions that makes a 
decentralised optimum by individual agents equivalent to a socially optimal 
solution. Equation (3) can be rearranged to give: 
a - f3x = c - OS + jJ + rA (12) 
, 
This equation shows that the optimum can be decentralised by a producer price, q 
and a consumer price, p; 
q=c-OS+jJ 
p=q+rA 
where A is a positive specific tax per unit of CO2 emissions. It represents the 
optimal emission charge per unit of pollution. 
Equation (3) damands that the marginal social benefit of consuming the resource 
equals the marginal cost plus the marginal social value of the damage done to the 
environment due to consumption. The pollution externality is fully internalised. 
In the absence of pollution, i.e. D(M) = 0, emission charges are zero, A = 0, so 
that the marginal social benefit equals the marginal social cost of extracting the 
resource. The market outcome corresponds to the optimal solution. 
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Since the market does not internalise the externality associated with pollution 
emissions, the level of production and consumption, i.e. the level of extraction is 
too high: 
In Chappell and Dury: 
a-c+OS-p x=----.....:..-p 
Here, the pollution damage is taken into account and the level of extraction is 
reduced: 
a - c + OS - p- y). 
x = ------''---~ p 
The socially optimum outcome is achieved by levying a consumption tax at a rate 
).. The dynamics of the specific tax are given by (5): 
).=(r +0»).-8 




where q is the producer price ofthe extracted resource. 
The evolution of the ad valorem tax, V, is given by: 
V .k q 8 US-it -=---=(r+O)--+--~ 
V ). q A. c-BS+J.I 
Therefore substituting (7) and (9) into the above equation gives: 
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v .,i q & rp 
- = - - - = (r + 0) - - - ---'--
V A- q A- e-BS+p (13) 
To proceed any further and determine the time path for the specific and ad 
valorem tax, then the system needs to be solved for the time paths of the variables. 
Equations (7), (8), (9) and (10) can be expressed in matrix form, r = AX + B : 
S 
-B 1 Y S (e-a) 
- 0 - p p p P 
Ai yB _y2 M y(a -e) 
-0 -y p 
= p p p + B(e-a) 
. 
_02 0 yO P p P 
--
0 r+-p p P 
A- 0 0 0 (r + 0) A- -& 
The characteristic equation of A is: 
[ -8 8 8
2
] (r+o-z)(-o-z) (--z)(r+--z)+- =0 p p p 
Therefore the eigenvalues of the system are (see appendix A): 
r-JQ r+JQ 
z = - 0 , (r + 0), 2 ' 2 
2 49-
where Q=r +-p 
there are two positive eigenvalues z = (r + 8) • r \.JQ 
r-& 
and two negative eigenvalues, z = - 0, 2 
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.as r -.jQ =r- ~r2 + ~ <0 




















The particular solution x is equal to the steady state solution proved previously, 
therefore (see aptmdix C): 
s (c - a )(r + 8) + re 
8(r+8) 
M 
x= = 0 (11) 
-p 0 
e 
- (r+8) A 
The paths of the variables over time are, (see appendix D): 
S(/) (r-/Q) I (r+/Q) I Ct (c-aXr+8)+y& fX..r +8) 
0 eCr+8)1 e 2 e 2 C2 
M(/) (r-/Q)t (r+.JQ) t 0 
-IX Ae(r+8)1 Be 2 De 2 + = e C3 
p(t) (r-/Q) (r+.JQ) 
F.e(r+8)t t I 0 0 Fe 2 Ge 2 C4 e 
ACt) 0 He(r+8) t 0 0 (r+8) 
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where 
A = -y(r +8) B = -y(r - JQ) D = -y(r +JQ) 
(r + 28)' 28 + (r - .J Q) • 28 + (r + .J Q) 
E= B(r+8) F=p[B + (r-.JQ)] G= 1~+ (r+.JQ)] 
8' P 2 • 'lp 2 
H = 8p(r + 8) -rB 
8y 
MUltiplying out gives: 
(r-.JQ) (r+.JQ) 
S(/) = C2e(r+8)1 + C3e 2 1 + C4e 2 1 + (c - a)(r + 8) + ye 
B«r + 8) 
Solving for Cl, C2• C3 and C4 using the Boundary and transversality conditions: 
gives: 
M(O)=MO >0 
S(O) = SO> 0 
Jim e -rl II(/)S(/) = 0 
t~oo 
lim e -rt 2(t)M(t) = 0 
I~OO 
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C [M yBSo(r +8)(r -.JQ) - y(r - .JQ)(c-a)(r +8) y 2e(r -jQ) ] 1= 0+ +--~--~~~=-
fJ(r + 8)(28 + (r - JQ» fJ(r + 8)(28 + (r - .JQ» 
C3 = [SOfJ(r + 8) - (c - a)(r + 8) + ye] 
8(r+8) 
Thus the optimal time paths are: 
(r-.JQ) 
S( ) - C 2 I (c - a)(r + 8) + ye I - 3e + fJ(r + 8) 
(r-.JQ) 
_--C.-_I 
M(/) = C}e -8t + +C3Be 2 
_(r_-.JQ_Q_) t 
pet) = C3Fe 2 
A(t) = e 
(r+8) 
The constant value for 1(t) implies that there is a constant specific tax on 
emissions of e over time. (r+8) 
Also as t ~ 00 S(t) ~ ( c - a )(r + 8) + ye) M(t) ~ 0 and pet) ~ 0 These 
, fJ(r+8) , . 
correspond to the steady state values derived above. 
From (6), x = a - c + fJS - p - YA and it follows that: p 
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[a- c] B 1 Y x(/)= - +-S(/)--p(/)--..t(/) P P P P 
Substituting S(/), p(/) and AC/) into this equation and rearranging gives: 
(r-JQ) X(f)=[a-c]_[a-c]+[ Y& ]_L( & )_l[(r-JQ) C3e -2 f P P p(r+5) P (r+o_ P 2 
As that r - JQ < 0 , then as I -+ 00 the rate of extraction is falling over time and 
x(t) -+ O. This agrees with the steady state value for X(/) that was derived 
above. 
. ..t(n Lookmg at the ad valorem tax V(/) = --) : 
q(t 
The producer price q(/) is: 
q(t) = c - ()S(t) + pet) 
Using the equations for S(/) and pet) and substituting into the above equation and 
rearranging gives: 
(r-JQ) 
( ) (c- a)(r +8) + ye C 2 t[p(r -JQ)] q I = c- + 3e ~+~ 2 
As 1-+00 then -q(t)-+O. Therefore the producer price is increasing over time. 
This is because F - B = per - JQ) is negative, remembering that r <.JQ 
2 
Differentiating with respect to time confirms this: 
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2 (r-.JQ) 
dq(t) = 1 (r - &)] C3e 2 t 
dt 'l 2 
Since Cj = So - S* ,(the amount taken out of the ground which by definition 
cannot be negative), the above derivative is positive; therefore q(t) is rising over 
time. 
It follows that if q(t) is rising over time then the ad valorem tax, Vet), is falling 
overtime. 
Ulph and Ulph argue that the social value of the resource stock,. i.e. the 
exhaustion rent, increases over time and that it is this that chokes off demand 
therefore both the specific and the ad valorem tax fall. But here the social value 
of the resource stock, p, falls over time and so it is the fact that the producer and 
therefore the consumer price is rising that chokes off demand. Thus it is optimal 
for the ad valorem carbon tax to fall. 
CONCLUSION 
This model extended the Ulph and Ulph analysis of stock externalities to 
incorporate increasing marginal costs of extraction and it was shown that the 
model can be solved in general for the time path of the carbon tax without having 
to make assumptions about some of the parameters. 
The socially optimal time path for the carbon tax, that makes the decentralised 
optimisation by individual agents equivalent to the socially optimal solution is 
found. It was shown that the price of output increases over time and it is this that 
causes the optimal carbon tax to fall. This is in contrast to Ulph and Ulph who 
argue that the optimal carbon tax trajectory should be one that first rises and then 
falls. They argue that this is because the exhaustion rent, the social price of the 
resource stock, rises and this raises fossil fuel prices, thus doing the work of 
Choking off demand. The carbon tax will therefore be gradually eliminated. 
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The falling tax rate agrees with the models presented by Sinclair (1992), but 
without making the implausible assumption that it is the percentage reduction. in 
the stock of resource which affects the percentage increase in the stock of CO2• 
This also agrees with Sinclair (1994) but here the dynamics of the stock of CO2 
are incorporated into the model. 
It is also shown that the steady state level of the resource stock is positive; hence 
extraction of the resource is terminated before the resource is totally exhausted, 
this is in contrast to Ulph and Ulph where the resource stock is completely 
exhausted in finite time. It is also shown that the level of steady state resource 
stock is greater than that which occurs when environmental considerations are not 
taken into account. This can be seen by comparing the level of steady state 
resource stock with that resulting in the case where environmental considerations 




Equations (7), (8), (9) and (10) can be expressed in matrix form,r = AX + B: 
s 
-0 1 !.... s (e-a) 
- 0 - p p p P 
AI yO _y2 M y(a - c) 
-0 -y p 
= p p p + O(e-a) 
p _02 
0 0 yO P P - r+-p p P 
A- 0 0 0 (r+o) A- -e 
The eigenvalues can be found by solving IA - zll = 0, where z is an eigenvalue. 
Therefore solving: 
-0 




0 P P P -
_02 
0 0 yO 
- r+--z p p p 
0 0 0 (r +o)-z 
gives the characteristic equation: 
[ 
-0 0 02J (r+o-z)(-o-z) (--z)(r+--z)+- =0 p p p 
mUltiplying and cancelling out: 
[ 2 02J (r+o-z)(-o-z) z -rz- p =0 
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Therefore the eigenvalues of the system are: 
z = - 0, (r + 0) , 
2 4{}-






The associated eigenvectors can be found by solving IA - zIIF = 0, where F is an 
eigenvector, therefore: 
f} 
0 I Y F} 0 ---z -p p p 
y(} 
_L y2 F2 0 
-o-z p p p = 
f}2 f} yf} F3 0 
-- 0 r+--z p p P 
F4 0 0 0 0 (r +o)-z 




[r +20]F4 = 0 (4a) 
From (4a), F4 = O. Therefore rearranging (Ia); 
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and substituting this into (2a) gives: 
Therefore: 






When z = (r + 0): 
[ 
() ] 1 r 
---(r+8) FI +-F3 +-F4 =0 P P P 










Multiplying out gives: 
This cancels to: 






17 op(r + 0) - rOF 
r4 = 1 
oy 






yO y(r + 0)0 y2 [p [ ro]] 
-FI -[r+2011<2 - FI-- - o(r+o)-- FI =0 P ,r. po P or P 
mUltiplying out gives: 
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Simplifying gives: 
F = [-y(r + O)]F 
2 (r+ 20) 1 






op(r + 0) - r() 
oy 
r-JQ 







Therefore F4 = 0 
Rearranging ( 1 c) gives: 
Substituting this into (2c) gives: 
MUltiplying out: 
yB F yBp y(r - .JQ) F _[5: + (r - .JQ)} _ 0 
- 1 -- 1 - 1 u 2 -P P 2 2 
Simplifying gives: 
F2 = 1 [ 
-y(r -.JQ) } 
28 +(r-.JQ) 






r+ 'Q When z= ,,~ : 
2 
[
-0 (r+JQ)r 1 r 
-- 1+-F3+-F4=O P 2 P P (ld) 
(2d) 
_02 [ 0 (r+/Q)] By 
-FI+ r+-- F3+-F4=O P P 2 P (3d) 
(4c) 
Therefore F4 = O. 
From (ld): 




-y(r + .JQ) l~ 
F2 = 20'+(r+.JQ)J1 










The inverse of the matrix A is (using elementary row operations) 
{~+!] 0 1 y r8 8(r + 0') 
_l... 1 0 0 
--
8 8 
8 0 1 0 -
r r 











As X = AX + B , and that the particular solution is X = -A - I B . 
Then: 
Therefore: 
(c- a)(r +8) + ye 
S Ys (r+8) 
M Ym 0 
= + 
JI Yp 0 
A YA e 
(r+8) 
Differentiating both sides gives, 
X=£:. 
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Substituting the expressions for X and X for X = AX + B, results in: 
I= A(X - A-I B) +!1 = AI 
Therefore: 
Ys 0 0 I I- Ys -- -
p p p 
Ym yO 
-8 r _C Ym 
= p p p 
Yp 02 0 yO Yp 
-- 0 r+-p p P YA. YA. 0 0 0 (r+8) 
Let P be a matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of 
0 I I I 
1 -y(r +8) -y(r-/Q) -y(r +/Q) (r + 28) 28 + (r-/Q) 28 + (r +/Q) 
A:P= O(r +8) 0 ~; + r-/~~; + r+24 8 
8p(r +8) -rO 
0 8y 0 0 
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Let I = Py. . Differentiating gives: 
Therefore: 




Ym (r + 20') 20' + (r -..JQ) 20' + (r +..JQ) vm 
= 
0 8(r + 0') {;+r-2&){;+r+/~ 
til 
0' vp 
O'p(r + 0') - r8 
tA 0 O'r 0 0 vA 
Now substituting I and t. into t. = AI gives: 
Pv = APv ~ v = p-l APv = Dv 
- - - --
where D is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of A on the principal diagonal 
and zero' s elsewhere. 
This results in the system: 
Vs 
-0' 0 0 0 Vs 
vm 
0 (r+O') 0 0 
(r-/Q) Vm 
= 0 0 0 
vII 2 (r+,JQ) vp 
0 0 0 
vA 2 vA 
Then it follows that: 
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Y.i = ~(!!.i; i = 1,2,3,4. 
where Zj represents the eigenvalues of A. 
integrating gives: 
~ = Cj exp(zjt); j = 1,2,3,4. 
Separating these variables and 
where the C's are arbitrary constants. Stacking these solutions to the individual 
equations in a vector we may write: 
~= exp(zt)C 
where exp(zt) is a diagonal matrix with exp(ztt), exp(z2t), ..... , exp(z4t) on the 
principal diagonal and zeros elsewhere and C is a column vector with elements 
Cl, C2, C3, C4. 
Therefore we can write: 
Vs e -ot 0 o o 
vm 0 e(r+o)t o 
= 
vII 0 0 e 2 
vA. 0 0 o e 2 
Substituting P and ~ into I = Py' gives: 
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-r(r-iQJ -r(r+iQJ 0 Jr+8y 0 0 
C2 (r+2b) 2O+(r-.jQ) 2O+(r+.jQ) 
Py= 
l:(r+b) (r-/0 0 ~ I r-!)~ I r+!) --t 0 0 0 e 2 0 CJ 
lJXr+b)-r8 (r+,jQ) 
0 0/ 0 0 
-t 
0 0 0 e 2 (4 
Ys 0 e(r+b)t (r-M (r+fQ) q 
--I --I 
e 2 e 2 
e-li -r(r +0) e(r+b)t (r-10 (r+10 
Ym -r(r-.jQ) e-2 -
1 
-r(r+.jQ) e-2- 1 (r+2O) C2 
. 2O+(r-.jQ) 2O+(r+.jQ) 
= ~ 4 (r-J0 t ~ {Q) ~+J0 
Y,u 0 
8 r- Q -- 8 r+ Q --I 
£Xr +0) ir+8)t -+-e 2 -+ e 2 2 2 C3 
0 
YA- 0 lJXr+b)-r8 e(r+b)t 
0/ 0 0 
Given that X = Y - A -1 B substituting the particular solution and Y into this 
- - -' -
equation gives: 
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Set) 0 e(r+8)t 
e-li -y(r +8) e(r+8)1 
M(/) (r+2b) 
= 
0 lX..r+O) e(r+8)1 j(t) 
8 












e 2 e 2 
2O+(r-.jQ) 2O+(r+.jQ) {o r-~) ('-&), {o r+~) (r+&), 
-+-e 2 -+--e 2 















Simplifying the system gives: 
e(r+o)1 (r-..[Q> (r+..[Q> CI 
S(/) 0 
1 1 
e 2 e 2 
M(t) Ae<r+o)1 (r-..[Q> (r+..[Q> C2 
-01 1 
1 
e Be 2 De 2 
= 
p(/) (r-/Q> (r+..[Q> 
Ee(r+o)1 1 1 C3 
0 Fe 2 Ge 2 
A(/) 
0 He (r+o)1 0 0 C4 







A = -y(r + 0) B = -y(r - JQ5 D = -y(r +.JQ) 
(r + 20)' 20 + (r - J Q) , 20 + (r + J Q) 
E = O(r +0) F =p[~+ (r -JQ)] G = 1 ~+ (r+JQ)] 
0' p 2 ' f'lp 2 
H= op(r+o)-rO 
or 
Therefore multiplying out gives: 
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(r-..jQ) t (r+..jQ) 
J.I(t) = C2E/ r +o)t + C3 Fe 2 + C4 Ge 2 t 
e 
+--(r+o) 




S =C +C +C + (c-a)(r+o)+ye 
o 2 3 4 B(r + 0) 
Next, using the transversality condition, 
we get: 
lim e -rt J.I(t)S(t) = 0 
t~oo 
-(~) -(~) 
e-rt J.I(t)S(t) = C2Ee li + C3e 2 + C4Ge 2 
C (r+o)t C 2 C 2 + (c - a )(r + 0) + ye [ (~)t (~)t 1 2e + 3e + 4e B(r + 0) 




(c-a)(r+o)+re]c G - --;-)t 
+ 8(r+o) 4 e 
To satisfy thetransversality condition lim e-rt }J(t)S(t) = 0 
t -+ 00 
Therefore 
( I'+..[Q\ C2e(-JQ)t +[(c-a)(r+o)+re]c e - -2-) t -+0 
3 8(r +0) . 3 
therefore as the exponents are negative, C3 has a value yet to be determined. 
Next using the second transversality condition, 




Multiplying out gives: 
(r+~ (r+20+~ (r-..fQ] ---I 1 - -I C3Bs 2 2' C4 Ds 2 
+ (r +8) e +C2C4DHe + (r +8) e 
To satisfy the transversality condition, again: 
Therefore: 
(r+..fQ] C3Bs - -2- 1 CIS -(r+8)1 0 
--=--e + e ~ (r +8) (r +8) 
therefore C1 and C3 have a value yet to be determined. Using this and substituting 
into 
S(O) = So and M(O) = Mo equations we get: 
s =C + (c-a)(r+8)+rs 




MO =CI +BC3 =CI - JQ C3 
20+(r- Q) 
Therefore from rearranging the So equation: 
C = [S08(r + 0) - (c - a)(r + 0) + re] 
3 8(r + 0) 
and substituting this into Mo and rearranging gives: 
C =M + r(r-JQ) [S08(r+O)-(c-a)(r+o)+re] 
1 0 20 + (r _ .JQ) 8(r + 0) 
MUltiplying out gives: 
C [ rfEo(r+S)(r-JQ)-r(r-JQ)(c-a)(r+O) r 2&(r-JQ) ] 
1 = MO +, fJ(r + 0)(20 + (r - JQ» +-8(-r +-O)(-20-+"";(r-';;;'-';""'JQ=Q=--» 
Therefore: 
(r-.JQJ S(t) = C e -2- t + (c-a)(r +0) + re 
3 8(r +0) 
. (r-Rl 
pet) = C3 Fe -2-) t 
A(t)= e (r+o) 
where CI, C3, Band Fare as stated above. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF OPENCAST 
COAL MINING 
Open Cast Coal Mining 
The opencasting of coal involves deeply ploughing an area of land to extract the 
coal. Coal that is mined by open casting has less extraneous dirt, less free 
moisture, better sizing and so better handling qualities than deep mined coal. 
Opencast coal has a far lower chlorine content than deep mined coal, and deep 
mines have relied on the supply of opencast coal so that it can be mixed with the 
deep mined coal to give an overall acceptable level of chlorine, particularly when it 
is sold to the customer for power generation as this will reduce the amount of 
chlorine emitted into the atmosphere, (Department of the Environment (1988». 
Opencast coal is cheaper to extract than deep mined coal and so it is in the 
national interest to maximise its production. However opencast coal mining 
inevitably causes adverse environmental effects in the area concerned; therefore it 
is necessary to strike a balance between the benefits of development and 
protecting the environment. 
It has been recognised by the Government that the environmental effects of any 
proposal for opencast coal mining need to be considered along with the scope for 
mitigating those effects. There are guidelines and strict regulations for any 
opencast coal operations and any proposal is subject to examination of all the 
possible effects that may occur: for a brief overview see Department of the 
Environment (1988). For example, the mineral planning authorities will need to 
make a judgement on each application for mining, taking into the account the case 
for development and the environmental effects that may occur. Where there are 
objections to the development being undertaken, the applicant must show how 
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these detrimental effects can be overcome. Where the application for mining 
concerns an area of environmental richness, such as a National Park or National 
Nature Reserve, then the mineral planning authorities must take the advice of the 
Department of the Environment which instructs any proposal for these workings 
to be placed under the most rigorous examinations: see Department of the 
Environment Circular 4/76 (Welsh Office 7/76). The Policy concerning Green 
Belts is set out in Planning Policy Guideline Notes PPG 2, where the site must be 
well restored. The Department of the Environment Circular 16/87 (Welsh Office 
25/87) emphasises that where an application concerns agricultural land, land 
quality after restoration as well as environmental effects must be considered. 
Proposals for the aftercare and restoration of a site must be submitted with any 
proposal for mining and should be in sufficient detail so that a realistic view can be 
taken of the aftercare and restoration intentions. These proposals must be 
agreed, before planning permission is granted to the applicant, with the mineral 
planning authorities, district councils, land owners, and the local community. The 
mineral planning authorities will therefore make the decision on whether the 
proposed site should be mined by comparing the benefits, whether these are 
economic or not, with the environmental costs. 
The after-use of the land must be decided before planning permission is granted. 
This will affect the course of restoration. Briefly (to be more fully explained 
later), if the afteruse is for agriculture, then the land must be restored in stages 
throughout mining. If the afteruse is development, then the restoration can take 
place at the end of the extraction phase. 
The council for the Protection of Rural England has argued that opencast coal 
mining is one of the most destructive activities being carried out in the UK: see 
Trade and Industry Select Committee (1993). The main forms of environmental 
impact include visual impacts, noise, blasting vibrations, water pollution, coal 
transportation effects, impacts on agriculture, and air pollution. Not only is there 
the visual impact that occurs from the intrusion of the excavation on the 
286 
landscape, including the fixed plant and machinery; but topsoil and subsoil 
mounds are formed close to the site boundary, (these are known as spoil banks). 
Noise emanates from the plant and machinery on the site, arising from soil 
stripping, the workings within the site, blasting, and the transportation of the coal 
and the restoration phase. The Secretary of State for Energy imposes noise levels 
for sites for day time and night time working. However, the noise produced 
during soil stripping and restoration are excluded from these conditions. The 
spoil mounds and the depth of the site will help to reduce the noise level, although 
their effectiveness may be reduced if housing is higher than the working site or if 
machinery is higher than the spoil piles. Blasting has three impacts associated 
with it; ground vibration, air blast waves which can cause vibrating windows, and 
rock particles that are projected into the atmosphere. The degree to which these 
cause disturbance to the public depends on the type and quantity of explosive, 
how far away the nearest houses are, the geology and topography of the site and 
the weather conditions (foggy, hazy or smoky conditions give rise to increased 
noise levels). 
Water pollution occurs because an opencast site needs to be kept dry and the 
water that accumulates in the site will need to be pumped away. This outflow of 
water will contain suspended solids and acidic drainage from the metals and 
sulphide in the waste rock. These can be quite harmful to water habitats if they 
find their way into natural waterways. 
Apart from the congestion that is caused from the extra traffic on the roads, due 
to the transportation of coal to the coal washeries or disposal points, there is the 
problem of dust which is created by the movement of the transportation vehicles. 
The problem will vary according to the weather conditions. The dust can partly 
be controlled by watering the site roads and by planting trees and hedges around 
the site. Transport vehicles that are using public roads will undergo wheel 
washing before leaving the site. 
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Another environmental problem that is caused by opencast mining is the affect it 
has on the landscape and the natural habitats that existed there. Woodlands, trees 
and hedgerows are removed, wetlands drained and heath, downland and moorland 
are ploughed up. Although restoring the landscape after mining will involve 
replanting trees and hedges, it will take a long time for them to re-establish 
themselves, and it unlikely that a mature woodland will be established. 
Sometimes the woodland and trees that once existed have been replaced by fences 
and in some cases where there has been replanting, the trees and hedgerow have 
failed to mature because of soil problems, see CoEnCo (1980). There is also the 
problem of the loss of species habitat that is very likely to occur from opencast 
mining. 
One of the main effects though is that on agriculture and the fertility of the soil 
after restoration has occurred. The soil after it has been mined tends to be 
poorly structur~d and there are areas where the soil is very compact which will 
have the effects of impeding drainage, restrict the growth of roots and make the 
land more difficult to work. Also, the land will become stonier and this might 
hinder farm machinery. The top soil will be of a shallower depth. The storage of 
top soil and sub soil causes deterioration of their biological value and this affects 
the fertility of the soil. Farmers have argued that their crop yields have been 
halved and many farmers have had to change from growing crops to raising cattle. 
They have also argued that opencasted land needs a greater amount of fertiliser 
inputs, especially that of phosphate and nitrogen, than before the land was 
disturbed. CoEnCo state that they are concerned that the loss in soil fertility is 
very long term and they are not convinced that it could be restored back to its 
original level of productivity. Therefore it is recommended by CoEnCo (1980), 
that the soil should be replaced in phases so that the deterioration of the soil 
fertility is minimised. 
There is a great debate between environmentalists and the Coal Authority on the 
environmental consequences of opencast coal mining. Environmentalists argue 
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that there is a long term degradation of the natural environment and a reduction in 
the agricultural productivity of land that is restored after opencast mining is 
completed. The Coal Authority argues that the land that is restored after mining 
is invariably improved and that land used for open cast coal mining is mostly 
derelict land anyway. 
As far back as 1981 the Flowers Commission calculated that of all the land used 
for opencast mining, only about ''14.4% could be attributed to some form of 
derelict land clearance" Flowers Commission on Energy and the Environment 
(I 981). But as derelict sites have been worked there are increasing applications 
made to move into land of higher agricultural and scenic value, Beynon et al 
(1990). 
The Government does not make any policy recommendations as to the overall 
level of opencast coal production; 
'it will be for current or prospective developers in the licensed 
sector, in the light of their own business plans, to' decide the level 
of output for which they wish to aim." Department of Trade and 
Industry (I 993); 
This White Paper states that the market should be allowed to decide how much to 
produce and there will be fewer restrictions after British coal has been privatised. 
This liberalisation by the Department of Trade and Industry contradicts the 
tightening up of rules in the guidance issued by the Department of the 
Environment. These new guidelines state that while: 
'boal which can be produced economically is an important 
indigenous energy resource," ... .it must be produced In an 
'tnvironmentally acceptable way and consistent with wider 
environmental objectives including sustainable development': . 
Department of the Environment (1993). 
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The underlying concept of sustainable development is to provide for an 
acceptable standard of living for aU, and ensure that all aspects of this 
development are fulfilled in the long run by the availability of natural 
resources, ecosystems and life support systems. We have a responsibility to 
future generations not to jeopardise their needs. Therefore when opencast 
mining is proposed in a certain area, the future effects must be taken seriously 
into account. For example, if the afteruse of the area is for agriculture, the 
restoration must be undertaken in phases during the excavation period so that 
in the future the deterioration of the soil quality is minimised and future 
generations' agricultural needs are not jeopardised. 
Open Cast Coal Models 
Ever since the work ofHotelling (1931), the problem of the optimal depletion 
of a non-renew~ble resource has received a lot of attention in the literature, 
and has been the focus of much research by economists. 
The symposium issue of the Review of Economic Studies (1974) was a major 
contribution to theoretical modelling in this field. A few of these articles show 
that if the availability of future technologies and future substitutes mean that the 
resource is no longer an essential for future production, then it is optimal to 
completely exhaust the resource: see Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974), 
Stiglitz (1974); also see Kamien and Schwartz (1978). 
Later work has looked at different aspects of the problem of non-renewable 
resource depletion. For instance, Sethi and Sorger (1990) analysed a model 
where a country possessed a non-renewable resource and it could either consume 
it or export it. There is a backstop price at which a substitute for the resource 
can be imported. The problem is to determine the optimal consumption, export 
and import of the resource so as to maximise consumer's utility and m~imise 
producer profits over a finite horizon. They show that there is an initial phase 
where none of the substitute is consumed, although the price of the substitute is 
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the same as the price of the resource. The substitute is only consumed in the 
second phase when the resource is completely exhausted. 
In some of the past literature, some of the consequences of pollution have been 
considered along with the optimal depletion of non-renewable resources, (see 
chapter 5). For example, Forster (1980) presents a model where a fossil fuel is 
the single energy resource which when burned, produces a non-accumulating flow 
of pollution, and this creates disutility. In the same paper he presents a model 
where a non-renewable resource, which is required in the production of goods and 
services, is extracted from the environment. Here the flow of pollution builds up 
into a stock in the environment. He also takes into account the negative effects 
that this pollution stock has on social welfare and allows for abatement activities, 
which also require the use of energy and which further reduce the stock of the 
resource. 
Barbier (1989) 'formulates a model where the problem is to maximise an objective 
function that has the flow of consumption and the level of environmental quality 
its arguments, subject to an environmental degradation variable which is increased 
as a result of waste emissions and renewable and non-renewable resource 
extraction. He finds that it is the initial level of environmental quality and the 
level of discount rate that are significant factors in determining whether it is 
optimal for the economy to follow an unsustainable or sustainable growth path. 
For more detail see chapter 5. 
These examples show that environmental considerations have been taken into 
account in the literature, (see chapter 5). However it is generally assumed in the 
literature that the costs that a mining firm will incur from extracting the resource 
end when extraction itself is completed. We have argued that this assumption is 
not always realistic. There are often post extraction payments that will be 
incurred, for instance clean up costs, payments to compensate for mutilation of the 
environment and there may be costs of storing or abating harmful and toxic 
materials. Permission for open cast coal mining requires the mining firm to c1ean-
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up the environment and restore the land that has been excavated, to its original 
state. However, as discussed above, the timing of this restoration is affected by 
-
the after use of the land. Therefore the post extraction payments should be 
included in an analysis of opencast coal mining whether they occur as a flow 
during the extraction period or at the end as an equivalent lump sum payment. 
Kemp and Long, (1980) formulated a model of the mining firm that has access to 
a single deposit of a nonrenewable resource. They take into account post 
extraction payments and they distinguish between those costs which are incurred 
at the end of the mining period, when the mine has closed, from those which occur 
when the mine is temporarily closed. Their model is presented below: 
They assume that: 
7r(q(t),x(t» = {7r 1(q(t),X(t», .if q(tt) > 0, jorsomett>t, (*) 
, ¢( x(t», if q(tt) = 0, jor all t' ~ t, 
Here, n(0, x(t» is the rate at which costs are incurred when production is 
temporarily stopped, and ¢(x(t» is the rate at which costs accrue after the mine is 
closed down completely. The rate of flow of net revenue depends on the rate of 
extraction and on the accumulated extraction. They assume that it costs as much 
to close down temporarily as it does to shut down the mine permanently, therefore 
(*) collapses to: 
n( q(t), x(t) == nt (q(t), x(t» 
The task of the firm is to maximise its flow of net revenue, i.e. 
max J; e -rt n(q(t),x(t».dt 
subject to: 
i(t) = q(t) ~ 0 
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with the boundary conditions: 
x{t) S a 
x{O) = xO 
where a is the initial stock of the resource, n(t) is the flow of net revenue, q{t) is 
the rate of extraction, and x{t) is the accumulated extraction, all at time t. 
Kemp and Long do not fully characterise their model and actually solve for the 
time paths of the variables, but use phase portrait analysis to examine typical 
optimal trajectories. They show that, under certain conditions, it is optimal for 
the firm to completely exhaust the resource in finite time. 
They then present a case when the rate at which costs accrue after the mine has 
shut down to are less than the rate at which costs are incurred when production is 
temporarily shut down. The objective function of the firm is shown below: 
max f: e-rt 1(1 {q,x)dt + e-rT (,p{x) / r), 
They do not, however, give a full solution to the problem and state that it is 
optimal to incompletely exhaust the resource and to close down after a finite 
working lifetime, and to extract at a positive terminal rate, i. e. the extraction rate 
at time T is positive. Again Kemp and Long do not fully characterise the solution 
to the problem and use phase portrait analysis to examine typical optimal 
trajectories. 
Kemp and Long have not taken into account the fact that the post extraction 
payments can be incurred at different times. In their analysis, the costs are 
incurred when there is no production taking place, everything is at a stand still and 
no resource is being extracted. This does not distinguish fully from the case when 
costs accrue to the firm at the end of the mining period, again when there is no 
extraction taking place. Costs that are associated with extraction that occur 
during the mining period, should be considered as a flow. In the following 
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analysis these costs occur in phases during the mining plan and it is shown that the 
extraction rate is positive for the whole of the extraction period and there is no 
temporary closure of the site. This is quite realistic as there is no reason why 
mining should come to a standstill while another part of the area is being restored. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the optimal exploitation of a non-
renewable natural resource, such as a fossil fuel, under the ownership of a 
monopolist who faces conditions of increasing marginal costs of extraction and 
new regularity constraints to protect the environment. This is an extension to an 
earlier paper by Chappell and Dury (1994) where there are no regulatory 
constraints on the monopolist to restore the land after it has been mined. This is 
an infinite horizon problem and will be presented in Section I. The problem will 
also be solved for a finite time horizon and will be presented in Section II. 
In Section III, two models are presented where there are regulatory constraints 
imposed on the'monopolist to infill the site after is has been mined. Two models 
are considered where different after uses of the site affect the timing of the 
. 
reclamation of the land. In Section HI.i, the land is to be used for development 
and so infilling is undertaken after the site has been mined. In Section HI.ii, the 
reclaimed land is to be used for agriculture or forestry. In this case the infilling is 
undertaken in phases to ensure that the subsoil and topsoil are replaced at the 
earliest opportunity to minimise deterioration of the biological value of the soil 
during storage. 
SECTION I 
The Model • the infinite time horizon case 
Suppose that a profit maximising monopolist has sole extraction rights over the 
resource stock of coal, x(t). The rate at which the monopolist extracts the coal at 




With initial condition: 
x(O) =xo > 0 
Let p(t) denote the selling price per unit of (extracted) coal at time t and suppose 
that the inverse demand function is linear and given by: 
p(t) = a - hu(t) a, h, > 0 
Suppose that total extraction costs depend on the rate of extraction and on the 
remaining deposits of coal, i.e. it is assumed: 
Total costs = uF(x) 
Now assume that the function F(x) which is the marginal cost, is decreasing 
, 
function ofx and is, for simplicity, is linear so that: 
F(x) = c- lex 
where k> 0 and 0 ~ c - a < lex(J. It is also assumed that F(O) ~ a > F(xo). This 
assumption is made to keep the ensuing dynamic problem tractable and to ensure 
that it has an 'interior' solution. If F( 0) < a, there would not be an interior 
solution to the problem; if F(xo) ~ a, i.e. marginal cost at time zero is greater than 
" the marginal price, then the monopolist would not extract any coal. 
It is assumed that the monopolist wishes to maximise his discounted profits over 
the entire future. Total revenue is given by: 
Total Revenue = au - hu2 
Profits are then equal to total revenue minus total costs, therefore: 
Profits = au - h~ -( c - lex)u 
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Thus the problem he faces is to choose an optimal extraction plan that maximises: 
subject to (1) and where r > 0 is his discount rate. 
and given the initial condition: 
x(O) =xo> 0 
This is the problem in Chappell and Dury (1994). Let A,(t) denote the costate 
variable associated with the constraint (1). Thus A(t) is the shadow value of the 
resource stock at time t. The Hamiltonian is defined as: 
The current value Hamiltonian is: 
He" =H= {(a-c)u-hu 2 +kuX-AU} 
Assuming an interior solution, the necessary conditions for a maximum are: 
tH 








and the transversality condition: 
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lim e -rt A(t)X(t) = 0 
t~oo 
It is clear that the system has a unique stationary state defined as x*, A *, u*. 
From (3): 
l=rA-ku=O 
ku* Therefore A * = -. From (1), u* = O. Therefore A* = O. From (2): 
r 
a-c+ kx *-A * 
u*=-----
2b 




The usual sufficiency conditions for the optimality of the steady state requires that 
the Hamiltonian function is concave with respect to x and u or M(x) is concave in 
x, where M(x) denotes the maximised Hamiltonian. In this optimal control 
problem the Hamiltonian is convex in x at the steady state, (x*, A *). Therefore 
the usual sufficiency conditions cannot be satisfied. However Sorger (1992) has 
shown that for a problem with a single state variable a sufficiency condition for a 
stationary state to be locally optimal is that: 
i). There exists a stationary state (x*, A *) and an open neighbourhood N of (x*, 
A *) such that H(x. A, u) has a unique maximum with respect to admissible values 
of u for all (x, A) EN and such that M(x, A) is twice continuously differentiable 
onN~ 
ii). M).;;. > 0 at (x*, A *); 
iii). M\'). - rMx'). - Mxx M').'). > 0 at (x*, A *); 
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(see Sorger (1992), p. 150, Corollary 2.1 and methodology) 
Solving for M by substituting (2) into the current value Hamiltonian gives: 
M(x A) = (a-c)[a -(c-kx) - AJ- b[a-(c - kx) - AJ2 + 
, 2b 2b 
Therefore: 
(a-(c-kx)-A)2 
M(X,A) = ~--4-b--"-- (4) 
We now show that conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) on the preceding page are satisfied. 







M. = (a-c+kx-A)k . 
x 2b ' 
Substituting these into the conditions (I) and (iii) we get: 
ii). M'J..'J.. at (x*, A. *) is: 
_1 >0 
2h 
k 2 rk kl rk 
-+--- = 
4b 2 2b 4b2 2b 
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( c-a ~ at the steady state x* = -k- , l * = Or 
= rk > ° 
2b 
Therefore aU the sufficiency conditions are satisfied and the steady state: 
c-a 
x* = -- u* = 0 and l * = ° k' , 
is a locally optimal stationary state. Thus it is not optimal for the monopolist to 
completely exhaust the stock of coal. 
Examining the behaviour of x and u along the transition path to the optimal 
stationary state. 
From (2): 
l = a - 2bu - c + kx 
Differentiating with respect to time gives: 
l = -2bu-ku 
Equating equations (3) and (5) gives: 
-2bu-ku = rA- ku 
Substituting (4) into the above gives: 
- 2bu - ku = r[ a - c - 2bu + kx] - ku 
Cancelling out and simplifYing gives: 






Therefore we need to solve the system: 
The particular solution is (x*, u*) = (c~a ,0) 
Solving for the eigenvalues of the system: 
The characteristic equation is: 
rk (r -z)(-z) --= 0 
2b 
Therefore the eigenvalues are: 
Letting: 
Q= ~r2 + 2~k 
The eigenvalues may be written: 
r+Q r-Q 




The general solution then is: 
(Q±r)t (Q=r)t ( ) x{t) = Ae 2 +Be- 2 + c-a 
k (7) 
where A and B are arbitrary constants. 
Differentiating x(t) with respect to time gives: 
Substituting this into (I) to derive the time path of the control variable we get: 
Using the boundary conditions: 
x(O)=xo and lim e -rt A,(t)x{t) = 0 
t~oo 
we can solve for A and B (see appendix A): 
A = 0 and B = kxo + a - c 
k 
Differentiating u{t) with respect to time we get: 
(8) 
A = 0 and B >0 therefore Ii < o. This implies that the change in the extraction 
rate is always negative, and that the extraction rate u(t) is monotonically 
decreasing over time. 
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Looking at the price equation: 
p{/) = a - hU{/) a, h, > 0 
It is clear that as u{/) is decreasing, the price of coal will be increasing over time. 
Therefore a profit maximising monopolist will adopt a policy of increasing price 
and decreasing production over time and will not completely exhaust the resource. 
SECTION II 
The model· the finite time horizon case 
In this section the same optimal control problem will be solved but in this case 
there is only a limited period in which the monopolist can extract the coal. This is 
because a developer will only be granted a limited period of time to mine the area 
- planning permission will be limited to a finite time period. The monopolist's 
objective then is to maximise his discounted profits over a finite time horizon 
subject to the same constraints as in the previous section. Thus the problem he 
faces is to choose an optimal extraction plan that maximises: 
max f:[ au-hu2 - (c- kx)uJe-rt .dt 
subject to: 
x=-u (1) 
With the initial condition: 
x(O) =Xo> 0 
The current valued Hamiltonian is: 
H = {{a-c)u-hu2 +kuX-AU} 
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Assuming an interior solution the necessary conditions for a maximum are: 
iJH 
- = 0 => a - c - 2bu + lex - ). = 0 
iU 
l=r).-ku 
The transversality condition is now: 
).(1) = 0 
From (2): 
). = a - c - 2bu + lex 
Differentiating with respect to time gives: 
~ = -2bit-ku 
Equating equations (3) and (5) gives: 
-2bit - ku = r). - ku 
Substituting (4) into the above gives: 
-2bit - ku = r[ a - c - 2bu + lex] - ku 
Simplifying gives: 
and 
it = r[c+2bu-lex-a] 
2b 
*=-u 














, 2 2 
where: 
Q=Jr2 + 2~k 
The general solution is: 
X(/) = AJ O;r} + Be -( °ir )t +...,;..( c_-_a~) 
, k (7) 
where A and B are arbitrary constants (See Appendix B). 
Differentiating X(/) with respect to time gives: 
Substituting this into (I) we get: 
(8) 
Using the boundary conditions: 
x(O) = Xo and 2(1) = 0 
we can solve for A and B: 
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A _ [kxo +a-c][b(Q-r)-k] 
- k[eQT[b(Q +r) + k] +[b(Q-r) - k]] 
B_~[~kx~o_+_a_-~~~b~(Q~+~r~)_+_k~e_QT~ 
- k[eQT[b(Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-k] 
Substituting A and B into u(t) and x(t), equations (7) and (8) respectively, gives 
expressions for the time path of x and u: 
[kxo +a-c!b(Q-r)-k] (~)t 
x(t) = e + 
k[eQT[b(Q +r) + k] + [b{Q -r) - k]] 
u(t) = (Q +r)[kxo +a - c][b(Q - r) - k] /Q;r)/ 
2k[eQT [b(Q +r) + k] + [b(Q -r) - k]] 
(Q-r)[kxo +a-cJ[b(Q+r)+k]eQT J~/ 
+ e 2 
2k[eQT [b(Q +r) + k] + [b(Q - r) - k]] 
Substituting A and B into u(1) and x(1) gives expressions for the extraction rate 
and the level of resource left in the ground at the end of the time period: 
x -e 2 + (Q+r)T[ [kxo +a-c b(Q-r)-k J 
(1) - k eQT[b(Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-k] 
e 2 + 
_(Q-r)T[ [kxo +a-c] b(Q+r)+k eQT ] c-a 
k eQT[b{Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-k] k 
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u(1)=- -- e + ( Q+r) (Q;rJT[ [kxo +a-c] b(Q-r)-k ] 2 k eQT[b(Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-k] 
( Q-r) _(Q;rJT[ [kxo +a-c b(Q+r)+k e
QT ] 
-2- e k eQT[b(Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-k] 
It is important to look at the level of extraction at the end of the time period. We 
need to establish that the rate of extraction at time T is non-negative and also that 
this holds at any point in time, i.e. u(t) ~ O. The rate of extraction can never be 
negative as this would imply putting the resource back in the ground - this would 
not make economic sense. Firstly we will look at the rate of extraction at time T. 
Multiply out: 
(lli:!:)r 
, (Q+r) [kxo +a-cIb(Q-r)-k]e 2 
u(1)=- -2- k[eQT[b(Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-kJ] + 
(Q±!:) 
(Q-r) [kxo +a-c][b(Q+r)+k]e 2 
-2- k[eQT[b(Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-k]] 
Multiply the numerator and the denominator by e-QT and rearranging gives: 
~1)= 
-(~)r 
= [ho + a - c]e {2kbQ} > 0 
2k[[b(Q+ r) + k] + e-aT[b(Q-r) - k]] 
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Therefore u(1) is positive - the rate of extraction at time T is positive. 
We then will look at the rate of extraction at time t = 0: 
Therefore the rate of extraction at time t = 0 is positive. 
We need to check that u(t) ~ 0: 
Looking back at A and B: 
A _ [ho +a-c][b(Q-r)-k] 
- k[eQT[b(Q+ r) + k] +[h(Q-r) - k]] 
B- [ho +a-c][h{Q+r)+k]eQT 
- k[eQT[h(Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-kJ] 
The denominator of A and B is: 
Rewriting this equation gives: 
hQ(eQT + 1) + (hr + k)(eQT -1) 
~ Q = VCr +T > 0, and (eQT -1) > 0, therefore: 
hQ(eQT + I) + (hr + k)(eQT -1) > 0 
Thus A and B have positive denominators. It is easy to see that the numerator of B 
is positive, A is not so clear. The numerator of A is: 
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[ho +a-c][b(Q-r)-k] 
The first bracket is positive. Expanding the second gives: 
bQ-br-k 
We will use a proofby contradiction to show that this is negative. 
Let us assume that it is non-negative: 
bQ-br-k ~ 0 
It follows that: 
bQ? br +k 
Squaring both sides gives: 
Multiplying out gives: 
This is obviously false, and it follows that A is negative. 
The extraction rate at time tis: 
Therefore, as A is negative and B is positive, u(t) is positive. Thus the extraction 
rate at any point in time in the finite horizon case is positive. If A and B were 
both positive then it is clear that the extraction rate would be decreasing over 
time. i.e. Ii < o. 
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2 (Q±!)t ( 2 -(Q::l:)t 
ti(t) = -( Q;r) Ae 2 _ Q;r) Be 2 
However as A is negative then it is unclear whether u(t) is increasing or decreasing 
over the whole of the planning period. 
We can now establish whether or not it is optimal for the monopolist to 
completely exhaust the resource, or whether it is optimal for him to leave some in 
the ground, i.e. is x(D ~ 0; 
e 2 +---
_(Q_r)T[ [ho +a-c] b(Q+r)+k eQT J c-a 
k eQT[b(Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-k] k 
Simplifying and rearranging gives: 
= e (lao +a-c] {bQ-br-k+bQ+br+k}+ (c-a) 
[ 
(!f)T ] 
k[[b(Q+r) +k] +e-QT[b(Q-r) - kJ] k 
Therefore x(D is positive and as one would expect, (since in the infinite horizon 
case x* > 0), it is not optimal for the monopolist to exhaust the resource totally in 
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the finite time horizon. As one would expect, the stock of coal left in the ground 
at the time T is greater than in the infinite case when the monopolist is not 
restricted to a mining the area for a certain length of time. 




lim x(T) = -- > 0 
T-+oo k 
lim u(T) = 0 
T-+oo 




In this section, the previous model will be extended to take account of the 
regulations imposed on the monopolist to restore the environment. An open-cast 
coal developer will only be granted a limited time period for mining and he will 
always be obliged to restore the land after he has mined the area. In this model 
the area is to be used for development purposes, possibly housing, after the area 
has been mined. The planning permission granted by the local Mineral Planning 
Authority will depend on the proposal. If there were great economic benefits to 
the local area then planning permission might be granted for a longer period. If 
there were sufficiently large environmental effects then the time period may be 
less. Indeed in this case, where the monopolist has to restore the land to its 
original condition after mining has finished, it would be unrealistic to have an 
infinite horizon time period. This is because no permission would be granted for 
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a longer period. If there were sufficiently large environmental effects then the 
time period may be less. Indeed in this case, where the monopolist has to restore 
the land to its original condition after mining has finished, it would be unrealistic 
to have an infinite horizon time period. This is because no permission would be 
granted for mining if the area was to be excavated for very long periods. 
Therefore it is legitimate to examine the finite time horizon case. The monopolist 
will now face a different problem. The regulations will affect the extraction plan 
as additional costs will be imposed on him. The problem then for the monopolist 
is to maximise his discounted profits subject to the constraints on the resource 
stock and the regulatory constraints imposed upon him. Formally, the problem is 
to: 
max J;[au -bu2 - (c- kx)uJe-rt .dt - re-rT S; u(t).dt 
subject to: 
x=-u (1) 
With the initial condition: 
x(O) =xo> 0 
where x(t) denotes the remaining reserves of coal at time t. The rate of extraction 
at time t is denoted by u(t), r> 0 is a constant of proportionality. For each unit 
extracted, the monopolist faces restoration costs of yu. The first part of the 
objective functional shows that total profits are maximised over the entire time 
horizon and so are discounted at each point in time, t. The second part shows 
that the costs of infilling occur at the end of the mining period and so they are 
discounted to give the current value, (i.e. at t = 0). The total revenue and 
marginal cost functions are as in Section I. 
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It is assumed that 05 c - a + r <kx(J. If a - (c-kxoJ - r ~ 0, then the monopolist 
would not extract any coal. This is because if at time t = 0, the marginal price of 
coal, a, was less than the marginal cost of extraction, (c + kxo), plus the marginal 
cost of infilling, y, then none would be extracted. This condition is assumed to 
hold throughout the subsequent analysis. 
The Hamiltonian is: 
H = e-rt {(a -c)u-bu2 + kux- rue-r(T-t) - Au} 
The current value Hamiltonian is therefore: 
He rt = H = {(a -c)u -bu2 + kux- rue-r(T-t) - AU} 
Assuming an interior solution, the necessary conditions are: 
CR = 0 :::) a _ c _ 2bu + kx - ye -r(T -I) - A = 0 
dI 
A=rA-ku 
with the transversality condition: 
A(1) = 0 
From (2): 
A = a- c- 2bu+ kx- ye-r(T-t) 
Differentiating with respect to time gives: 
A = _2bu_ku_rye-r(T-t) 






-2bti - ku - r'jf!-r(T-t) = r2 - ku 
Substituting (4) into the above equation gives: 
-2b'li -ku _r'jf!-r(T-t) = r[a-c-2bu +kx - ye-r(T-t)] - ku 
Simplifying gives: 
and 
'Ii = r[ c + 2bu - kx - a] 
2b 
x=-u 
Therefore we need to solve the system: 
The particular solution of is : 
Solving for the eigenvalues of the system: 






and the eigenvalues are: 
Letting: 
Q= ,jr2 + 2~k 







The general solution is: 
(Q±r)t -(Q::r)t (c-a) 
x(t) = Ae 2 +Be 2 +...:...-~ 
k 
(7) 
where A and B are arbitrary constants. 
Differentiating x(t) with respect to time gives: 
Therefore substituting this into (1): 
(8) 
Using the boundary conditions: 
x(O)=xo and A(1) = 0 
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we can solve for A and B. (see Appendix C): 
(Q::r)T 
A=[kxo +a-c][b(Q-r)-k]+rke 2 
k[eQT[b(Q + r) + k] + [b(Q - r) - k]] 
Substituting A and B into u(t) and x(t) gives expressions for the time path of the 
rate of extraction and the stock of resource in the ground at time t. 
( Q-r) 
- T Q+r 
u(t)=- (Q+r)[kxo +a-clb(Q-r)-k1+/'ke 2 e(T)t + 
2k[eQT[b(Q +r) + k] + [b(Q -r) - k 11 
Substituting A and B into u(1) and x(1) gives expressions for the resource stock 
and rate of extraction at the end of the time period. It is important to establish 
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whether it is optimal for the monopolist to completely exhaust the resource and 
also to check that the rate of extraction is always non-negative. 
The level of resource at time Tis: 
(Q;r)T [ho +a-c][b(Q-r)-k]+rke 2 + 
x(n = e -[ 
(Q::r)r 
k[eQT[b(Q +r) + k] + [b(Q -r) - k]] 
And the level of extraction at time Tis:: 





_ (Q+r) [kxo +a-c][b(Q-r)-k]e- 2 T +yk 
u(l)-- - - - + 
2k [[b(Q +r) + k] +e-QT[b(Q-r) - k]] 
Then as T -+ 00 : 
lim u(l) = -r(Q + r) < 0 
T-+oo 2[b(Q+r) +0] 
This would imply that if the time horizon were very long the monopolist would be 
putting coal bac~ into the ground. This does not make sense and it was argued at 
the beginning that in this situation only the finite case is realistic. However it is 
interesting to see the result if we do let T -+ (x). This agrees with Kemp and Long 
(1980) who state that it is optimal for the mine to be closed down after a finite 
working life. They do not give a full solution to the problem and this result above 
shows why it is optimal to shut down the mine - after a finite amount of time the 
rate of extraction becomes negative, Kemp and Long do not explicitly point this 
out. 
If T = 0 we find that: 
[kxo +a - c] -(Q+r)[b(Q-r) - k] + (Q-r)[b(Q+r)+ k]} -(Q+r)yk - (Q-r)yk 
u(O) = ~--.:..l.....---=-:r;::-;-:---:---:-;-r:-;-::-~--:;jf'--------":~ 
= [kxo + a - c - r] 
2b 
2k [b(Q +r) + k] + [b(Q- r) - k]] 
Therefore for u(O) > 0, the following condition must hold: 
317 
kxo+a-c-y>O 
But this condition must hold because if the expression was negative none of the 
resource would ever be extracted. At time t = 0, if the marginal price of coal, a, 
was Jess than the marginal cost of extraction, (c + kxo), plus the marginal cost of 
infilling, y, then none would be extracted. This condition is assumed to hold 
throughout the analysis and was stated at the beginning. 
It follows that there are some finite time T where u(1) is non-negative. It implies 
that for each unit extracted from the ground, the cost of infilling is yu where y is a 
constant fraction. 
Looking at the extraction rate at time T and letting: 
~ = k[[ b(Q + r) + k] + e -QT [b(Q - r) - k 11 
1 - - T 
[ 
(Q-r) 
u(1)= 2~ [kxo+a-c]e 2 (-(Q+r)[b(Q-r)-k]+(Q-r)[b(Q+r)+k]) 
-(Q+ r)yk + (Q -r)yke-QT] 
The sign of this expression cannot be unambiguously determined. We need to 
look at the boundary condition which is defined as: 
2bu(1) - kx(1) = a-c-y 
Ifx(1) > 0 then u(1) > 0, since a - c - y> O. It is unclear, however, whether the 
extraction rate is decreasing or increasing over time. 
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Looking at the optimal amount of resource stock that is left in the ground after the 
site has been mined, i.e. x(1) is:. 
= [[kxO +a-c][h(Q-r)-k])~)T +rk]+ 









e 2 ]} {rk -;ke-QT} c-a x(I)= ~ {[kxo +a-c][b(Q-r)-k + b(Q +r) +k + ~ +k 
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x(1) > 0 as )'k - )'ke-QT > 0 since Q > 0, e > 0 and 1> e-QT . This means that 
u(1) is positive. As the extraction rate is positive at time t = 0 and at time t = T, 
it will be assumed here that the level of resource extraction is non-negative for t ~ 
T. 
Thus at time T, the level of coal left in the ground is positive, therefore it is not 
optimal for the monopolist to completely exhaust the resource. We can compare 
the level of resource stock at time T with x( 1) in the unregulated case in Section II 
In the unregulated case (Section!l), the level of resource stock at time Tis: 
x(]) = 
In this case, where the monopolist is obliged to restore the environment, the level 
of resource stock is: 
pc _ )'ke -QT 
There is an extra term in the regulated case, ~ > O. Therefore we can 
see that the level of coal left in the ground when there is a requirement to restore 
the environment after excavation, is greater than the level of resource stock when 
the monopolist is not faced with these extra costs. 
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Section III.ii 
After use· Agriculture 
In the previous model the land was to be used for development and so infilling is 
undertaken after the site has been mined. In this second model, the reclaimed 
land is to be used for agriculture or forestry. In this case the infilling is 
undertaken in phases during the excavation period to ensure that the subsoil and 
topsoil are replaced at the earliest opportunity to minimise deterioration of the 
biological value of the soil during storage. The model will be solved for a finite 
time horizon and then the steady states of the variables win be derived so that 
comparison can be made with the unregulated case where the monopolist has no 
restrictions on the excavation time and state of the land when mining has finished. 
This is a valid comparison in this case as it is possible that permission would be 
granted for excavating the site for long periods if the site was to be restored while 
, 
the mining was actually taking place. 
It is assumed that a profit maximising monopolist wishes to maximise his 
discounted profits over a finite time horizon. Thus the problem he faces is to 
choose an optimal extraction plan so as to maximise those profits. However the 
monopolist faces the new constraint that is he is obliged to fill the site and restore 
the land in phases while the excavations are taking place. Again this wiU impose 
additional costs on the monopolist. The problem then is to: 
max S:[ au - bu2 - (c - kx)u - yu} -rt .dt 
subject to: 
i=-u (1) 
With initial condition: 
x(O) = XI) > 0 
321 
where X(/) denotes the remaining reserves of coal at time t. The rate of extraction 
at time t is denoted by u(t), r> 0 is a constant of proportionality. For each unit 
extracted, the monopolist faces infilling costs of yu. The objective function shows 
that the costs of infilling are incurred during the extraction plan rather than at the 
end of the mining period. The total revenue and marginal cost functions are as in 
Section I. 
It is assumed that 0 $ c - a + r <kx(). If a - (c-kxaJ - r ~ 0, then the monopolist 
would not extract any coal. At time I = 0, if the marginal price of coal, a, was 
less than the marginal cost of extraction, (c + kxo), plus the marginal cost of 
infilling, y, then none would be extracted. Therefore this condition is assumed to 
hold throughout the subsequent analysis. 
The Hamiltonian is: 
Ii = e-rt {(a-C)U-hu 2 +kux- r"- Au} 
where Ae-rt is the costate variable. 
The current value Hamiltonian is, therefore: 
Assuming an interior solution the necessary conditions are: 
8H 




with the transversality condition: 
A(T) = 0 
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From (2): 
A = a - c - 2bu + kx - r 
Differentiating with respect to time gives: 
l = -2bu-1m 
Equating equations (3) and (5) gives: 
-2bu - 1m = r)., - 1m 
Substituting (4) into the above gives: 
-2bu - 1m = r[ a - c - 2bu + lex - r] - 1m 
and it follows that: 
iI = r[ c + 2bu - kx - a + r] 
2b 
x=-u 
Solving the system: 
.=r 2b + 2b [u] [ - rkJuJ [_ rea -c + r)] x -lOx 0 
The particular solution is: 
Solving for the eigenvalues of the system, the characteristic equation is: 





Therefore the eigenvalues are: 
Let 
Q = ,Jr2 + 2~k 
and the eigenvalues may be written: 
r+Q r-Q 
z\ =-- , Zz =-
2 2 
(Note that these are the same as in the previous model). 
The general sol~tion is: 
(~)t -(~)t (c-a+r) 
x(t) = Ae + Be + k (7) 
where A and B are arbitrary constants. 
Differentiating x(t) with respect to time gives: 
Therefore substituting this into (1) gives: 
(8) 
Using the boundary conditions: 
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x(O)=Xo and.1(1) = 0 
we can solve for A and B, (see Appendix D): 
A _ rho +a-c-r][b(Q-r)-k] 
- k[eQT[b(Q +r) +k] + [b(Q -r) - k]] 
B _ [ho +a-c-r ][b(Q+r)+k]eQT 
- k[eQT[b(Q+r)+k]+[b(Q-r)-kl] 
where B is positive and A is negative since (see previous model): 
[b(Q-r)-k]<O 
Substituting A and B into u(1) and x(1) gives: 
x 1)=e + ( (Q;r)T[ [ho +a-c-r][b(Q-r)-k] ] 
k[eQT[b(Q+ r) + k]+[b(Q -r) - k]] 
And: 
u(1)-- -- e + - (Q+r) (Q;')T[ [kxo +a-c-rKb(Q-r)-k] J 
2 k[eQT[b(Q+r) + k] + [b(Q- r)- kl] 
Rearranging and simplifYing, it follows that: 
325 
Suppose T = 0, then: 
u(O) = .=...,[ kx_o_+_a _-c_-_Y.::.a...X -::-(Q_+_r-!:.)[ h.-.:.(Q_-~r-::-) -_k-=-] +_(_Q_--::.-r )[=--h(_Q_+_r )_+~k]] 
2k[[h(Q +r) + k] + [h(Q- r) - k]] 
= [kxo +a -c-yI-bQ2 -rbQ+rbQ+r 2b +kQ+rk +bQ2 -rbQ+rbQ-r2b +kQ-rk] 
4bkQ 
= rkxo + a - c - Y][2kQ] = rkxo + a - c - y] 
4hkQ 2h 
Therefore for u(O) > 0, the following condition must hold: 
kxo+a>c+y 
Or: 
O<y <kxo +a-c 
This is the assumption stated at the beginning of the section and is assumed to 
hold throughout the analysis. If this was not the case then none of the resource 
would ever be extracted. 
Looking at u(t): 
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Since A is negative and B is positive, then u(t) is positive for all t. It is unclear, 
however, whether u(t) is increasing or decreasing over the finite time period. 
Looking at the optimal amount of resource stock that is left in the ground after 
the site has been mined. 
x(T) =e 2 + (Q+r)T[ [ho +a-c-r][h(Q-r)-k] ] 
k[eQT[h(Q +r) + k] + [h(Q -r) - k]J 
Rearranging and simplifying, we may write: 
X(/) = 
(!:Q)r [ho +a-c-rIh(Q+r)+k1e 2 







x(1)= e ~ [[.lxo +a-c-rIh(Q-r)-k+b(Q+r)+kll+ c-~+r 
(!::Q)r 
e 2 c-a+r 
= ~ [rho +a-c-r][2bQ]]+ k 
If the monopolist was not operating under any constraints concerning the length of 
time, and he could mine for as long as he wanted, we can compare this case with 
the infinite horizon problem in Section 1. This is a valid assumption to make as it 
is feasible that permission may be granted to a monopolist to extract coal over 
very long periods if he was obliged to restore the land as he went along. It is 
straight forward to show that: 
lim u(T) = 0 
T~oo 
Therefore U(/) tends to zero just as in the infinite horizon case when there are no 
regulations on the extracting monopolist. 
I, (1) c-a+r 0 1m x = > T~oo k 
The optimal level of resource stock left in the ground by the monopolist when no 









Again, it will not be optimal for the monopolist to completely exhaust the resource 
in the infinite horizon case and in fact there will be more left in the ground than 
when no restoration constraints are imposed on the monopolist. 
Next we will compare the resource stock at finite time Tin this section, i.e. when 
the monopolist is obliged to infill the site as he goes along, with the resource stock 
when there are no constraints imposed on the monopolist (Section II), and when 
the monopolist is required to infill at the end of the mining period (Section llI.i). 
In Section II, the unregulated case, x(1) is: 
x(I) = 
(r;Q)r 
e [kxo+a-c] {2hQ} + (c-a) 
q k 
We will use a proof by contradiction to show that x(1) in this section i.e. x(1) 
when there are constraints, is greater than in the unregulated case in Section II : 
Suppose that x(1) in the unregulated case is greater than in the case where there 
are constraints imposed on the monopolist: 
( !::Q)r 
e 2 [kxo +a-c] { } (c-a) > q 2bQ + k 
(!::Q) 
2 r ] c-a+r 
e q [[kxo +a-c-r][2bQ] + k 
Simplitying gives: 
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(r-Q) 2brQe T T r 
0>- +-q k 
Substituting for ~ and simplifYing we get: 
(r-Q) 
0>-2bQe T T +[b(Q+r)+k]+e-QT[b(Q-r)-k] 
or: 
(r-Q) 
2bQe -2 T > [b(Q+r)+k]+e-QT[b(Q-r)-k] 
If T is large enough the left hand side of the inequality and the second term on the 
right hand side will be very small. It follows that it is likely that the inequality will 
not hold; therefore if T is large enough, the resource stock in the unregulated case 
, 
will be less than in the regulated case. 
In Section IIli, the case where infilling is required at the end of the mining period, 
x(1) is: 




e T T {rk yke-QT } (c a) 4 {[kxo +a-c][2hQ]} + - 4 + ~ > 
(!::il) 
e 2 T c-a+r 4 [[kxo +a-c-r][2hQ]]+ k 
Simplifying gives: 
Cancelling and rearranging gives: 
When T = 0 then the left hand side of the inequaUty is zero, implying that at the 
beginning of the plan the level of resource in the ground is the same in each case. 
This doesn't teU us whether one is bigger than the other at time T, i.e. if one leaves 
more in the ground than the other. Next we differentiate the left hand side of the 
inequality and if the derivative is positive. which would imply that as time 
increases the left hand side would become positive. then we can say the inequality 
holds. 
Let: 
Differentiating ¢ with respect T gives: 
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(Q-r) iJ¢ = -(Q-r)Qe - 2" T + Qe-QT (Q-r) 
or 
eQT Multiplying by QT: 
e 
_e _ iJ¢ = -(Q-r)Qe 2" +Q(Q-r) [ 
QT] (Q+r)r 
eQT iJT 
Therefore an increase in T results in a fall in ¢. Thus the inequality does not hold 
and the level of resource stock at time T is greater in the case when the 
monopolist has to infill the site as he goes along. This would make sense because 
the present value of the costs of infilling would be greater in this case as they are 
discounted along the time period and not right at the end. Therefore the level of 
extraction when the monopolist infills as he goes along would be less resulting in a 
greater level of x at time T. 
SECTION IV 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, two models have been formulated to consider the optimal 
depletion of a non-renewable resource - open-cast coal, under conditions of 
increasing marginal costs of extraction. In much of the past literature the cost of 
extraction come to an end when the site has been mined. It has been discussed 
earlier that this assumption is unrealistic in the case of open-cast coal mining. 
The monopolist who is excavating the site wants to maximise his profits but he is 
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required to restore the site. The timing of the restoration is dependent on 
whether the site is to be used for development or agricultural land. If the site is 
to be developed then the restoration of the area can be undertaken after mining 
has finished. However, if the land is to be used for agriculture or forestry, then 
the infilling must be undertaken continually during the excavation period so as to 
minimise the deterioration of the soil quality. The post extraction costs that the 
monopolist will incur are therefore either a lump sum payment at the end of the 
period or they are a flow during excavation. 
This is an extension to an earlier paper by Chappell and Dury (1994), where the 
problem was to determine the optimal depletion of a non-renewable resource 
under the ownership of a monopolist who faces increasing marginal costs of 
extraction, but where the monopolist is not obliged to incur costs of restoring the 
area once it has been mined. This paper is presented in Section I and it is shown 
that for the infinite time horizon case, the profit maximising monopolist will adopt 
a policy of increasing price and decreasing production over time. It is also 
shown that it is not optimal for the monopolist to completely exhaust the resource 
in either the infinite time horizon of finite time horizon. In the finite time horizon 
case, Section II, the monopolist will not extract all the resource, but it is 
indeterminate whether the extraction rate is decreasing or increasing over time. 
In Section IIli the monopolist is obliged to restore the land at the end of the 
mining period. The monopolist is now faced with a new regulatory constraint 
which changes the extraction plan and it becomes optimal for the firm to leave 
more of the resource stock in the ground at time T than in the unregulated case 
where there are no constraints imposed on the monopolist. It is also unclear 
whether production is increasing or decreasing over the transition path. In 
Section IIlii the monopolist faces restoration payments during the mining period 
and the result is that with an infinite time horizon the steady state resource stock is 
greater than the unregulated situation. The level of resource stock at the end of 
the finite time horizon is also greater in the regulated than the unregulated case. 
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However, it is unclear whether production increases or decreases along the 
transition path. Nevertheless, it is shown that when the post extraction payments 
are a flow during the mining by the firm, it is not optimal for the firm to shut down 
temporarily, therefore production is not zero at any point during the mining 
period, the extraction rate, u(t), is always positive. 
It has also been shown that the level of resource stock when the monopolist is 
faced with continuous payments to restore the land, is greater than when he has to 
pay a lump sum at the end of the finite time period. This is as would be expected. 
The present value of the restoration payments would yield a greater value if they 
were discounted during the time period rather than if they were discounted at the 
end of the time period. This is assuming that the infilling costs are the same for 
both options which is a fair assumption to make. This would make it more 
expensive to extract the resource and so he would leave more in the ground jf he 
was obliged to j~fill the land continuously along the time span of the project. 
This analysis extends that of Kemp and Long (I 980), who formulated a model 
where the mining firm incurs post extraction payments. However, they do not 
fully characterise their model and assume that the mine closes down temporarily or 
that it shuts down permanently, for restoration purposes. Therefore the two 
possible situations, in their optimal control problem, collapses to just one where 
the mine is shut down. They do not distinguish fully between the two situations. 
In this chapter a more realistic analysis is presented and the two different scenarios 




First using x(O) = Xo (7) becomes: 
From (2): 
Therefore: 
A +B = lao +a-c 
k 
A = a - c - 2bu + kx 
Ax = (a-c)x-2bux+kx2 
Substituting in u(/) and X(/) gives: 
(9) 
Ae 2 + Be 2 + ke -rt Ae 2 + Be 2 Ae 2 + Be 2 r [ (Q±r)t -(Q::r)t] [(!2±r)t -(Q::;r)t I (Q±r)t _(!2::l: \.] 
which simplifies to: 
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2h(Q;r)AB+2h(Q;r)B2e-Qt +kA2eQt +kAB+kAB+B2e-Qt 
For the boundary condition to hold, i.e.: 
lim l(t)x(t) = 0 
t~OCJ 
A must be equal to zero, A = O. To find B, substitute A = 0 into equation (9) 
and: 
APPENDIX B 
First using x(O) = Xo (7) becomes: 
A +B == kxo +a-c 
k 
At time T, u(1) and x(1) are: 
(9) 
x(J) = Ae(Q;r)r + Be-(Qir)r + (c-a) (10) 
k 
Substituting A.(1) = 0 into (2) gives: 
2hu(J) - kx(J) = a - c 
Substituting (10) and (11) into the above condition and simplifYing gives: 
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A)~)r[b(Q +r)+k] - Be -(~)r[b(Q_r) -kJ (12) 
Expressing (9) and (12) in matrix form: 
[ 
(!2±!:)r (!2=!)r rAJ [ 0 ] e 2 [b~Q+r)+kl -e - 2 [~Q-r)-k] B = kxo :a-c 
Using Cramer's Rule and simplifYing the resultant expressions gives: 
A _ [kxo +a-cIb(Q-r)-k] 
- k[eQT[b(Q+r) + k] +[h(Q- r)- k]] 
B- rkxo +a-cKh(Q+r)+k]eQT 
, - k[eQT[h(Q+r)+k]+[h(Q-r)-k]] 
APPENDIX C 
First using x(O) = Xo (7) becomes: 
A + B = kxo + a - c 
k 
At time T u(1) and x(1) are: 
Substituting A.(1) = 0 into (2) gives: 
2hu( 1) - kx( 1) = a - c - r 
(9) 
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Substituting (IO) and (11) into the above condition and simplifYing we get: 
Expressing (9) and (12) in matrix form gives: 
[ 
(ilir)T (Q::!:)T I A] [ Y ] e 2 [b~Q+r)+kl -e - 2 [:(Q-r)-k) B = lex, :a-c 
Using Cramer's Rule and simplifying the resultant expressions gives: 
APPENDIX D 
First using x(O) = Xo (7) becomes: 
A + B = _kx...;::.,o_+_a_-_c_-,--Y 
k 
At time T, u(1) and x(1) are: 
(9) 
(Q.±r)r -( Q::!:)r (c - a + y) (10) 
x(T) = Ae 2 + Be 2 + k 
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Substituting A.(1) = 0 into (2) gives: 
2bu(1) - kx(1) = a - c - r 
Substituting (10) and (11) into the above condition and simplitying we get: 
Ae(~)T [b(Q+ r) + k]- Be -(~)T [b(Q -r) -k]= 0 (12) 
Expressing (9) and (12) in matrix form gives: 
Using Cramer's Rule and simplitying the resultant expressions gives: 
A _ [kxo +a-c-r][b(Q-r)-k] . 
- k[eQT[b(Q+r)+k]+[h(Q-r)-k]] 
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